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Contingency Fee Agreements (CFAs) are now a fixed feature of the Ontario litigation landscape.  
However, little research or study has been done on exactly how they operate in practice, whether they 
advance the objectives that they were intended to achieve, and whether litigants are best served by the 
current arrangements.  In this study, I intend to make a preliminary start to that research, set out some 
tentative criticisms of the CFA system as it currently operates, and, where appropriate, suggest 
preliminary proposals for change.   
It should be said at the outset that my efforts to obtain real and serious data and information about the 
reliance on and kind of CFAs utilized by Ontario lawyers have been frustrated at every turn.  Although 
often divided and divisive in interests, the Plaintiffs’ Bar seems to be almost uniquely united in striving to 
resist any efforts to render the fee-charging process more transparent and knowable.  Accordingly, this 
Report has been written not only without any assistance from the Plaintiffs’ Bar, but with its concerted 
opposition.  While there is an understandable concern among the Plaintiffs’ Bar about any inquiry that is 
driven and funded by the Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC), the extent of the concern has reached almost 
paranoid proportions in attitude and response.  However, I have tried to ensure that this fact has not 
influenced my analysis and recommendations. 
In what follows, I will first outline the formal regime within which contingency fees are allowed and 
regulated in Ontario.  The focus of this Part is to get a general and comparative sense of the legal and 
policy framework for CFAs.  The core of the Report attempts to go behind the received picture of CFAs 
and get to a more realistic sense of how they actually work in practice.  Next, I draw some tentative 
conclusions and critical observations from the available data and information.  Finally, I will put forward 
some proposals to address the more apparent failings of the present system in order to enhance its 
efficiency, fairness, and transparency.   
Throughout the Report, the emphasis will be on understanding and improving the existing system from 
the point of view of the litigant-as-consumer.  The challenge is to make justice more available, but at a 
reasonable cost so that the interests of both litigants and lawyers are fairly represented, balanced and 
advanced. 
PART A -- THE REGIME OF CFAs 
1. The Costs of Litigation 
The expense incurred in staffing and maintaining the courts is met largely by the state, with the litigant 
paying only a minimal sum to utilize these facilities. The major financial burden incurred by the parties is 
the cost of legal representation. A lesser expense is the payment of incidental expenses, so-called 
disbursements, that are incurred throughout the litigation. In allocating this burden, the legal system has 
two alternative solutions.  It can permit costs to lie where they fall and leave litigants to pay their own 
costs, regardless of the outcome of the litigation, or it can order that costs should follow the event and 
require the unsuccessful litigant to pay the costs of the successful litigant.  
Whereas the Americans have adopted the former as a general rule, the Anglo-Canadian system has opted 
for a general rule of indemnity.  This means that successful litigants may recover any costs that have been 
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reasonably incurred in litigating the dispute, provided that their conduct is not of a kind that should result 
in no entitlement.    It is generally acknowledged that a successful party will receive about 50-60% of the 
actual costs incurred.   
Although contingency fee arrangements are a long-standing feature of the American litigation system, 
they have only been allowed in Canada in more recent decades. This reflects an historical antipathy in the 
Anglo-Canadian system to allowing CFAs because they are generally thought to encourage lawsuits.  The 
basic hostility to contingency fees as a form of champertous1 agreement is captured by Spiegel J.’s 
statements in Bergel & Edson v. Wolf: 
Rules against maintenance and champerty were introduced over 700 years ago in 
response to abusive interference in the legal system by powerful royal officials and 
nobles.  Although the particular abuses against which the prohibitions were directed had 
been cured by the time of the Tudors, the rules continued to survive.  In modern decisions 
concerning maintenance, courts do not refer to the mediaeval origins of the doctrine, but 
justify its continued existence on the basis of public policy considerations.  The antipathy 
of the courts to champertous agreements similarly is supported by policy concerns.  In 
these expressions of policy are the roots of the arguments justifying the present ban on 
contingent fees.2 
Nevertheless, a proportionate relation between fees and the amount of damages awarded has always 
played a role in fee arrangements, even if a limited and understated one.  For instance, in Cohen v. Kealey 
& Blaney in 2000, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed a list of considerations to be taken into account 
by an assessment officer when conducting a fee assessment:3 
the time expended by the solicitor; 
the legal complexity of the matters to be dealt with; 
the degree of responsibility assumed by the solicitor; 
the monetary value of the matters in issue; 
the importance of the matter to the client; 
the degree of skill and competence demonstrated by the solicitor; 
the results achieved; 
the ability of the client to pay; and 
the client’s expectation as to the amount of the fee. 
2. Rationale for Contingency Fee Agreements 
The basic rationale for allowing any kind of CFA is that it allows people who cannot afford legal services 
to bring claims that they would otherwise have to abandon.  This general policy objective seems 
unimpeachable in its logic and effect.  The litigant will be able to proceed in the confidence that they will 
not be left with an enormous economic burden if their claim fails.  Of course, this state of affairs is 
                                                     
1 Definition: referring to sharing in the proceeds of a lawsuit by an outside party who has funded or assisted in 
funding the litigation.  
2 Bergel & Edson v. Wolf (2000), 50 O.R. 3rd 777 at para. 22.  For a general history from an Ontario standpoint, 
see Andrew Murray, Contingency Fees What Is Old Is New Again (March 4, 2005). 
3 Cohen v. Kealey & Blaney (1985), 26 C.P.C. (2d) 211 at 215. 
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premised on the high cost of legal services – lawyers’ fees are often perceived to be prohibitive by many 
potential litigants, especially where they are already injured or indebted.  That said, it also must be 
recognized that lawyers should be entitled to a reasonable rate of compensation for services rendered.  
Consequently, the challenge is to ensure that the benefits of CFAs to litigants are not obtained at an 
exorbitant cost and that a balance is struck and maintained between the advantages of more claims being 
litigated and the costs of doing so.  In other words, any legitimate regime of CFAs must work to ensure 
that both sides of the equation, litigants and lawyers, are balanced.  Access to justice should be obtainable 
at a reasonable cost and lawyers should be entitled to fair compensation for their services, but they should 
not be allowed to obtain undue financial benefit from the plight of impecunious or vulnerable litigants.  In 
short, although promoted as a device to benefit litigants, CFAs must not be permitted to operate to 
prioritize the financial interests of lawyers over litigants.   
When a lawyer is paid a percentage of the settlement amount (with the settlement amount often equaling 
the insurance limit), a lawyer’s financial incentives will vary considerably.  Under the traditional billing 
regime, a lawyer knows that he or she will be paid in accordance with the work that they have done.  
While this system presents some risk that the client will not pay, most lawyers finesse this possibility by 
requiring retainers up-front.  Indeed, under the traditional arrangements, there is a genuine concern that 
lawyers will have an incentive to do more work than a file may require. 
Under a CFA, a lawyer will face a very different set of incentives. This is because, irrespective of the 
amount of hours the contingency fee lawyer puts in, the lawyer will be paid a percentage of the settlement 
or judgment amount.  While this may incentivize them to ensure that their client wins a substantial 
amount, they will also be disincentivized from putting in “too much” time since their compensation 
remains fixed.  Indeed, their economically optimal approach is to ensure that their efforts will lead to an 
improved resolution of the case, but only up to a certain point.  In other words, rational lawyers under 
CFAs will strive to maximize their compensation by constantly assessing the cost-benefit of proceeding 
further in the case.  The cost can simply be seen as the amount of hours the lawyer puts into a case, while 
the benefit is their percentage of the total settlement amount.  A potential conflict of interest arises if the 
lawyer’s incremental financial benefit from proceeding further will cause the lawyer’s effective hourly 
rate or total compensation to fall.  
According to Richard Posner, the doyen of law-and-economics scholars, the lawyer is effectively a “co-
tenant of the property represented by the plaintiff’s claim” and therefore “may lack an adequate incentive 
to exploit the right (to litigate) because the value he creates will accrue in part to another person”.4  
Indeed, this may well incentivize lawyers to settle too early.  Again, Posner offers a good example of this: 
 “A problem with the contingent fee is that in any situation of joint ownership – and a 
contingent fee contract makes the lawyer in effect a co-tenant of the property represented 
by the plaintiff’s claim – each owner… may lack an adequate incentive to exploit the 
right because the value he creates will accrue in part to another person.  Suppose the 
plaintiff’s lawyer is offered a settlement of $100,000; if he goes to trial, there is a 90 
percent chance that the plaintiff will win $150,000 but it will cost the lawyer $25,000 
worth of his time to try the case; the parties are risk averse; and the contingent fee is 30 
percent.  If the plaintiff agrees to the settlement, he will net $70,000 and the lawyer 
                                                     
4 RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONMICS OF JUSTICE (*th ed. 19**). 
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$30,000.  If the case goes to trial, the net expected gain to the plaintiff rises to $94,500 (.9 
* ($150,000 - $45,000)) but the lawyer’s net expected gain falls to $15,500 ($45,000 * .9 
- $25,000).  So there is a conflict of interest between the parties that is due to the fact that 
the lawyer does not obtain the whole benefit of a trial (the expected net benefit of trial is 
($50,000 * .9) - $25,000, and is thus positive).”5 
In accordance with this perspective, it can be argued that lawyers should be entitled to receive a higher fee 
than might otherwise be the case since they are seeking to spread the risk across a range of cases that have 
no guarantee of success.  So, in assessing the fairness of any fee received by a lawyer under a CFA, it is 
important to acknowledge that, in some cases, a lawyer will invest considerable time and effort in a case 
that does not produce any, or sufficient, funds to cover the time expended by the lawyer.  However, as 
Posner puts it, this “risk is reduced because the lawyer specializing in contingent fee matters can pool many 
claims and thereby minimize the variance of the returns.”  Accordingly, in order to assess the overall fairness 
of lawyers’ compensation from CFAs, it would be necessary to obtain data on all files covered by CFAs to 
ascertain the relative number of ‘losing’ cases (i.e., the lawyer receives no fees) that are undertaken by 
lawyers as well as the relative number of ‘winning cases’ that are undertaken. 
As regards the conflicting incentives for lawyers and clients under CFAs, the courts have acknowledged 
that the difference between settling and going to trial can have some perverse effects on the lawyer-client 
relationship.  For instance, in the leading case of  Hodge, it was estimated that, prior to trial, 
disbursements amounted to $65,177.52.  If the matter had proceeded through trial preparation or through 
trial, that figure would have been several times higher due to the cost of expert witnesses.  Moreover, the 
lawyer’s fees would have been many times higher if the matter had proceeded to trail.  But the cost to the 
lawyer might be so high as to place the lawyer’s firm in serious jeopardy.   
The challenge of mediating conflicting interests was well described by the court, especially when the 
problem of “double-dipping”6 was involved: 
“[W]hen cases settle prior to trial, such clauses will frequently put the solicitor in a direct 
conflict of interest with his own client.  It is the solicitor who negotiates the settlement.  
Defendants typically have no particular interest in how much of a settlement payment is 
allocated to damages and how much is allocated to costs.  What a defendant is interested 
in is the bottom line - how much in total the defendant is prepared to pay to settle the 
case.  Often, the settlement amount is an all-in figure.  If the plaintiff's lawyer is taking a 
flat percentage, there is no issue.  However, if the plaintiff's lawyer takes a percentage of 
the damages in addition to all of the costs, it is in the interests of the lawyer to maximize 
the amount allocated to costs and in the interests of the client to maximize the amount 
allocated to damages.  A simple example is illustrative.  Suppose there is a contingency 
agreement providing for a 20% fee to the lawyer and a settlement agreement is reached 
for $100,000, all-in.  The lawyer's fee would be $20,000.  On the other hand, if the 
lawyer's fee is 10% of the damages plus all of the costs, and the $100,000 settlement is 
allocated as $70,000 for damages and $30,000 for costs, then the lawyer's fee is $37,000.  
Since it is often the plaintiff's lawyer who negotiates the allocation of costs, or, even 
                                                     
5 Posner , id. at 614. 
6 See later in this report for more on this topic.  
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worse, allocates the costs/damages himself, the conflict of interest is obvious.”7 
3. Contingency Fee Agreements 
It was not until October 1st, 2004 that the Solicitors Act was amended to allow for contingency fee 
arrangements (see Appendix One).  Ontario was the last Canadian province to take this step.  Section 28.1 
provides that a solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement – the lawyer’s fees may be 
contingently calculated upon the disposition of the matter -- with a client as long as certain conditions are 
met.  In particular, the CFA cannot contain a provision that any amount that is to be paid for partial 
indemnity costs or substantial indemnity costs can be subject to a contingency arrangement.  The only 
exception is where the lawyer and client jointly apply to a Judge of the Superior Court of Justice for the 
inclusion of such costs in the CFA and the Judge is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances (see 
s.28.1 (8)). 
Also, for personal injury claims, there are additional provisions under Ontario Regulation 195/04: 
Contingency Fee Agreements (under the Solicitor’s Act) that must also be included in order for a CFA to 
be valid (see Appendix Two): 
1. If the client is a Plaintiff, a statement that the solicitor shall not recover more in fees than the 
client recovers as damages or receives by way of settlement; 
2. A statement in respect of disbursements and taxes, including the GST payable on the 
solicitor's fees, that indicates, 
whether the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and, if the client is responsible 
for the payment of disbursements, a general description of disbursements likely to be incurred, other than 
relatively minor disbursements; and 
that if the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and the solicitor pays the 
disbursements or taxes during the course of the matter, the solicitor is entitled to be reimbursed for those 
payments, subject to Section 47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998 (legal aid charge against recovery), 
as a first charge on any funds received as a result of the judgment or settlement of the matter; 
1. A statement that explains costs and the awarding of costs and that indicates, 
a. that, unless otherwise ordered by a Judge, a client is entitled to receive any costs 
contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if 
the client is the party entitled to costs; and 
that a client is responsible for paying any costs contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or 
substantial indemnity scale, if the client is the party liable to pay costs; 
1. If the client is a Plaintiff, a statement that indicates that the client agrees and directs that all 
funds claimed by the solicitor for legal fees, cost, taxes and disbursements shall be paid to the 
solicitor in trust from any judgment or settlement money; 
2. If the client is a party under disability, for the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
represented by a litigation guardian, 
                                                     
7 Hodge v. Neinstein (2015 ONSC 7345) 
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a. a statement that the Contingency Fee Agreement either must be reviewed by a Judge 
before the Agreement is finalized or must be reviewed as part of both the motion or 
application for approval of a settlement or a consent judgment under Rule 7.08 of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure; 
a statement that the amount of the legal fees, costs, taxes and disbursements are subject to the approval of 
a Judge when the Judge reviews a settlement agreement or consent judgment under Rule 7.08 of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure; and 
a statement that any money payable to a person under disability under an Order or settlement shall be paid 
into Court unless a Judge orders otherwise under Rule 7.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In November of 2002, Rule 2.08(3) was amended to incorporate a comment about CFAs.  As well as 
confirming the general validity of CFAs, there is editorial commentary (see Appendix Three): 
In determining the appropriate percentage or other basis of the contingency fee, the 
lawyer and the client should consider a number of factors, including the likelihood of 
success, the nature and complexity of the claim, the expense and risk of pursuing it, the 
amount of the expected recovery and who is to receive an award of costs.  The lawyer 
and client may agree that, in addition to the fee payable under the agreement, any amount 
arising as a result of an award of costs or as a part of a settlement is to be paid to the 
lawyer, which agreement under the Solicitors Act must receive judicial approval.  In such 
circumstances, a smaller percentage of the award than would otherwise be agreed upon 
for the contingency fee, after considering all relevant factors, will generally be 
appropriate. The test is whether the fee in all of the circumstances is fair and reasonable. 
In general, therefore, CFAs are approved if they are found to be: 
-- In compliance with the relevant provisions of the Solicitors Act and accompanying 
Regulation; 
--  Fair, assessed as of the date the arrangement was entered into; and 
--  Reasonable, assessed as of the date of the hearing.  
A contingency fee agreement can only be declared void, or be cancelled and disregarded, where the court 
determines that it is either unfair or unreasonable.  In other words, the emphasis of the analysis is on the 
reasonableness and fairness of the agreement over and above compliance with the more discrete 
requirements of CFAs set out in the CFA Regulation.  However, compliance with these requirements may 
also have some bearing on whether or not the CFA is determined to be fair and reasonable.  For example, 
if a CFA does not include the required statement that the client has a right to review, that shortfall may be 
considered in weighing the CFA’s fairness.  Accordingly, if the agreement is not fair and reasonable, it 
will be declared void and referred for an assessment to the courts’ assessment officers.   
In Raphael Partners v Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417, the Ontario Court of Appeal explained the two-step 
process to be followed by a judge where enforcement of a CFA is sought pursuant to s. 24 of 
the Solicitors Act: 
Upon any such application, if it appears to the court that the agreement is in all respects 
fair and reasonable between the parties, it may be enforced by the court by order in such 
manner and subject to such conditions as to the costs of the application as the court thinks 
fit, but, if the terms of the agreement are deemed by the court not to be fair and 
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reasonable, the agreement may be declared void, and the court may order it to be 
cancelled and may direct the costs, fees, charges and disbursements incurred or 
chargeable in respect of the matters included therein to be assessed in the ordinary 
manner.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 24. [emphasis added] 
The lawyer bears the onus of satisfying the Court that the agreement was fair; it would be unjust to expect 
the client to show that it was unfair in light of the overall imbalance in power and circumstances between 
lawyer and client.  As such, the fairness requirement is about the circumstances surrounding the making 
of the agreement and whether clients fully understand and appreciate the nature of the agreement that they 
executed.  As noted, this is to be determined as of the date that the CFA was entered into.8  Notably, any 
breach of the rules and regulations must be fundamental, not merely technical in nature and scope.9 
In Hodge, the court made it plain that lawyers have a fiduciary duty to protect and promote the client’s 
interests above their own.  It went on to say that: 
“Ms. Hodge's claim alleges that the solicitors in this instance entered into agreements that 
enabled the solicitor to receive as fees both costs and a percentage of the damages.  
Further, they did so without including in the agreement a provision that advises the client 
that costs belong to the client unless a judge orders otherwise (as required under the 
Regulations [sic]) and without getting a judge's approval for taking the costs (as required 
under the Solicitors Act).  The purpose of both provisions is the protection of clients  ...  
Further, the plaintiff alleges that the law firm entered into all-in settlements and then 
simply allocated a portion of the proceeds to costs, thereby increasing the fees to be 
received by the solicitors, to the detriment of the client.  That would be a conflict of 
interest and a further basis for a claim in contract and for breach of fiduciary duty.  These 
provisions [ss. 28.1(6), 28.1(8), 28.1(9)] of the Solicitors Act are intended for the 
protection of the public and to improve access to justice.  These are issues vitally 
important to the integrity of our justice system.  As such, they are to be given a broad and 
liberal construction, consistent with that remedial purpose”10 
In the recent case of Zha, it was stated that: 
“It is unfortunate that experienced counsel are not following the guidelines that have been 
repeatedly set out by the Court, as to what is required insofar as solicitor's fees are 
concerned, in numerous cases dating back to at least 2007.  See, for example, Marcoccia 
(Litigation Guardian of) v. Gill, [2007] O.J. No. 12 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Lau (Litigation 
Guardian of) v. Bloomfield [2007 CarswellOnt 5269 (Ont. S.C.J.)], 2007 CanLII 34443.  
Furthermore, in an effort to provide assistance to counsel in their preparation of written 
motion material for these motions Justice Wilkins of this Court, who deals with the vast 
majority of these motions, issued the Rule 7.08 Best Practices Guidelines in late April 
2013 ("the Guidelines").”11 
                                                     
8 Edwards (Litigation guardian of) v. Camp Kennebec (Frontenac) 2016 ONSC 2501  
9 Séguin v. Van Dyke (2013 ONSC 6576) 
10 Hodge , supra note 7..NSC 7345) 
11 Zhau (2015 ONSC 785) 
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Also, in Warnica, the court went further and contended that the lawyer has to demonstrate what it is that 
she or he actually did in order to earn the 30% contingency fee claimed.  Because that was not done, “the 
appropriate mechanism to permit that to happen, and also to ensure that [the lawyer] is paid a fair fee for 
the service provided… is to refer the matter for assessment” 12 This approach has much to recommend it. 
4. A Comparative Survey 
The Ontario scheme bears many similarities to and differences from other Canadian provinces as well as 
other common law jurisdictions (i.e., the United Kingdom and Australia) (see Appendices Four and Five).  
I have included detailed charts that  summarize these comparisons.  I have not thought it pertinent to 
canvass the arrangements in the United States because the basic difference in handling of costs (i.e., there 
is no general rule in the U.S. that a substantial portion of the winner’s legal fees is paid by the loser; each 
party is responsible for their own lawyer’s fees) makes any comparisons unreliable and distorted.  
However, it is worthwhile to offer some general comments on the contrasts between the Ontario regime 
and other jurisdictions in regard to contingency fee arrangements.  While I do not pretend that these 
comments are exhaustive or definitive, I do believe that they capture some important insights into factors 
that make for a fair and effective CFA system. 
1. While all provinces provide that there are lists of factors that must be contained in any CFA, 
only New Brunswick provides and requires that a standard form be used; 
2. Although there are exceptional circumstances in which court approval is required, almost all 
provinces do not offer any approval or filing process.  However, New Brunswick and 
Northwest Territories/Nunavut require that a CFA must be filed with an officer of the court;   
3. Apart from the filing process in 2 above, any complaints about a CFA are left to the 
discretion of the client.  Each province offers a court-based process for challenging a CFA; 
4. As regards permissible percentages or fees charged under a CFA, only New Brunswick 
(25%) and British Columbia (33 1/3%) impose a maximum figure.  As for the other 
provinces,  Alberta and Saskatchewan have established very limited constraints on 
contingency fees, while the remainder generally demand that fees charged are ‘fair and 
reasonable’. 
5. The Way Forward 
The proof of any pudding is in the eating.  It is only possible to assess the fairness and efficacy of a 
particular scheme if data is available as to compliance with the letter and spirit of the statutory 
framework.  While there will inevitably be a gap between legislative intent and practice, the key issue is 
the size of the gap – are the statutory expectations followed more in the breach than in observance?  And 
how can the requirements and rules  be amended so as to better protect the interests of litigants and 
maintain the integrity of the litigation process from a public policy perspective? 
  
                                                     
12 Warnica v. Van Moorlehem (2012 ONSC 4241) 
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PART B – THE REALITY OF CFAs: DATA AND STUDY 
1. Initial Attempts at Data Collection 
As stated in the introduction to this report, my efforts to conduct a rigorous and sophisticated empirical 
study were foiled at every turn by the plaintiffs’ bar.  There was not only no appetite for the study, but 
also a defiant refusal to be part of it.  Although I found this to be a disturbing and entirely over-heated 
reaction, I have tried to remain open and balanced in my approach; I have sought to keep an open mind 
about the both the benefits and drawbacks of CFAs and their operation in practice. 
The study began with personal e-mails to a sampling of leading plaintiffs’ counsel in late October 2015.  
The plan was to gauge counsels’ responses to a draft set of questions and  determine if changes to the 
questions were needed for the study itself.   The initial e-mail sent read as follows: 
I am writing to you as part of a research project that I am conducting on Lawyers’ Fees in 
Personal Injury Actions. 
It is my intention to obtain as much empirical data as possible on the fee arrangements 
entered and charges made by both plaintiff and defendant lawyers.  My focus is on the 
situation of the injured parties and whether the present regime is best suited to advancing 
their interests and needs.  I have no axe to grind in this matter; it is simply a matter of 
obtaining better and fuller information than is presently available. 
In accordance with the ethics protocol for academic research, any information disclosed 
will be held in the strictest confidence and treated with complete anonymity.  I consider 
this to be an essential commitment of professional integrity as a result of being both a 
lawyer and a professor. 
As such, I attach a short questionnaire for your perusal.  I am sending this to all the 
leading law firms in Ontario who engage in personal injury litigation.  Ideally, I would 
like to meet with you to discuss these matters. 
I look forward to hearing from you and thank you in advance for your cooperation in this 
important matter. 
Regards, Hutch 
Allan C. Hutchinson LL.D. 
Distinguished Research Professor 
Osgoode Hall Law School 
York University 






The questionnaire attached to the e-mail read as follows: 
Personal Injury Litigation (Plaintiffs) 
What kind of fee agreement do you generally enter into with prospective clients as 
regards personal injury claims?  
Do you use a standard retainer letter/contract?  Please provide a copy if you do so. 
Is it by way of hourly rates (which are?)?  
Is it by way of contingency fee (which is?)?  
Or is it a combination of both? 
If it is by way of a contingency fee, is your percentage fixed?  Or does your percentage 
vary depending on a set of variables (e.g., length of time, amount of claim, etc.)? 
Whether you use a contingency fee arrangement or not, do you provide the client with a 
billing statement of hours spent on the file? 
What do you do about disbursements?  Are they chargeable whether the client wins or 
loses? And, if they win, is it on top of the contingency fee? 
If you are successful and recover costs as part of a settlement or judgment, are those costs 
treated as part of the contingency percentage?  Or is it on top of that percentage? 
Do you loan money to clients or arrange for them to obtain loans?  On what terms and 
conditions?  Please provide a copy if you do so. 
Can you provide examples of cases that you have settled or won and what the final 
figures were for damages obtained, fees charged, disbursements charged, and any other 
connected charges? 
The response to this initial e-mail was a firestorm of negative e-mails and phone calls.  The views ranged 
from reasonable suspicion through suggestions of political naivety on my part to outright allegations of 
betrayal (as a fellow member of the Plaintiffs’ Bar).  The fact that the work was being done through the 
IBC was considered to be a major bone of contention.  Despite efforts by me to allay concerns that I was a 
prejudiced and ‘bought’ researcher, the criticism and resistance did not abate.  Accordingly, it soon 
became clear that any attempt to proceed with my proposed approach would be met with stiff and 
concerted opposition.  After consulting with staff at IBC, it was agreed that I should proceed with the 
research, but in a very scaled-down and modest manner.  Consequently, I developed and implemented a 
second-best approach to studying the operation of CFAs in practice. 
2. Revised and Second-Best Approach 
A plan was made to access all reported Ontario cases that mentioned the words ‘contingency fee’.  The 
period under study was from January 2010 to April 2016.  This search generated an overall total of 471 
cases.  A number of these cases only mentioned ‘contingency fee’ in passing and so were deleted from the 
database.  The bulk of cases arose by way of application by a disgruntled litigant who was objecting to the 
fees charged by their lawyer.  The sample included not only those cases involving personal injury matters, 
but also encompassed other subject matter, such as class actions and guardians.  The justification for 
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including the latter was that some of the commentary by judges and assessment officers had relevance to 
contingency fees more generally.  However, care has been taken to place the personal injury cases front 
and centre in the ensuing analysis. 
It should be noted at the outset that it is fully appreciated that this is a far from ideal way of proceeding 
with the study.  These cases represent a narrow view of contingency fees in that the cases only involve 
files either where the plaintiff party identified some problem, real or imagined, with the ultimate charge 
for legal fees or where the claimant, by law, required a litigation guardian and court approval of fee 
arrangements was compulsory.  Of course, there were many cases during the period examined in which 
such circumstances did not apply and there was no court review.  It seems reasonable to comment, 
therefore, that looking at the overall practice of CFAs through the lens of such cases is like watching and 
analyzing the world by looking through a keyhole; what you see might well not be representative of the 
overall situation and may well be distortive of it.  However, all that having been said, this way of 
proceeding was the only one available in the circumstances.  Although the conclusions drawn from the 
data may well be limited and flawed, I maintain that they do offer some, albeit partial, insight into the 
operation of the CFA system.   
The recent Clatney case offers an example of the kind of unscrupulous, heavy-handed and frankly abusive 
tendencies that can be engaged in.  The case focuses on the plaintiff switching law firms in mid-litigation, 
and casts a further shadow over the murky world of fee arrangements between personal injury lawyers 
and injured parties. It notably demonstrates that there can be a considerable disconnect between work 
done and fees charged.  In her decision, Epstein JA for the Ontario Court of Appeal cited two excellent 
sources concerning the overall role and stance of courts in regulating lawyers’ fees: 
“In Plazavest Financial Corp. v. National Bank of Canada (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 647 
C.A.), at para. 14, Doherty J.A. explained how the public interest informs the court’s role 
in supervising the rendering of legal services and payment of legal fees: 
“The rendering of legal services and the determination of appropriate compensation 
for those services is not solely a private matter to be left entirely to the parties.  There 
is a public interest component relating to the performance of legal services and the 
compensation paid for them.  That public interest component requires that the court 
maintain a supervisory role over disputes relating to the payment of lawyers’ fees.  I 
adopt the comments of Adams J. in Borden & Elliot v. Barclays Bank of Canada: 
“The Solicitors Act begins with s.1 reflecting the legal profession’s monopoly 
status.  This beneficial status or privilege of the profession is coupled with 
corresponding obligations set out in the Act and which make clear that the 
rendering of legal services is not simply a matter of contract.  This is not to say a 
contract to pay a specific amount for legal fees cannot prevail.  It may.  But even 
that kind of agreement can be the subject of review for fairness: see s.18 of the 
Solicitors Act.” 
In Price, at para. 19, Sharpe J.A. further elucidated the court’s role: 
“Public confidence in the administration of justice requires the court to intervene 
where necessary to protect the client’s right to a fair procedure for the assessment 
of a solicitor’s bill.  As a general matter, if a client objects to a solicitor’s account, 
the solicitor should facilitate the assessment process, rather than frustrating the 
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process....  In my view, the courts should interpret legislation and procedural rules 
relating to the assessment of solicitors’ accounts in a similar spirit.  As Orkin 
argues, “if the courts permit lawyers to avoid the scrutiny of their accounts for 
fairness and reasonableness, the administration of justice will be brought into 
disrepute.”  The court has an inherent jurisdiction to control the conduct of 
solicitors and its own procedures.  This inherent jurisdiction may be applied to 
ensure that a client’s request for an assessment is dealt with fairly and equitably 
despite procedural gaps or irregularities.”13 
3. Analysis of Available Data 
The available data does not lend itself to rigorous or quantitative analysis.  It is merely suggestive, at best, 
revealing certain tendencies and trends (see Appendices Six, Seven and Eight).  However, on the whole, it 
does not represent a very reassuring snapshot of the landscape of CFAs.  Thus, it appears that not only are 
some lawyers pushing on and back the limits of what is permitted in CFAs, but also some are engaged in 
routine disregard of both the letter and spirit of the rules and regulations in regard to CFAs.   
There are four particular issues that bear more attention – judicial oversight, disbursements, ‘double-
dipping’, and percentages charged by way of a contingency fee. 
A. Judicial Oversight 
Hodge gives a stark glimpse of what can happen when contingency fee agreements are made outside of 
the courtroom and without judicial oversight.  In this case, the lawyers created agreements that were 
contrary to the law (e.g., the lawyer receiving compensation through both costs and a contingency fee, 
without court approval, and thus contrary to s.28 (1)(8)).  Furthermore, the proposed representative 
plaintiff in Hodge was provided with only 27% of the total settlement amount apportioned for that 
individual; there are 4-6,000 others who also had agreements with the law firm of Neinstein LLP.14  
Hodge is the first case where the Superior Court interpreted the regulatory framework surrounding 
contingency fees.  For instance, the court clearly contrasted permissive and mandatory language, such as 
“may” and “shall”, within the Solicitors Act.  Thus, ss. 28.1(1) and (2) are permissive, stating that a 
solicitor "may" enter into these agreements, while s. 28.1(4) is expressed in mandatory language: a 
contingency fee agreement "shall be in writing.”  Likewise, there is a proscription in s. 28.1(3) against 
contingency fee agreements in certain types of cases - criminal and family - and it also employs 
mandatory language (the solicitor "shall not enter into a contingency fee agreement...”). 
  While lawyers seem to understand that the law does not allow them to be compensated with contingency 
fees in criminal law or family law cases, the data reveals  many cases where lawyers have acted contrary 
to the double-dipping section (i.e., lawyers cannot receive both a contingency fee and any costs awarded 
or agreed to) of the legislation.  This is despite “s.28.1 (8) [using] the same kind of proscriptive language 
as the subsection prohibiting contingency fees in criminal and family law cases [with that section being 
s.28.1(3)].”15   
                                                     
13 Clatney v. Quinn Thiele Mineault Grodzki (2016 ONCA 377) pp. 24-26 
14 Hodge, supra note 7 at  at para. 26. 
15 Hodge, supra note 7 at para. 23.  
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B. Disbursements 
There are several sample CFAs available on the web.  A good example, incorporating more than two 
dozen required clauses further to the Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.15 and Contingency Fee 
Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, is contained in Appendix Nine.16   
In practice, it is very difficult to ascertain what a “typical” CFA is in personal injury cases.  Very few 
actual agreements are evidenced in the reported cases; reference is usually only made to particular 
disputed clauses.  There are several sample CFAs available on the web.  A good example is contained in 
Appendix Nine.  This document incorporates more than two dozen required clauses further to the 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.15 and Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04. 
For instance, there is no simple answer to whether CFAs require the client to pay disbursements whatever 
the outcome.  While many do contain such clauses, not all do.  The courts have indicated that what 
constitutes a fair and appropriate contingency fee may well be influenced by whether the agreement 
requires the client plaintiff to recompense the lawyer for disbursements even if the case fails.  Further, the 
Ontario Superior Court has held that a firm may not charge interest on outstanding disbursements. 
In Hodge, Ms. Hodge signed a standard form retainer agreement that included a clause stipulating that she 
would be required to pay the firm 25% of any damages recovered plus anything recovered for partial 
indemnity costs (the total of which would be no more than 40% of the damages award).  She would also 
be liable to pay for any disbursements incurred by the firm.”17 This was not considered reasonable.  By 
contrast, in Cogan the Court found that a contingency fee of 33% was fair and reasonable because 
plaintiff's counsel had assumed the risk of paying the disbursements in the event that the action was 
unsuccessful.”  It is notable that for few of the cases identified for this study was there a breakdown of 
what was to be included in disbursements.   
Another important issue is what expenses can or should be included under the general rubric of 
‘disbursements’.  In Henricks-Hunter, the reported disbursements were found to include a significant 
number of office expenses and items such as "drinks" and "finding a Tim Horton’s restaurant.”18  Again, 
in Hodge, an amount of 48,942.37 was charged for disbursements.  The disbursements included 
$4,008.27 for photocopies; $2,791.20 for laser copies; $1,280.70 for scanned documents; $1,372.33 for 
interest recovery; and $200.00 for Miscellaneous Expenses/File Closing Charges.  It has to be 
remembered that Ms. Hodge ultimately only recovered the total sum of $41,906.41.”19 
Some lawyers have sought to charge interest on outstanding disbursements.  The rationale is that these 
amounts are paid at the end of the case, once it is settled or fully litigated.  Yet the courts have held that 
lawyers may not charge interest on outstanding disbursements.  In Umbach, the courts took the view that 
interest charges totaling $937.01 in respect of a particular expert could not be charged: “As one of the 
justifications for contingency fee agreements is that the lawyer often has to carry significant 
disbursements for a prolonged period of time, I decided to invite submissions as to why the client should 
                                                     
16 See  http://www.practicepro.ca/practice/financesbookletprecedents.asp  
17 Hodge, supra note 7. 
18 Henricks-Hunter (Litigation Guardian) 2012 ONSC 4564. 
19 Hodge, supra note 7. 
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pay interest on unpaid disbursements as well as fees on a contingency basis, when part of the rationale 
behind contingency fees is that the lawyer carries the disbursements.”20 
C. Double-Dipping  
A very egregious practice is where lawyers  charge a contingency fee on any settlement reached as well as 
pocket any costs recovered as a result of or included in the settlement.  This might best be described as 
‘double-dipping’.  As per s.28.1 (8) of the Solicitors Act, the lawyer’s costs cannot be claimed over and 
above the contingency percentage unless the court elevates the circumstances to exceptional.  The courts’ 
general attitude to the issue has been in conformity with the regulation.  In Dryden v. Oatley Vigmond, 
the assessment officer inferentially reduced the lawyers’ fees by the exact amount of costs.  The action 
was settled for $285,000 in respect of damages and interest, plus $42,500 for costs inclusive of sales tax, 
and $47,500 for disbursements.  Following the settlement, Mr. Dryden was charged $127,905.16 for legal 
services.  The assessment officer held that the CFA that had been established between the law firm and 
Mr. Dryden was unjustified.  Further, she concluded that the $128,000 legal bill that had been rendered to 
Mr. Dryden was excessive and should be reduced by almost $43,000, to $85,000 including GST.  On this 
issue, the Hodge case is notorious for the fact that the client was required to pay to the law firm the 
contingency fee plus any costs recovered or bargained for, up to 40% of the amount recovered.  She 
would also be liable to pay for any disbursements incurred by the firm.  Although the CFA provided that 
the solicitors would be paid a fee plus any costs recovered, no application was made to a judge for 
approval of the agreement, as required under s. 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act. 
There are other cases on the public record where the lawyer sought to claim costs on top of a contingency 
fee.  In Seguin v Van Dyke,21 the plaintiff signed a CFA with her lawyer pursuant to which the lawyer 
was to be paid, in the event of a settlement, 33.3% of the settlement amount (including costs) plus 
disbursements.  However, in the event of judgment after trial, her lawyer was to receive 33.3% of the 
damages, plus 100% of the costs.  The CFA was declared to be unenforceable.  Also, in Choi v Choi,22 
the CFA was found to be unenforceable where a lawyer sought to obtain $1M be paid to the law firm for 
partial indemnity costs and disbursements inclusive of GST; and a further $1.6M as a contingency fee.  
D. Percentages Charged 
The data that was available for this study (see Appendix 6 for summaries of the relevant cases) is wholly 
inadequate for describing the typical experience of Ontario personal injury plaintiffs with respect to the 
cost of their legal representation.  It does, however, illustrate that, of the CFAs that have been challenged 
or reviewed before the courts in recent years, a large number have been either deemed unenforceable, in 
violation of the Solicitors Act, ordered for reassessment and/or otherwise had their original terms altered 
in favour of the client.  It also shows that even among challenged CFAs that have ultimately received 
court approval, the total amount of compensation paid to the lawyer in contingency fee, costs, and 
disbursements, depicted as a percentage of the total of awarded damages, can be quite high.   
The chart that follows shows the break-down of compensation paid to the plaintiff lawyer in thirteen 
personal injury cases where the CFA was challenged and ultimately deemed to be enforceable.  For 
                                                     
20 Umbach (Litigation guardian of) v. Wilmot (Township) (2014 ONSC 2995). 
21 Seguin, supra note 9. 
22 Choi v. Choi (2010 ONSC 4800). 
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illustrative purposes, the amounts for the class action case of Hodge v Neinstein  -- where the CFA was 
determined to be unenforceable -- are included in the chart. 
    NOTE: Red is the highest % whereas 
green is the lowest 
Compensation paid to lawyer (% of 







CF + Costs 
+ Disburse 
Disburse (% of 
settlement 
amount) 
Costs paid to 
lawyer 
1. Cogan (Litigation 
Guardian)  $7,362,500.00  25% 25% 26% 1% 
 $-  
5. Aywas (Litigation 
Guardian)  $144,375.00  17% 17% 27% 9% 
 $-  
9. Choi (Litigation 
Guardian)  $14,350,000.00  7% 13% 14% 1% 
 $863,110.00 
12. Dolan (Litigation 
Guardian)  $75,000.00  8% 8% 10% 2% 
 $-  
14. Laushway  $650,000.00  32% 32% 36% 5%  $-  
17. Consky  $250,000.00  24% 24% 31% 7%  $-  
19. Dryden25  $285,000.00  30% 30% 46% 17%  $-  
21. Henricks-Hunter 
(Litigation Guardian)  $2,050,000.00  22% 22% 24% 2% 
 $-  
29. Soulliere (Litigation 
Guardian)  $8,500,000.00  28% 28% 31% 4% 
 $-  
33. Umbach (Litigation 
Guardian)  $1,250,000.00  25% 25% 32% 7% 
 $-  
30. St. Jean  $550,000.00  29% 29% 45% 15%  $-  
81. Hodge v Neinstein 
(2015)  $150,000.00  20% 40% 73% 33% 
 $30,000.00 
38. Batalla  $5,741,560.00  17% 17% 19% 1%  $-  
37. Edwards (Litigation 
Guardian)  $2,750,000.00  8% 8% 10% 2% 
 $-  
  
                                                     
23 This necessarily excludes agreements deemed unenforceable by the court. 
24 Complete amount paid by the defense for tort/negligence action (i.e., excludes SAB actions).  This also excludes 
costs.  GST was oftentimes broken out, but sometimes not. 
25 This is the case where the assessment officer reduced the amount payable by the dollar value of costs. 
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PART C – THE FAILINGS OF THE PRESENT REGIME 
OF CFAs 
In both theory and practice (insofar as it is possible to know), Ontario’s CFA regime is open to a number 
of serious objections and criticisms.  The main appeal of CFAs and the basic rationale for allowing them 
is that they permit claimants to pursue litigation that would otherwise remain out of reach.  They are 
intended as a response to the fact, and widespread perception, that the costs of legal services are 
prohibitively expensive.  While other ways exist to contain or respond to the high cost of legal services 
(e.g., legal aid, pro bono, etc.), CFAs are one way to enable claimants to have access to the courts and 
perhaps, through that, to some measure of justice.  They allow claimants to seek to enforce their legal 
rights with confidence that, although they might not be successful, they will not be even worse off than 
they already are.26  This purpose is not be underrated or scoffed at.   
At the same time, a central question is whether, in current circumstances, the benefit to plaintiffs is often 
being obtained at too high a price to litigants and at too large an advantage to lawyers.  While litigants 
may gain from CFAs, it must not be to the greater comparative advantage of lawyers who might receive a 
regular windfall in the fees received,  In short, is the price of access to justice still too high?  Are lawyers, 
not claimants, the big winners under the present regime of CFAs? 
1. Consumer Protection 
The focus that I have taken to this study can be broadly understood as a ‘consumer protection’ 
perspective.  It is now fully accepted that consumers need to be protected against the greater economic 
and bargaining power of large merchants and corporations in the marketplace; there is consequently a 
detailed and comprehensive set of protections and entitlements (e.g., standard terms, enhanced remedies, 
etc.) in both statute and common law that serve to guard the consumer against disreputable and 
exploitative practices.  If there is a case for such safeguards in the general market (which there surely is), 
then there is an even stronger case for protections and entitlements in regard to dealings between lawyers 
and potential clients.  Three particular considerations spring to mind: the enforcement of legal rights is a 
mainstay of society’s commitment to democracy and the Rule of Law; the stakes are extremely high for 
clients, especially those with personal injuries, seeking compensation for damages caused by the 
wrongdoing or negligence of others;  and lawyers hold a monopoly as gatekeepers to the legal process.  
Taken together, these factors mean that there should not only be appropriate and similar protections in 
place for legal clients as in the general consumer context, but perhaps that the protections provided in the 
legal context should be elevated. 
When persons with personal injuries seek legal assistance to pursue any claims available to them, they are 
doubly vulnerable.  Not only is there an obvious and large imbalance in knowledge and power between 
them and lawyers in regard to the validity, strength and viability of their claims, but they are also in a 
debilitated and injured state.  In such circumstances, it is essential that the system operates to ensure that 
they are not further taken advantage of, especially by their legal advisers.  Insofar as lawyers hold 
themselves out as a ‘noble profession’ with social duties and responsibilities, they are not simply another 
                                                     
26 Unsuccessful claimants will not be entirely protected because most CFAs require them to compensate lawyers 
for disbursements that can be not inconsiderable. 
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business in the marketplace.  Accordingly, it is incumbent on the system, both by way of legislation and 
professional regulation, to take decisive steps to ensure that the interests of clients are given the fullest 
protection against exploitive and unfair practices and that, conversely, lawyers are restrained from and 
penalized for engaging in such practices. 
As things stand now and as a result of the research done for this study, it cannot be reported that the 
present scheme in regard to CFAs is operating to protect and advance the interests of clients in their 
dealings with lawyers.  Indeed, there is evidence that the existing scheme of regulations and rules are 
allowing some lawyers to recoup larger fees than they otherwise might do under the normal hourly-fee 
arrangements for services rendered.  While lawyers are fully entitled to receive fair and reasonable fees 
for services rendered, there is suggestive evidence that lawyers are cashing in on the opportunities for 
enhancing their fees afforded by CFAs.   
While the data assembled and available is limited and opaque, it appears that there are two major claims 
by lawyers that need immediate and reliable confirmation: 
-- that lawyers take on a significant number of cases that are unsuccessful in producing any or 
sufficient compensation for the client such that the lawyer does not receive adequate fees for the 
time expended on the file?; and 
-- that it is possible for clients to choose to enter arrangements with personal injury lawyers that 
are not based on a CFA?  
Any defence of the existing system demands that both these questions can be answered in the affirmative.  
Unless there is a significant number of ‘losing cases’, the argument in favour of allowing lawyers to 
receive more by way of fees than they otherwise would do so becomes unpersuasive.  Secondly, unless 
personal injury claimants can enter other kinds of fee-arrangements with lawyers and not be simply 
presented with a take-it-or-leave-it CFA (even a balanced and reasonable one), they are being exploited 
by the legal process.  Genuine and informed choice by consumers is a basic standard that consumers are 
accorded in other commercial settings.  To have less than that in the lawyering and rights-enforcement 
context is simply unacceptable and against the public interest.  The legal profession as much as the public 
at large has a serious interest in ensuring that ‘access to justice’ is real, and not simply a stated ambition. 
2. Baseline Standards 
A major challenge in making a sensible and reasoned assessment of Ontario’s CFA system is the need to 
develop a base-line level of compensation against which any changes in the billing arrangements can be 
measured.  One possibility recommends itself – to measure what happens across files that have CF 
agreements against what those files would have generated if they had been billed on a traditional hourly 
basis. 
Imagine that a lawyer charges an hourly rate of $200; this is about average for a Toronto personal injury 
lawyer and could be said to represent what the lawyer thinks is a reasonable and achievable rate (less 
substantial overheads) for their services.  The precise amount will vary from lawyer to lawyer, but this is 
not important for illustrative purposes.  If they only worked on a traditional hourly basis, they might bill 
$400,000 annually if they worked 40 hours per week for 50 weeks.  Assuming that this amounts to a 
reasonable level of remuneration for the hours of work done, it seems reasonable that a broadly similar 
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amount should be earned under CF arrangements, assessed as the cumulative total for both ‘winning’ and 
‘losing’ files.27  If lawyers were to earn substantially more than this, then they would seem to be taking 
advantage of those clients who were obliged by circumstances to enter into such CF agreements.  If they 
were to earn substantially less than this, then they would be providing their services on a discounted rate. 
To play out this logic more fully, if a lawyer were to take on files and had a 50% success rate, they would 
be entitled to charge an amount that would average out to $400 per hour (or twice their normal fee of 
$200) for the winning cases.  This would result in them receiving their normal level of annual billing if 
they were billing on an hourly basis.  If their success rate were 75/25%, they would be entitled to charge 
an amount that would average out to $266 per hour (or 1/3rd (25/75) over their normal fee) for the 
winning cases.  This would result in them receiving their normal level of annual billing of $400,000 if 
they were billing on an hourly basis. 
To determine the reasonableness of the fee, law firms would need to keep time dockets, and Ontario 
courts occasionally do request such information of lawyers.  In Young (Litigation Guardian of) v. Hinks 
Estate, it was stated that “it is incumbent on Mr. Acri to justify the reasonableness of the [$67k] his firm 
claims in relation to the tort claim and [$76k] in relation to the accident benefits settlement…  I want to 
see documents evidencing his retainer and dockets and understand exactly [what Mr. Acri did on the case 
over 6 years].”  That said, there are many instances where the court has not requested time docket 
information, and have actually spoken against a reliance on time dockets, in both personal injury and class 
action litigation.  In Henricks-Hunter (Litigation guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc, it was noted that 
“the determination of the proper fee in a CFA is not based on the value of the time spent, but rather on the 
amount recovered for the client.”  Also, in West Coast Soft Wear Ltd. v. 1000128 Alberta Ltd., it was 
concluded that “using a percentage calculation in determining class counsel fees properly places the 
emphasis on the quality of representation, and the benefits conferred to the class.  A percentage-based fee 
rewards ‘one imaginative, brilliant hour’ rather than ‘1000 plodding hours’.” 
3. Losing Cases? 
As regards the reasonableness of lawyers’ billing under CFAs, the key factor will obviously be the ratio 
of winning to losing cases that they take on.  There is no reliable information, about this ratio, but it is not 
as though lawyers have not made the ‘losing cases’ argument before the court.  However, it defies both 
logic and reason to assume that experienced lawyers are taking on more than 25% of files that they 
consider to be likely to lose.  There is no evidence that lawyers are risking taking on files with a less than  
75% chance of success.  Because the effect of taking on losing cases is so dramatic (i.e., no remuneration 
for work done), it would be foolhardy of lawyers to take on too many losing cases.  
Moreover, it would also be wrong-headed for the legal process to proceed on the basis that lawyers took 
on more losing cases than winning cases and to make rules (e.g., CFA legislation) that assumed such 
miscalculation.  Accordingly, any system of billing that routinely results in lawyers receiving 
significantly more or less than their base-line hourly-billings amount would be unreasonable.  In the 
former case, litigants would be paying too much by way of legal fees and lawyers would be receiving too 
                                                     
27 By ‘losing’ and ‘winning’ cases, I do not simply mean to include only those that generate nothing and 
something.  By winning, I mean that litigants will receive a sizeable amount after their lawyer has been paid that 
will go a substantial way to compensating them fairly for their claims. 
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much.  In the latter, lawyers would be receiving less than they deserve and litigants would collectively be 
paying less than they should. 
 
PART D – SOME PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF CFAs 
The reality of the functioning of CFAs and the criticism that I and others have leveled at them suggest a 
number of possible reforms.  While the continued use of CFAs seems to be taken as a given from an 
‘access to justice’ standpoint (and for good reasons), there are several relatively small changes that could 
be made that would enhance the operation and regulation of CFAs.  The challenge is, as previously stated, 
to make justice more accessible, but at a reasonable cost so that the interests of both litigants and lawyers 
are fairly represented and balanced.  The following proposals are made with this end in mind. 
(1) The most pressing need is to get a better and fuller picture of how CFAs work in practice.  At present, 
there is far too much dark and shadow to go forward confidently with any wide-ranging reform.  In light 
of the aversion shown by the Plaintiffs’ Bar to an outside study, it is incumbent upon the Law Society of 
Upper Canada (LSUC), the legal profession’s governing body, to commission and implement a thorough 
and wide-ranging study of lawyers’ fees in personal injury litigation.  The LSUC  is the only organization 
that has the prestige and authority to conduct the kind of thorough, unconditional and comprehensive 
survey that is needed, and  it can deal effectively with any concerns that lawyers claim to have about 
privacy and confidentiality. Such a study would benefit everyone.  It would confirm or contradict the 
findings, criticisms, and proposals put forward in this Report, and it might well develop and validate other 
insights and concerns about the whole process of fee-charging by lawyers.   
(2) A particular challenge is whether leaving lawyers to fix their own percentage contingency is a fair and 
defensible way to proceed.  My own sense is that this has had a tendency to price access to justice at too 
high a cost.  While contingency fees open up litigation to more people than would otherwise be the case, 
the available evidence indicates that the system has allowed some lawyers to reap financial benefits that 
are out of proportion to the work done and the risk undertaken.   there is not only an imbalance of power 
between lawyers and clients when it comes to entering the litigation process, but clients are also in an 
injured and often desperate situation.  In short, clients are in need of protection.  Accordingly, although 
the better preference might be  be to go with a fee-multiplier for successful cases rather than a straight 
percentage (as this would ensure a link between the final compensation received and the actual amount of 
work done), a second-best proposal would be to fix a maximum percentage that lawyers could charge.  
Such maximum figure might be 25%.  On the evidence available this would be a generous figure as it 
generally assumes that lawyers will be taking on around 20% of cases that lose.  While this seems high, it 
nevertheless offers a basis on which to ensure that lawyers are adequately rewarded for their efforts. 
(3) Lawyers should be mandated to keep hourly log/dockets of the time worked on any file, especially 
those that are the subject of a CFA.  The absence of this requirement is  irresponsible and permits abuse 
by unscrupulous lawyers.  It is impossible to assess the fairness or reasonableness of any fee-charging 
agreement between lawyers and clients without some knowledge of the time expended by the lawyer on 
the file.  Indeed, without such information, no court or assessment officer can realistically arrive at any 
decision about the fairness or reasonableness of the fee charged.  Consequently, failure to keep hourly 
log/dockets of the time worked on any file should be a basis for ordering that no fees are awarded to the 
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lawyer under a CFA. 
(4) In order to reduce the scope for abuse or misunderstanding, lawyers should be required to use a 
‘standard-form’ CFA.  At present, only New Brunswick provides and requires that a standard form be 
used. If lawyers wanted to deviate from that standard form, they would need to obtain the approval of the 
court.  In any other situation, a deviation from the standard form would render the CFA invalid and 
unenforceable.  The great attractions of the standard form are that the information provided would be 
consistent and put consumers in a position to compare the costs of using different law firms, while they 
would also ensure fairness and protection for clients.  Although there are many possible formats that such 
a standard form might take, I have included a possible draft of such a standard-form CFA in Appendix 
Nine. 
(5) All CFAs should be registered or filed with an officer of the court.  At present, this requirement has 
only been mandated by New Brunswick and the North West Territories.  This recommendation is not that 
all CFAs are approved by an officer of the court; this would be too time-consuming and expensive.  
However, the need to register or file all CFAs, along with the reliance on standard forms, will place 
appropriate and increased pressure on any lawyer who might be tempted to operate through unfair or 
unreasonable agreements.  This requirement will introduce a level of transparency that is sorely missing 
from the existing process of regulation.  In particular, again when combined with a standard-form 
requirement, this will provide a genuine check on the unlawful and not uncommon temptation to double-
dip.  Of course, truly unscrupulous lawyers might still be prepared to do ‘side-deals’ with clients, but this 
will hopefully be extremely rare (and a cause for severe disciple or disbarment). 




Solicitor’s Act,  RSO 1990, c S15 
Agreements Between Solicitors and Clients 
Definitions 
15.  In this section and in sections 16 to 33, 
“client” includes a person who, as a principal or on behalf of another person, retains or employs or is 
about to retain or employ a solicitor, and a person who is or may be liable to pay the bill of a solicitor for 
any services; (“client”) 
“contingency fee agreement” means an agreement referred to in section 28.1; (“entente sur des honoraires 
conditionnels”) 
“services” includes fees, costs, charges and disbursements. (“service”)  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 15; 2002, 
c. 24, Sched. A, s. 1. 
Agreements between solicitors and clients as to compensation 
16.  (1)  Subject to sections 17 to 33, a solicitor may make an agreement in writing with his or her client 
respecting the amount and manner of payment for the whole or a part of any past or future services in 
respect of business done or to be done by the solicitor, either by a gross sum or by commission or 
percentage, or by salary or otherwise, and either at the same rate or at a greater or less rate than that at 
which he or she would otherwise be entitled to be remunerated.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 16 (1). 
Definition 
(2)  For purposes of this section and sections 20 to 32, “agreement” includes a contingency fee agreement.  
2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 2. 
Approval of agreement by assessment officer 
17.  Where the agreement is made in respect of business done or to be done in any court, except the Small 
Claims Court, the amount payable under the agreement shall not be received by the solicitor until the 
agreement has been examined and allowed by an assessment officer.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 17. 
Opinion of court on agreement 
18.  Where it appears to the assessment officer that the agreement is not fair and reasonable, he or she 
may require the opinion of a court to be taken thereon.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 18. 
Rejection of agreement by court 
19.  The court may either reduce the amount payable under the agreement or order it to be cancelled and 
the costs, fees, charges and disbursements in respect of the business done to be assessed in the same 
manner as if the agreement had not been made.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 19. 
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Agreement not to affect costs as between party and party 
20.  (1)  Such an agreement does not affect the amount, or any right or remedy for the recovery, of any 
costs recoverable from the client by any other person, or payable to the client by any other person, and 
any such other person may require any costs payable or recoverable by the person to or from the client to 
be assessed in the ordinary manner, unless such person has otherwise agreed.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, 
s. 20 (1). 
Idem 
(2)  However, the client who has entered into the agreement is not entitled to recover from any other 
person under any order for the payment of any costs that are the subject of the agreement more than the 
amount payable by the client to the client’s own solicitor under the agreement.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, 
s. 20 (2). 
Awards of costs in contingency fee agreements 
20.1  (1)  In calculating the amount of costs for the purposes of making an award of costs, a court shall 
not reduce the amount of costs only because the client’s solicitor is being compensated in accordance with 
a contingency fee agreement.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 3. 
Same 
(2)  Despite subsection 20 (2), even if an order for the payment of costs is more than the amount payable 
by the client to the client’s own solicitor under a contingency fee agreement, a client may recover the full 
amount under an order for the payment of costs if the client is to use the payment of costs to pay his, her 
or its solicitor.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 3. 
Same 
(3)  If the client recovers the full amount under an order for the payment of costs under subsection (2), the 
client is only required to pay costs to his, her or its solicitor and not the amount payable under the 
contingency fee agreement, unless the contingency fee agreement is one that has been approved by a 
court under subsection 28.1 (8) and provides otherwise.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 3. 
Claims for additional remuneration excluded 
21.  Such an agreement excludes any further claim of the solicitor beyond the terms of the agreement in 
respect of services in relation to the conduct and completion of the business in respect of which it is made, 
except such as are expressly excepted by the agreement.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 21. 
Agreements relieving solicitor from liability for negligence void 
22.  (1)  A provision in any such agreement that the solicitor is not to be liable for negligence or that he 
or she is to be relieved from any responsibility to which he or she would otherwise be subject as such 
solicitor is wholly void.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 22. 
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Exception, indemnification by solicitor’s employer 
(2)  Subsection (1) does not prohibit a solicitor who is employed in a master-servant relationship from 
being indemnified by the employer for liabilities incurred by professional negligence in the course of the 
employment.  1999, c. 12, Sched. B, s. 14. 
Determination of disputes under the agreement 
23.  No action shall be brought upon any such agreement, but every question respecting the validity or 
effect of it may be examined and determined, and it may be enforced or set aside without action on the 
application of any person who is a party to the agreement or who is or is alleged to be liable to pay or who 
is or claims to be entitled to be paid the costs, fees, charges or disbursements, in respect of which the 
agreement is made, by the court, not being the Small Claims Court, in which the business or any part of it 
was done or a judge thereof, or, if the business was not done in any court, by the Superior Court of 
Justice.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 23; 2006, c. 19, Sched. C, s. 1 (1). 
Enforcement of agreement 
24.  Upon any such application, if it appears to the court that the agreement is in all respects fair and 
reasonable between the parties, it may be enforced by the court by order in such manner and subject to 
such conditions as to the costs of the application as the court thinks fit, but, if the terms of the agreement 
are deemed by the court not to be fair and reasonable, the agreement may be declared void, and the court 
may order it to be cancelled and may direct the costs, fees, charges and disbursements incurred or 
chargeable in respect of the matters included therein to be assessed in the ordinary manner.  R.S.O. 1990, 
c. S.15, s. 24. 
Reopening of agreement 
25.  Where the amount agreed under any such agreement has been paid by or on behalf of the client or by 
any person chargeable with or entitled to pay it, the Superior Court of Justice may, upon the application of 
the person who has paid it if it appears to the court that the special circumstances of the case require the 
agreement to be reopened, reopen it and order the costs, fees, charges and disbursements to be assessed, 
and may also order the whole or any part of the amount received by the solicitor to be repaid by him or 
her on such terms and conditions as to the court seems just.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 25; 2002, c. 24, 
Sched. B, s. 46 (2); 2006, c. 19, Sched. C, s. 1 (1). 
Agreements made by client in fiduciary capacity 
26.  Where any such agreement is made by the client in the capacity of guardian or of trustee under a 
deed or will, or in the capacity of guardian of property that will be chargeable with the amount or any part 
of the amount payable under the agreement, the agreement shall, before payment, be laid before an 
assessment officer who shall examine it and may disallow any part of it or may require the direction of 
the court to be made thereon.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 26; 1992, c. 32, s. 26. 
Client paying without approval to be liable to estate 
27.  If the client pays the whole or any part of such amount without the previous allowance of an 
assessment officer or the direction of the court, the client is liable to account to the person whose estate or 
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property is charged with the amount paid or any part of it for the amount so charged, and the solicitor who 
accepts such payment may be ordered by the court to refund the amount received by him or her.  R.S.O. 
1990, c. S.15, s. 27. 
Purchase of interest prohibited 
28.  A solicitor shall not enter into an agreement by which the solicitor purchases all or part of a client’s 
interest in the action or other contentious proceeding that the solicitor is to bring or maintain on the 
client’s behalf.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
Contingency fee agreements 
28.1  (1)  A solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement with a client in accordance with this 
section.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
Remuneration dependent on success 
(2)  A solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement that provides that the remuneration paid to the 
solicitor for the legal services provided to or on behalf of the client is contingent, in whole or in part, on 
the successful disposition or completion of the matter in respect of which services are provided.  2002, 
c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
No contingency fees in certain matters 
(3)  A solicitor shall not enter into a contingency fee agreement if the solicitor is retained in respect of, 
(a)  a proceeding under the Criminal Code (Canada) or any other criminal or quasi-criminal 
proceeding; or 
(b)  a family law matter.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
Written agreement 
(4)  A contingency fee agreement shall be in writing.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
Maximum amount of contingency fee 
(5)  If a contingency fee agreement involves a percentage of the amount or of the value of the property 
recovered in an action or proceeding, the amount to be paid to the solicitor shall not be more than the 
maximum percentage, if any, prescribed by regulation of the amount or of the value of the property 
recovered in the action or proceeding, however the amount or property is recovered.  2002, c. 24, 
Sched. A, s. 4. 
Greater maximum amount where approved 
(6)  Despite subsection (5), a solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement where the amount paid 
to the solicitor is more than the maximum percentage prescribed by regulation of the amount or of the 
value of the property recovered in the action or proceeding, if, upon joint application of the solicitor and 
his or her client whose application is to be brought within 90 days after the agreement is executed, the 
agreement is approved by the Superior Court of Justice.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
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Factors to be considered in application 
(7)  In determining whether to grant an application under subsection (6), the court shall consider the 
nature and complexity of the action or proceeding and the expense or risk involved in it and may consider 
such other factors as the court considers relevant.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
Agreement not to include costs except with leave 
(8)  A contingency fee agreement shall not include in the fee payable to the solicitor, in addition to the fee 
payable under the agreement, any amount arising as a result of an award of costs or costs obtained as part 
of a settlement, unless, 
(a)  the solicitor and client jointly apply to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice for approval to 
include the costs or a proportion of the costs in the contingency fee agreement because of 
exceptional circumstances; and 
(b)  the judge is satisfied that exceptional circumstances apply and approves the inclusion of the 
costs or a proportion of them.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
Enforceability of greater maximum amount of contingency fee 
(9)  A contingency fee agreement that is subject to approval under subsection (6) or (8) is not enforceable 
unless it is so approved.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
Non-application 
(10)  Sections 17, 18 and 19 do not apply to contingency fee agreements.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
Assessment of contingency fee  
(11)  For purposes of assessment, if a contingency fee agreement, 
(a)  is not one to which subsection (6) or (8) applies, the client may apply to the Superior Court of 
Justice for an assessment of the solicitor’s bill within 30 days after its delivery or within one year 
after its payment; or  
(b)  is one to which subsection (6) or (8) applies, the client or the solicitor may apply to the 
Superior Court of Justice for an assessment within the time prescribed by regulation made under 
this section.  2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4. 
Regulations 
(12)  The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations governing contingency fee agreements, 
including regulations, 
(a)  governing the maximum percentage of the amount or of the value of the property recovered 
that may be a contingency fee, including but not limited to,  
(i) setting a scale for the maximum percentage that may be charged for a contingency fee 
based on factors such as the value of the recovery and the amount of time spent by the 
solicitor, and  
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(ii) differentiating the maximum percentage that may be charged for a contingency fee based 
on factors such as the type of cause of action and the court in which the action is to be heard 
and distinguishing between causes of actions of the same type; 
(b)  governing the maximum amount of remuneration that may be paid to a solicitor pursuant to a 
contingency fee agreement; 
(c)  in respect of treatment of costs awarded or obtained where there is a contingency fee 
agreement;  
(d)  prescribing standards and requirements for contingency fee agreements, including the form of 
the agreements and terms that must be included in contingency fee agreements and prohibiting 
terms from being included in contingency fee agreements; 
(e)  imposing duties on solicitors who enter into contingency fee agreements; 
(f)  prescribing the time in which a solicitor or client may apply for an assessment under clause 
(11) (b); 
(g)  exempting persons, actions or proceedings or classes of persons, actions or proceedings from 
this section, a regulation made under this section or any provision in a regulation.  2002, c. 24, 
Sched. A, s. 4. 
Where solicitor dies or becomes incapable of acting after agreement 
29.  Where a solicitor who has made such an agreement and who has done anything under it dies or 
becomes incapable of acting before the agreement has been completely performed by him or her, an 
application may be made to any court that would have jurisdiction to examine and enforce the agreement 
by any person who is a party thereto, and the court may thereupon enforce or set aside the agreement so 
far as it may have been acted upon as if the death or incapacity had not happened, and, if it deems the 
agreement to be in all respects fair and reasonable, may order the amount in respect of the past 
performance of it to be ascertained by assessment, and the assessment officer, in ascertaining such 
amount, shall have regard, so far as may be, to the terms of the agreement, and payment of the amount 
found to be due may be ordered in the same manner as if the agreement had been completely performed 
by the solicitor.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 29. 
Changing solicitor after making agreement 
30.  If, after any such agreement has been made, the client changes solicitor before the conclusion of the 
business to which the agreement relates, which the client is at liberty to do despite the agreement, the 
solicitor, party to the agreement, shall be deemed to have become incapable to act under it within the 
meaning of section 29, and upon any order being made for assessment of the amount due him or her in 
respect of the past performance of the agreement the court shall direct the assessment officer to have 
regard to the circumstances under which the change of solicitor took place, and upon the assessment the 
solicitor shall be deemed not to be entitled to the full amount of the remuneration agreed to be paid to him 
or her, unless it appears that there has been no default, negligence, improper delay or other conduct on his 
or her part affording reasonable ground to the client for the change of solicitor.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, 
s. 30. 
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Bills under agreement not to be liable to assessment 
31.  Except as otherwise provided in sections 16 to 30 and sections 32 and 33, a bill of a solicitor for the 
amount due under any such agreement is not subject to any assessment or to any provision of law 
respecting the signing and delivery of a bill of a solicitor.  R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 31. 
Security may be given to solicitor for costs 
32.  A solicitor may accept from his or her client, and a client may give to the client’s solicitor, security 
for the amount to become due to the solicitor for business to be transacted by him or her and for interest 
thereon, but so that the interest is not to commence until the amount due is ascertained by agreement or by 






Ontario Regulation 195/04: Contingency Fee Agreements (under the Solicitor’s Act) 
CONTENTS 
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6. Contingency fee excludes costs and disbursements 
7. Contingency fee not to exceed damages 
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9. Disbursements and taxes 
10. Timing of assessment of contingency fee agreement 
 
Signing and dating contingency fee agreement 
1.  (1)  For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition to being in writing, a contingency fee 
agreement, 
a. shall be entitled “Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement”; 
b. shall be dated; and 
c. shall be signed by the client and the solicitor with each of their signatures being 
verified by a witness.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 1 (1). 
   (2)  The solicitor shall provide an executed copy of the contingency fee agreement to the client and 
shall retain a copy of the agreement.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 1 (2). 
Contents of contingency fee agreements, general 
2.  A solicitor who is a party to a contingency fee agreement shall ensure that the agreement includes the 
following: 
1.  The name, address and telephone number of the solicitor and of the client.  
2.  A statement of the basic type and nature of the matter in respect of which the solicitor is 
providing services to the client.  
3.  A statement that indicates, 
i. that the client and the solicitor have discussed options for retaining the solicitor other 
than by way of a contingency fee agreement, including retaining the solicitor by way of an 
hourly-rate retainer, 
ii. that the client has been advised that hourly rates may vary among solicitors and that the 
client can speak with other solicitors to compare rates,   
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iii. that the client has chosen to retain the solicitor by way of a contingency fee agreement, 
and  
iv. that the client understands that all usual protections and controls on retainers between a 
solicitor and client, as defined by the Law Society of Upper Canada and the common law, 
apply to the contingency fee agreement.  
4.  A statement that explains the contingency upon which the fee is to be paid to the solicitor. 
5.  A statement that sets out the method by which the fee is to be determined and, if the method of 
determination is as a percentage of the amount recovered, a statement that explains that for the 
purpose of calculating the fee the amount of recovery excludes any amount awarded or agreed to 
that is separately specified as being in respect of costs and disbursements.   
6.  A simple example that shows how the contingency fee is calculated. 
7.  A statement that outlines how the contingency fee is calculated, if recovery is by way of a 
structured settlement. 
8.  A statement that informs the client of their right to ask the Superior Court of Justice to review 
and approve of the solicitor’s bill and that includes the applicable timelines for asking for the 
review.  
9.  A statement that outlines when and how the client or the solicitor may terminate the contingency 
fee agreement, the consequences of the termination for each of them and the manner in which the 
solicitor’s fee is to be determined in the event that the agreement is terminated. 
10.  A statement that informs the client that the client retains the right to make all critical decisions 
regarding the conduct of the matter.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 2. 
Contents of contingency fee agreements, litigious matters 
3.  In addition to the requirements set out in section 2, a solicitor who is a party to a contingency fee 
agreement made in respect of a litigious matter shall ensure that the agreement includes the following: 
1.  If the client is a plaintiff, a statement that the solicitor shall not recover more in fees than the 
client recovers as damages or receives by way of settlement.  
2.  A statement in respect of disbursements and taxes, including the GST payable on the 
solicitor’s fees, that indicates, 
i. whether the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and, if the 
client is responsible for the payment of disbursements, a general description of disbursements 
likely to be incurred, other than relatively minor disbursements, and 
ii. that if the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and the solicitor 
pays the disbursements or taxes during the course of the matter, the solicitor is entitled to be 
reimbursed for those payments, subject to section 47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998 
(legal aid charge against recovery), as a first charge on any funds received as a result of a 
judgment or settlement of the matter.  
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3.  A statement that explains costs and the awarding of costs and that indicates, 
i. that, unless otherwise ordered by a judge, a client is entitled to receive any costs 
contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if the client 
is the party entitled to costs, and  
ii. that a client is responsible for paying any costs contribution or award, on a partial 
indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if the client is the party liable to pay costs.  
4.  If the client is a plaintiff, a statement that indicates that the client agrees and directs that all 
funds claimed by the solicitor for legal fees, cost, taxes and disbursements shall be paid to the 
solicitor in trust from any judgment or settlement money.  
5.  If the client is a party under disability, for the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
represented by a litigation guardian, 
i. a statement that the contingency fee agreement either must be reviewed by a judge before 
the agreement is finalized or must be reviewed as part of the motion or application for approval 
of a settlement or a consent judgment under rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
ii. a statement that the amount of the legal fees, costs, taxes and disbursements are subject to 
the approval of a judge when the judge reviews a settlement agreement or consent judgment 
under rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
iii. a statement that any money payable to a person under disability under an order or 
settlement shall be paid into court unless a judge orders otherwise under rule 7.09 of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 3. 
Matters not to be included in contingency fee agreements 
4.  (1)  A solicitor shall not include in a contingency fee agreement a provision that, 
(a) requires the solicitor’s consent before a claim may be abandoned, discontinued or settled 
at the instructions of the client;  
(b) prevents the client from terminating the contingency fee agreement with the solicitor or 
changing solicitors; or 
(c) permits the solicitor to split their fee with any other person, except as provided by the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 4 (1). 
     (2)  In this section, 
“Rules of Professional Conduct” means the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper 
Canada.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 4 (2). 
Contingency fee agreement, person under disability 
5.  (1)  A solicitor for a person under disability represented by a litigation guardian with whom the 
solicitor is entering into a contingency fee agreement shall, 
(a) apply to a judge for approval of the agreement before the agreement is finalized; or 
(b) include the agreement as part of the motion or application for approval of a settlement or 
a consent judgment under rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 5 (1). 
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     (2)  In this section, 
“person under disability” means a person under disability for the purposes of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 5 (2). 
Contingency fee excludes costs and disbursements 
6.  A contingency fee agreement that provides that the fee is determined as a percentage of the amount 
recovered shall exclude any amount awarded or agreed to that is separately specified as being in respect 
of costs and disbursements.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 6. 
Contingency fee not to exceed damages 
7.  Despite any terms in a contingency fee agreement, a solicitor for a plaintiff shall not recover more in 
fees under the agreement than the plaintiff recovers as damages or receives by way of settlement.  O. Reg. 
195/04, s. 7. 
Settlement or judgment money to be held in trust  
8.  A client who is a party to a contingency fee agreement shall direct that the amount of funds claimed by 
the solicitor for legal fees, cost, taxes and disbursements be paid to the solicitor in trust from any 
judgment or settlement money.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 8. 
Disbursements and taxes 
9.  (1)  If the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes under a contingency fee 
agreement, a solicitor who has paid disbursements or taxes during the course of the matter in respect of 
which services were provided shall be reimbursed for the disbursements or taxes on any funds received as 
a result of a judgment or settlement of the matter.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 9 (1). 
     (2)  Except as provided under section 47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998 (legal aid charge 
against recovery), the amount to be reimbursed to the solicitor under subsection (1) is a first charge on the 
funds received as a result of the judgment or settlement.  O. Reg. 195/04, s. 9 (2). 
Timing of assessment of contingency fee agreement 
10.  For the purposes of clause 28.1 (11) (b) of the Act, the client or the solicitor may apply to the 
Superior Court of Justice for an assessment of the solicitor’s bill rendered in respect of a contingency fee 
agreement to which subsection 28.1 (6) or (8) of the Act applies within six months after its delivery.  
O. Reg. 195/04, s. 10. 
11.  OMITTED (PROVIDES FOR COMING INTO FORCE OF PROVISIONS OF THIS REGULATION).  O. Reg. 




LSUC Rules of Professional Conduct 
Contingency Fees and Contingency Fee Agreements  
3.6-2 Subject to rule 3.6-1, except in family law or criminal or quasi-criminal matters, a lawyer may enter 
into a written agreement in accordance with the Solicitors Act and the regulations thereunder, that 
provides that the lawyer’s fee is contingent, in whole or in part, on the successful disposition or 
completion of the matter for which the lawyer's services are to be provided. [Amended – November 2002, 
October 2004]  
Commentary [1] In determining the appropriate percentage or other basis of the contingency fee, the 
lawyer and the client should consider a number of factors, including the likelihood of success, the nature 
and complexity of the claim, the expense and risk of pursuing it, the amount of the expected recovery and 
who is to receive an award of costs. The lawyer and client may agree that in addition to the fee payable 
under the written agreement, any amount arising as a result of an award of costs or costs obtained as a 
part of a settlement is to be paid to the lawyer. Such agreement under the Solicitors Act must receive 
judicial approval. In such circumstances, a smaller percentage of the award than would otherwise be 
agreed upon for the contingency fee, after considering all relevant factors, will generally be appropriate. 
The test is whether the fee in all of the circumstances is fair and reasonable.  
[New - October 2002, Amended October 2004, October 2014] [2] [FLSC - not in use] 
LSUC Rules of Paralegal Conduct 
Contingency Fees (7) Except in quasi-criminal or criminal matters, a paralegal may enter into a written 
agreement that provides that the paralegal’s fee is contingent, in whole or in part, on the successful 
disposition or completion of the matter for which the paralegal’s services are to be provided. (8) In 
determining the appropriate percentage or other basis of a contingency fee under subrule (7), the paralegal 
shall advise the client on the factors that are being taken into account in determining the percentage or 
other basis, including the likelihood of success, the nature and complexity of the claim, the expense and 
risk of pursuing it, the amount of the expected recovery, who is to receive an award of costs and the 
amount of costs awarded. (9) The percentage or other basis of a contingency fee agreed upon under 
subrule (7) shall be fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all of the circumstances and the factors 
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SNB 2009, c 25, s 83. 
Since when 1979 1969 1975 1980 1968 1973 
Pre-Authorized 
Forms 
Benchers may make rules 
including but not limited 
to: form, content, limits on 
how much lawyer may 
charge, conditions lawyer 
must meet  
 
From Law Society Rules 




Must be: in writing; signed 
by lawyer and client(s) or 
agent; witnessed by a 
person who sees the 
client(s) sign the agreement 
and witness must swear an 
affidavit of execution; 
served to client(s) within 10 
days after signed and 
person who serves client(s) 
must swear an affidavit of 
service     
Benchers may make rules re: 
form, content, scope, and 
subject matter of provisions 
that shall or shall not be 
included in fee agreements  
 
From Rules of The Law Society 
of Saskatchewan, r 1501(1), 
(3): 
Must be in writing, signed by 
each party, and copies 
delivered to each party by 
lawyer  
Must be in writing; signed by 
client(s)/agent; and lawyer 
must provide client(s) with a 
copy of the “contingency 
contract”  
No Standard “Contingent Fee 
Agreement” provided by 
Law Society; agreement 
may vary from standard 
form if approved by a 
reviewing officer and 
consistent with 
requirements set-out under 
section 83 of the Act 
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 P.E.I. N.S. N.L. Y.T. N.W.T./N.U. ONT. 
Permitted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Legal Authority Rules of Civil Procedure, r 
57.  
 
(adopted from Ontario in 
1990) 
Nova Scotia Civil 
Procedure Rules, r 36.15, 
77.14, 82.05. 
Rules of Supreme Court, 
1986, r 55.15 -55.20. 
Legal Profession Act, 
RSY 2002, c.134, s 5. 
Rules of the Supreme 
Court of the Northwest 
Territories, NWT Reg 
010-96, r 657-663. 
Solicitors Act, RSO 1990, c S15, ss 
20-30. 
 
Since when 1977 1972 Formally 1986 1980 Formally 1979 Formally 2004 
Pre-Authorized 
Forms 
Must be in writing & 
signed by client(s)/agent 
Must be in writing & 
signed and dated by 
client(s)/agent and lawyer; 
once signed, lawyers must 
deliver copy “immediately” 
to each client(s), place 
original in a sealed 
envelope, and keep it so 
that it can be produced on 
order of an adjudicator 
under the Small Claims 
Court Act or a judge   
Must be in writing & 
signed by client(s)/agent; 
copy must be provided to 
client(s) 
Must be in writing; cannot 
contain provision stating 
that lawyer is not liable 
for negligence; Benchers 
may make rules re: form 
and content, maximum % 
for different classes of 
service and for different 
stages of a proceeding  
Must be in writing & 
signed by client(s)/agent 
Must be in writing; entitled 
“Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement”; 
dated; signed by lawyer and client(s); 
signatures must be verified by witness; 
lawyer must provide client(s) with 
executed copy and keep copy themselves 
From Ontario Regulation 195/04: 
Contingency Fee Agreements (under the 
Solicitors Act) 
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 B.C. ALTA. SASK. MAN. QUE. 
Statutory Lists of 
Mandatory and  
Restricted 
Contents 
Agreement must state that client(s) may apply to 
district registrar of the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia for review within 3 months after 
agreement was made or retainer was terminated; 
agreement cannot include provision stating that 
lawyer not liable for negligence or relieved from any 
responsibility lawyer would otherwise be subject; 
agreement cannot include provision stating that 
lawyer is entitled to both fee based on proportion of 
amount recovered and portion of amount awarded as 
costs or paid as costs in settlement (Law Society 
Rules 2015, ss 8-1(2), 8-3.) 
For personal injury or wrongful death arising out of 
the use or operation of a motor vehicle: agreement 
must include statement per s. 8-4(1) of Law Society 
Rules 201528 
In any other claim for personal injury or wrongful 
death: agreement must include statement per s. 8-4(2) 
of Law Society Rules 201529 
Name & address of client(s) & lawyer; 
nature of claim; statement of event or 
contingency; statement about manner of 
calculation; maximum fee or rate; 
responsibility for disbursements and other 
charges; if lawyer to receive part of costs 
award, then statement of: whether complete 
or partial portion of costs, 
acknowledgement of client(s) waiving right 
to complete or partial costs, 
acknowledgement that lawyer’s portion of 
costs award is in addition to other legal 
fees, % of costs award that lawyer receives 
may not exceed % of judgement or 
settlement lawyer is entitled to; statement 
that client(s) may terminate agreement 
within 5 days after being served; statement 
that review officer may review agreement 
and any lawyer’s charges upon client(s)’s 
request and review officer’s decision may 
be appealed to a judge     
Agreement cannot 
purport to: 1) exclude the 
member’s liability for 
negligence; 2) require the 
member’s consent before 
a client(s)’s cause may be 
abandoned, discontinued 
or settled; or 3) prevent 
the client(s) from 
changing solicitors 
before the conclusion of 
the retainer 
(Rules of The Law 
Society of Saskatchewan, 
r 1501(2))  
 
 
Lawyer must provide client(s) with notice of their 
right to review accompanying their “contingency 
contract”  
No 
Filing with Courts No No No No No 
Sanctions If lawyer does not comply with agreement 
requirements, lawyer only entitled to compensation 
in absence of agreement, but only if the event that 
would have allowed payment under the void 
agreement occurs 
If lawyer does not comply with agreement 
requirements, lawyer only entitled to 
compensation in absence of agreement  
No  If don't deliver notice of right of review, lawyer 
only entitled to compensation in absence of 
agreement; if contract found to be void upon 
review lawyer may have to reimburse the client(s) 
for any payment made under the contract 
No 
                                                     
28 Statement must read: Under the Rules of the Law Society of British Columbia, without court approval, a lawyer may charge a maximum of 33 1/3% of the total amount recovered in a claim for personal injury or wrongful death arising 
out of the use of a motor vehicle. The percentage limit applies to all matters related to the trial of a lawsuit, but does not include any appeal. A lawyer and a client(s) may make a separate agreement for legal fees for an appeal. Fees charged 
by different lawyers vary. 
29 Statement must read: Under the Rules of the Law Society of British Columbia, without court approval, a lawyer may charge a maximum of 40% of the total amount recovered in a claim for personal injury or wrongful death. The 
percentage limit applies to all matters related to the trial of a lawsuit, but does not include any appeal. A lawyer and a client(s) may make a separate agreement for legal fees for an appeal. Fees charged by different lawyers vary. 
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 N.B. P.E.I. N.S. N.L. YUKON 
Statutory Lists of 
Mandatory and  
Restricted 
Contents 
Name of client(s) & lawyer/firm; 
description of legal services to be 
performed; amount of fees to be charged 
for legal services; method by which fees 
are to be calculated and paid; description 
of costs, charges, disbursements and taxes 
to be paid under agreement; manner in 
which costs awarded by the court are to be 
applied to the payment of fees, costs, 
changes, disbursements and taxes; any 
other matter that affects the agreement; 
statement that client(s) is entitled to copy 
of the agreement upon execution; 
agreement shall not include provision 
allowing lawyer to be paid both a fee based 
on a proportion of amount recovered and 
costs awarded to client(s) by order of a 
court or by settlement of the matter  
Name & address of client(s) & lawyer; 
nature of claim; 
statement of contingency and whether 
and to what extent the client(s) is liable 
to pay compensation otherwise than 
from amounts collected by the lawyer; a 
statement that reasonable contingent 
compensation is to be paid for the 
services; the maximum amount or rate 
of compensation after disbursements;  
statement to the following effect: "This 
agreement may be reviewed by the 
Prothonotary at the client(s)'s request, 
and may either at the instance of the 
Prothonotary or the client(s) be further 
reviewed by the court, and either the 
Prothonotary or the court may vary, 
modify or disallow the agreement". 
Name & address of client(s) & lawyer; 
nature of claim; description of client(s)’s 
claim; condition prescribing contingency 
upon which services or disbursements are 
to be paid; term providing for any part of 
the services or disbursements the client(s) 
is required to pay regardless of the 
contingency, or providing that there are no 
such services or disbursements;   term 
providing the amount to be paid on the 
contingency, either as a gross sum or by a 
stated formula; the responsibilities of the 
parties if the solicitor-client(s) 
relationship terminates before the claim is 
settled or determined;  statement that the 
client(s) has the right to have the 
agreement and any payment due under it 
reviewed for the reasonableness and 
necessity of the charges by an adjudicator 
under the Small Claims Court Act or a 
judge 
Name & address of client(s) & 
lawyer; nature of claim; statement of 
contingency; whether and to what 
extent the client(s) is to be liable to 
pay compensation otherwise than 
from amounts collected by the 
lawyer; statement that reasonable 
contingent compensation is to be paid 
for services; maximum amount or 
rate which the compensation is not to 
exceed after deduction of 
disbursements; and statement to the 
following effect: "This agreement 
may be reviewed by a taxing officer 
at the client(s)'s request, and may 
either at the instance of the taxing 
officer or the client(s) be further 
reviewed by the Court, and either the 
taxing officer or the Court may vary, 
modify or disallow the agreement." 
Specify % 
applied; notice of 
right of review 
by the clerk of 
the Supreme 
Court 
Filing with Courts Yes, filed with the Executive Director as a 
confidential document and maintained on 
file until the final disposition of the matter 
Yes, filed with the Prothonotary as a 
confidential document within 10 days of 
being signed  
No No No 
Sanctions If lawyer does not comply with agreement 
requirements, lawyer only entitled to 
compensation in absence of agreement, but 
only if the event that would have allowed 
payment under the void agreement occurs 
If lawyer does not comply with 
agreement requirements, lawyer only 
entitled to compensation in absence of 
agreement  
No  If don't deliver notice of right of 
review, lawyer only entitled to 
compensation in absence of 
agreement; if contract found to be 
void upon review lawyer may have to 
reimburse the client(s) for any 





 N.W.T./N.U. ONT. 
Statutory Lists of 
Mandatory and  
Restricted 
Contents 
Memorandum evidencing contingency 
agreement shall state: name & address of 
client(s) & lawyer; nature of the claim;  
contingency and whether and to what extent 
the client(s) is liable to pay compensation 
otherwise than from amounts collected by the 
solicitor;  
that contingent compensation must be 
reasonable and is to be paid for services; 
maximum amount or rate after deduction of 
disbursements;   
and statement to the following effect: "This 
agreement may be reviewed by the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court at the client(s)’s request 
and may at the instance of either the Clerk or 
the client(s) be further reviewed by a Judge of 
the Supreme Court and either the Clerk or the 
Judge may vary, modify or disallow the 
agreement." 
 
Name, address & telephone number of client(s) & lawyer; statement of the basic type and nature of lawyer’s services; description of contingency 
upon which fee is based; method by which fees are to be determined; if method is percentage, then statement that recovery excludes costs and 
disbursements; a simple example of how fee is calculated; statement outlining how fee is calculated if recovery is by structured settlement; statement 
that client has right to ask for review, including applicable timelines; explanation of how lawyer or client may terminate agreement, and the 
consequences for each party and manner in which fees would be determined in the event the agreement is terminated; agreement cannot contain 
provisions stating client cannot terminate contingency fee agreement or that the lawyer may split the fee with any person, other than provided for 
under LSUC’s Rules of Professional Conduct; statement that client(s) retains right to make all critical decisions regarding the matter; and statement 
indicating: 1) client(s) and lawyer have discussed options other than contingency fee agreement, including hourly-rate retainer; 2) client advised that 
hourly rates may vary across lawyers and that they can compare rates; 3) client has chosen to retain lawyer by way of contingency fee agreement; 
and 4) client understands that all usual protections and controls on retainers apply  
 
In addition to the above, if agreement is with regard to litigious matter, then agreement must also include: if client is plaintiff, statement that lawyer 
shall not recover more in fees than damages or settlement; statement with regard to disbursements and taxes, including if client(s) is responsible for 
payments and a description of disbursements likely to be incurred, and that the client(s) may have to reimburse lawyer for these payments; statement 
explaining that, unless otherwise ordered by a judge, if client(s) is party entitled to costs they are entitled to receive  costs contribution or award on a 
partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, and  if client(s) is the party liable and responsible to pay costs then they must pay on one of the 
two aforementioned scales; if client is a plaintiff, statement indicating client(s) agrees and directs all funds claimed by lawyer for legal fees, cost, 
taxes, and disbursements to be paid to the lawyer in trust from any judgement or settlement money; if client(s) under disability and represented by a 
litigation guardian under the Rules of Civil Procedure: statement that agreement must either be reviewed by judge before finalized or reviewed as 
part of motion or application for approval of settlement or a consent judgment under rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, along with all of legal 
fees, costs, taxes, and disbursements, and statement that any money payable to person under disability under an order or settlement shall be paid into 
court unless a judge orders otherwise under rule 7.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure   
From Ontario Regulation 195/04: Contingency Fee Agreements (under the Solicitors Act) 
Filing with Courts Yes, memorandum filed with the Clerk as a 
confidential document within 15 days of 
signing 
No 
Sanctions If agreement does not comply with content 
and filing requirements, lawyer only entitled 
to compensation in absence of agreement 
Upon application to the Superior Court of Justice, agreement may be declared void and cancelled; in that case, any costs, fees, charges and 
disbursements incurred or chargeable are to be assessed in the ordinary manner 
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 B.C. ALTA. SASK. MAN. QUE. N.B. 
Prohibited Areas & 
Clients 
Child custody or access; 
Matrimonial disputes (unless 
Court approved) 
 
No Child custody or access; Matrimonial 
disputes (unless Court approved) 
(Rules of The Law Society of 
Saskatchewan, r 1502)  
No No Child custody or access; 
Matrimonial disputes; 
Criminal or quasi-criminal 





Yes, client(s) may apply to 
district registrar of the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia for 
review within 3 months after 
agreement was made or retainer 
was terminated 
Yes, client(s) can request an 
officer to review the 
reasonableness of the account 
and contingency agreement; 
review officer’s decision may 
be appealed to a judge 
Yes, at any time after agreement is made 
up until 30 days after the client(s) is 
billed, or at any time if the court is 
satisfied that it is in the interests of justice 
to do so; alternatively, an application for 
review can be made to the local registrar 
after the client(s) has been billed, at the 
request of both the lawyer and client(s)  
Yes, at any time within 6 
months after receiving the bill 
client(s) may apply for 
assessment; or within 6 months 
after payment of the bill, 
client(s) may seek a 
declaration that the contract is 
not fair and reasonable  
No Yes, within 90 days after the 
agreement is made or the 
retainer is terminated 
client(s) can apply to 
reviewing officer, 
notwithstanding payment 
under the agreement 
 
 P.E.I. N.S. N.L. YUKON N.W.T./N.U. ONT. 
Prohibited Areas 
& Clients 
No No No Family law; distribution of 
Estates; any proceeding in 
relation to the property of 
any person under Legal 
Disability 
No Criminal or quasi-criminal matters; 
Family law 
Court approval required for 
agreements made with persons under 
disability (Ontario Regulation 195/04: 




Yes, at any time after 
the agreement is 
formed up until 6 
months after payment 
of the bill, client(s) 
may apply to the 
Prothonotary, who then 
may refer to court 
Yes, client(s) has 
right to have 
agreement and any 
payment due under it 
reviewed by an 
adjudicator or a 
judge under the 
Small Claims Court 
Act  
Yes, client(s) can apply 
to taxing officer at any 
time after agreement is 
made until expiry of 6 
months from date on 
which lawyer received 
fee or part of the fee, and 
from there, taxing officer 
can refer to the Court 
Yes, within 90 days after 
agreement made or retainer 
terminated client(s) may 
apply to clerk of the 
Supreme Court for review, 
notwithstanding payment 
under the agreement; 
decision may be appealed to 
judge of the Supreme Court  
Yes, client(s) may request review from 
Clerk at any time after agreement 
made until 1 year from last date lawyer 
has received the fee or part of the fee; 
at any time while contingency 
agreement is before the Clerk for 
review or within 15 days after Clerk’s 
decision, Clerk may, on the request of 
client(s) or lawyer refer to a judge 
Yes, client(s) or lawyer may apply to 
the Superior Court of Justice for 
assessment of the lawyer’s bill within 
6 months after its delivery  
From Ontario Regulation 195/04: 
Contingency Fee Agreements (under 
the Solicitors Act)  
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 B.C. ALTA. SASK. MAN. QUE. N.B. 
Fixed or Maximum 
Fee Specified & Basis 
of Compensation 
Total fee cannot exceed the remuneration 
provided for in the agreement 
For personal injury or wrongful death arising out 
of the use or operation of a motor vehicle: 33 
1/3% of the amount recovered (unless higher 
remuneration approved by Court) 
In any other claim for personal injury or wrongful 
death: 40% of the amount recovered (unless 
higher remuneration approved by Court)30 
If lawyer receives portion of 
costs award then % of costs 
award received may not 
exceed % of judgement or 
settlement lawyer is entitled 
to 
Total fee cannot exceed the remuneration 
provided for in the agreement 
 
No No Unless approved by a reviewing 
officer, lawyer may retain 25% at 
most of the amount recovered for 
the client(s), exclusive of costs, 
taxes and disbursements; if the 
matter proceeds to an appeal, the 
maximum percentage increases 
to 30% 
Settlement Provision Agreement cannot purport to require lawyer 
consent to abandon, discontinue, or settle 
None Agreement cannot purport to require 
lawyer consent to abandon, discontinue, 
or settle 
(Rules of The Law Society of 
Saskatchewan, r 1501(1)(d)) 
None None None 
Termination/ Change 
Lawyer Provision 
Agreement cannot purport to prevent the client(s) 
from changing solicitors before the conclusion of 
the claim or cause of action 
Client(s) may terminate 
lawyer without incurring any 
liability under the agreement 
within 5 days of service 
Agreement cannot purport to prevent the 
client(s) from changing solicitors before 
the conclusion of the retainer 
(Rules of The Law Society of 
Saskatchewan, r 1501(e)) 
None None None 
 
  
                                                     
30 In the alternative, agreement may provide that the lawyer may elect to forego any remuneration based on a proportion of the amount recovered and receive instead an amount equal to any costs awarded to the 
client by order of a court. 
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 P.E.I. N.S. N.L. Y.T. N.W.T./N.U. ONT. 
Fixed or Maximum 
Fee Specified & Basis 
of Compensation 
No No No No No No fixed or maximum fee, however contingency fee must exclude costs 
and disbursements, and cannot exceed damages 
From Ontario Regulation 195/04: Contingency Fee Agreements (under the 
Solicitors Act) 
(Solicitors Act: The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations 
governing the maximum amount or percentage of remuneration that may 
be paid to lawyer pursuant to a contingency fee agreement; agreements 
may exceed any regulated maximum if, upon joint application by the 
lawyer and client(s), agreement is approved by the Superior Court of 
Justice within 90 days after agreement executed) 
Settlement Provision Provision requiring 
lawyer consent to 
abandon, 
discontinue, or settle 
is void 
None Provision requiring 
lawyer consent to 
abandon, discontinue, or 
settle is void 
None Provision requiring 
lawyer consent to 
abandon, discontinue, 
or settle is void 
Agreement cannot contain provision requiring lawyer consent to abandon, 
discontinue, or settle 














responsibilities of the 
parties if the solicitor 
and client(s) 
relationship 
terminates before the 




application may be made 
by or on behalf of either 
party to the taxing officer 
to determine the amount, 
if any, due for the 
services rendered under 
the retainer with regard 
to terms of the agreement 




Agreement cannot contain provision preventing client(s) from terminating 
agreement with lawyer or from changing lawyers 
 








CONDITIONAL & DAMAGES-BASED AGREEMENTS IN THE U.K. AND AUSTRALIA 
 
UK Conditional Fee 
Agreements [CFA] with/without 
success fee (or “uplift”) 
UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA] Australia Conditional Costs Agreements with/without success fee (or “uplift”) 
Australia Damages-based 
Agreements 
Description CFAs “…are sold on the 
understanding that a lawyer will 
not take a fee if the claim fails. In 
most cases, if the claim is 
successful, the lawyer will charge 
an uplift (known as a success fee) in 
addition to their base costs.” (“'No 
win, no fee' agreements” from the 
Legal Ombudsman) 
 
“DBAs are a type of ‘no win, no fee’ agreement 
under which a representative can recover an agreed 
percentage of a client’s damages if the case is won, 
but will receive nothing if the case is lost.” 
(Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013) 
Note: the Civil Justice Council has recently published 
a report on Damages-Based Agreements, including a 
number of recommended changes (see, The 
Damages-Based Agreements Reform Project: 
Drafting and Policy Issues) 
“A costs agreement may provide that the payment of 
some or all of the legal costs is conditional on the 
successful outcome of the matter to which those costs 
relate” (Legal Profession Act 2004, No 112, ss 323-
24) 
From the Productivity Commission’s final 
report on Access to Justice Arrangements: 
The Australian, State and Territory 
Governments should remove restrictions 
on damages based billing (contingency 
fees). This recommendation should only 
be adopted subject to the following 
protections being in place for consumers: 
•  the prohibition on damages based 
billing for criminal and family matters, in 
line with restrictions for conditional 
billing, should remain. 
•  comprehensive disclosure requirements 
— including the percentage of damages, 
and where liability will fall for 
disbursements and adverse costs orders — 
being made explicit in the billing contract 
at the outset of the agreement. 
•  percentages should be capped on a 
sliding scale for retail clients with no 
percentage restrictions for sophisticated 
clients. 
•  damages based fees should be used on 
their own with no additional fees (for 
example, lawyers should not be able to 
charge a percentage of damages in 
addition to their hourly rate). 
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UK Conditional Fee 
Agreements [CFA] with/without 
success fee (or “uplift”) 
UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA] Australia Conditional Costs Agreements with/without success fee (or “uplift”) 
Australia Damages-based 
Agreements 
Permitted Yes Yes Yes No (not yet anyway… see above) 
Legal Authority Courts and Legal Services Act 
1990, c 41, s 58. 
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c 41, s 58. Each state and territory has an Act in force 
entitled Legal Profession Act, based on national 
template legislation, which allows for Conditional 
Costs Agreements and sets-out the specific 
requirements and restrictions of the Agreements 
with and without success fees; at least some of 
these Acts also explicitly ban contingency fee or 
damages-based agreements (see for example: New 
South Wales’ Legal Profession Act 2004, No 112, s 
325, “contingency fees are prohibited”) 
NA 
Since when 1998 2010 (for employment proceedings only); 2013 (for 




Must be in writing; must relate to 
proceedings of a description specified 
by order made by the Lord 
Chancellor; must comply with any 
requirements prescribed by the Lord 
Chancellor  
(Law Society provides model CFA as 
a suggested starting point for building 
agreements) 
Must be in writing; must not provide for a payment 
above a prescribed amount or for a payment above an 
amount calculated in a prescribed manner (see, 
“Fixed or Maximum Fee Specified & Basis of 
Compensation”); must comply with such other 
requirements as to its terms and conditions as are 
prescribed (see, “Statutory Lists of Mandatory and  
Restricted Contents”); and must be made only after 
the person providing services under the agreement 
has provided prescribed information (see below)  
For employment matters: any amendment to a DBA 
to cover additional causes of action must be in 
writing and signed by client and lawyer; and lawyer 
must provide client with,  
Information in writing about the meanings of terms, 
as defined in the Damages-Based Agreements 
Regulation;  




UK Conditional Fee 
Agreements [CFA] with/without 
success fee (or “uplift”) 
UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA] Australia Conditional Costs Agreements with/without success fee (or “uplift”) 
Australia Damages-based 
Agreements 
circumstances in which client may seek a review of 
lawyer’s costs and expenses and the procedure for 
doing so 
the dispute resolution service provided by the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS) in regard to actual and potential claims; 
Whether other methods of pursuing the claim or 
financing the proceedings are available, and, if so, 
how they apply to the client and the claim or 
proceedings in question (i.e., advice under the 
Community Legal Service, legal expenses insurance, 
pro bono representation, or trade union 
representation); 
The point at which expenses become payable; and 
A reasonable estimate of the amount that is likely to 
be spent upon expenses, inclusive of VAT 
Statutory Lists of 
Mandatory and  
Restricted 
Contents 
Description of damages (can only 
include those specified by the Lord 
Chancellor in the Conditional Fee 
Agreements Order 2013; see “Fixed 
or Maximum Fee Specified & Basis 
of Compensation”); statement that the 
success fee is subject to a maximum 
limit; maximum limit expressed as a 
% of the damages awarded in the 
proceedings (see “Fixed or Maximum 
Fee Specified & Basis of 
Compensation”); statement that the % 
by which the amount of fees which 
would be payable if it were not a 
CFA is to be increased 
Description of claim or proceedings or the parts of 
them to which the agreement relates; description of 
the contingency; explanation for setting the amount 
of payment at the level agreed (in an employment 
matter, must include whether the claim or 
proceedings is one of several similar claims or 
proceedings) 
DBAs must not require an amount to be paid by 
client other than the payment, net of any costs, 
disbursements incurred by lawyer, and any expenses 
incurred by lawyer 
For personal injury proceedings: DBAs must not 
require an amount to be paid by client other than: 
general damages for pain, suffering and loss of 




UK Conditional Fee 
Agreements [CFA] with/without 
success fee (or “uplift”) 
UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA] Australia Conditional Costs Agreements with/without success fee (or “uplift”) 
Australia Damages-based 
Agreements 
future pecuniary loss), net of any sums recoverable 
by the Compensation Recovery Unit of the 
Department for Work and Pensions 
Filing with 
Courts 
No No  NA 
Sanctions Breach of the statutory requirements 
of s.58 of the Courts and Legal 
Services Act renders a CFA 
unlawful/unenforceable and no costs 
may be recovered 
Examples of breaches are: 
a success fee of more than 100% 
the CFA is not in writing 
there is no statutory cap in PI cases 
where the CFA provides for a success 
fee to be paid 
No 
(If DBA terminated, lawyer may not charge client 
more than their normal costs and expenses for the 





Criminal proceedings (other than 
under section 82 of 
the Environmental Protection Act 
1990); Family proceedings (including 
child custody or access and 
matrimonial disputes) 
No (open to all civil litigation)  
 






No No  NA 
Fixed or 
Maximum Fee 
Specified & Basis 
of Compensation 
Success fee may not exceed 100% of 
the lawyer’s fee 
Success fee under a CFA may not be 
recovered by a lawyer from a losing 
For personal injury claims at first instance: maximum 
fee is 25% of damages, including VAT; fee may be 
taken from general damages for pain, suffering, loss 
of amenity, damages for pecuniary loss [other than 




UK Conditional Fee 
Agreements [CFA] with/without 
success fee (or “uplift”) 
UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA] Australia Conditional Costs Agreements with/without success fee (or “uplift”) 
Australia Damages-based 
Agreements 
party, only from their successful 
client (previously, lawyer could 
recover from losing party) 
For personal injury claims: maximum 
fee is 25% of damages in proceedings 
at first instance; and 100% of 
damages in all other proceedings, i.e. 
appeals; (in proceedings at first 
instance or on appeal, fee may be 
taken from general damages for pain, 
suffering, loss of amenity, damages 
for pecuniary loss [other than future 
pecuniary loss], and net of any sums 
recoverable by the Compensation 
Recovery Unit of the Department for 
Work and Pensions (some limitations 
such as in the case of diffuse 
mesothelioma, insolvency work or 
publication and privacy proceedings, 
see the Conditional Fee Agreement 
Order 2013, s 6(2)) 
recoverable by the Compensation Recovery Unit of 
the Department for Work and Pensions 
For employment matters: maximum fee is 35% of the 
sums ultimately recovered by the client in the claim 
or proceedings, including VAT 
In any other claim or proceedings at first instance: 
maximum fee is 50% of the sums ultimately 
recovered by the client, including VAT 
Settlement 
Provision 





No Client may not terminate DBA after settlement has 
been agreed; or within 7 days before the start of the 
tribunal hearing 
Lawyer may not terminate DBA and charge costs 
unless the client has behaved or is behaving 
unreasonably 
(see, “Pre-Authorized Forms” for amending a DBA 




Personal Injury/Malpractice Decisions 
 
Cogan, Re (2010 ONSC 915) .................................................................................................................................. 50	
Seguin v. Chaput (2010 ONSC 1275) ..................................................................................................................... 51	
Access Legal Services Professional Corp. v. Padjen (2010 ONSC 1412) .............................................................. 52	
Access Legal Services Professional Corp. V Padjen (2010 ONCA 669) ................................................................ 53	
Aywas (Litigation Guardian of) V Kirwan (2010 ONSC 2278) ............................................................................. 54	
Young (Litigation Guardian of) V Hinks Estate (2010 ONSC 2067) ..................................................................... 55	
MPampas V Steamatic Toronto Inc. (2010 ONCA 373) ......................................................................................... 56	
Alves v. Azevedo & Nelson Barristers & Solicitors (2010 ONSC 2853) ............................................................... 57	
Skocir v. Premier Fitness Clubs (Yorkdale) Inc. (2010 ONSC 4636)..................................................................... 57	
Jean Estate v. Wires Jolley LLP (2010 ONSC 4835) .............................................................................................. 58	
Choi v. Choi (2010 ONSC 4800) ............................................................................................................................ 59	
Attis v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (2010 ONSC 4508) ....................................................................................... 60	
Loreto v. Little (2010 ONSC 4764) ........................................................................................................................ 60	
Séguin v. Van Dyke (2010 ONSC 6636) ................................................................................................................ 61	
Séguin v. Van Dyke (2013 ONSC 6576) ................................................................................................................ 62	
Dolan (Litigation Guardian of) v. Reid (2010 ONSC 6608) ................................................................................... 64	
394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek (2010 ONSC 7238) ..................................................................... 65	
Broesky v. Lüst (2011 ONSC 167) ......................................................................................................................... 65	
Billings (Litigation Guardian of) v. Lanark Mutual Insurance Co. (2011 ONSC 2564) ......................................... 65	
Ledroit v. Rooplall (2011 ONSC 2751) .................................................................................................................. 66	
Karkar v. Karkar (2011 ONSC 2550) ...................................................................................................................... 67	
Ontario (Public Guardian & Trustee) v. Charland (2011 ONSC 2961) .................................................................. 67	
Laushway Law Office v. Simpson (2011 ONSC 4155) .......................................................................................... 68	
Laushway Law Office v. Simpson (2013 ONCA 317) ........................................................................................... 70	
Miller (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bender (2011 ONSC 4379) ............................................................................... 71	
Consky v. Farooq (2011 ONSC 5148) .................................................................................................................... 72	
Consky v. Farooq (2013 ONCA 393)...................................................................................................................... 73	
Oakley & Oakley Professional Corp. v. Aitken (2011 ONSC 5613) ...................................................................... 74	
Dryden v. Oatley Vigmond LLP (2011 ONSC 7303) ............................................................................................. 75	
Merovitz Potechin LLP v. Cantor (2011 ONSC 79) ............................................................................................... 76	
Ahou (Guardian of Property) v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2012 ONSC 1601) .................... 76	
Henricks-Hunter (Litigation guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (2013 ONSC 5245) .......................................... 78	
Henricks-Hunter (Litigation Guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (2012 ONCA 496)........................................... 80	
Warnica v. Van Moorlehem (2012 ONSC 4241) .................................................................................................... 82	
McAndrew (Litigation Guardian of) v. Roberts (2012 ONSC 4712) ...................................................................... 83	
Meady v. Greyhound Canada Transportation Corp. (2012 ONSC 5568) ............................................................... 84	
Kamboj v. Sidhu (2013 ONSC 2478)...................................................................................................................... 84	
Melvin (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ontario (Minister of Correctional Services) (2013 ONSC 5432) .................... 85	
Traffic Law Advocate (E.E.) Professional Corp. v. Yang (2013 ONSC 2887) ...................................................... 86	
Jane Conte Professional Corp. v. Smith (2014 ONSC 6009) .................................................................................. 87	
Chen v. Singer, Kwinter LLP (2013 ONSC 6712) .................................................................................................. 88	
 49 
Rops (Litigation guardian of) v. Intact Insurance Co. (2013 ONSC 7366) ............................................................. 89	
Soullière (Litigation Guardian of) v. Robitaille Estate (2014 ONSC 851) ............................................................. 90	
Baines v. Linett & Timmis Barristers & Solicitors (2014 ONSC 2348) ................................................................. 91	
St. Jean v. Armstrong (2015 ONSC 13) .................................................................................................................. 92	
Erickson & Partners v. Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care) (2014 ONSC 4339) ........................... 94	
Erickson & Partners v. Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care) (2015 ONCA 285) ............................. 95	
Davis v. Cox-Kikkajoon (2015 ONSC 1946) .......................................................................................................... 97	
Umbach (Litigation guardian of) v. Wilmot (Township) (2014 ONSC 2995) ........................................................ 98	
Zhau (Litigation guardian of) v. 2100950 Ontario Inc. – additional reasons to judgement in (2015 ONSC 785) .. 99	
Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP v. Chen (2015 ONSC 2501) .................................................................................... 100	
Russo (Litigation guardian of) v. Seligman (2015 ONSC 3019) .......................................................................... 101	
Romero v. Turnbull (2015 ONSC 3638) ............................................................................................................... 102	
Gnys v. Narbutt (2015 ONSC 4407) ..................................................................................................................... 104	
John Doe v. MacDonald (2015 ONSC 4850) ........................................................................................................ 105	
Sawah v. Warren (2015 ONSC 5373) ................................................................................................................... 106	
Mishan v. York Central Hospital (2015 ONSC 6369) .......................................................................................... 107	
Livent Inc. (Receiver of) v. Deloitte & Touche (2016 ONCA 11)........................................................................ 108	
Livent Inc. (Receiver of) v. Deloitte & Touche (2016 ONCA 11)........................................................................ 109	
Edwards (Litigation guardian of) v. Camp Kennebec (Frontenac) (1979) Inc.  (2016 ONSC 2501) ................... 110	
Batalla v. St. Michael's Hospital (2016 ONSC 1513) ........................................................................................... 111	





Cogan, Re (2010 ONSC 915) 
2010 Carswell Ont 1148, 2010 ONSC 915, [2010] O.J. No. 827, 185 A.C.W.S. (3d) 779, 92 C.P.C. (6th) 356 
Date Heard: N/A 
Judgement: February, 2010 
Parties Moving Party: Cogan, Q.C. 
Counsel For himself (motion): J. Arthur Cogan, Q.C. 
Judge/s Then: Hackland R.S.J. 
Quick Facts P. (minor) and Litigation Guardian (“LG”) brought a medical negligence action (birth injury). 
MOTION by solicitor for approval of contingency fee to be charged to minor plaintiff and 
litigation guardian. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act: ss. 28.1(1), 28.1(2), 28.1(8), 28.1(8), 28.1(12); Reg 195/04: s.5(1); Rules of 
Civil Procedure: referred to: s.5; Family Law Act 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
33.33% CFA: "[s.2.(4) of Reg] “…the clients hereby agree that the lawyer's fee shall be 
contingent upon the successful resolution of the litigation whether by court disposition after 
trial or by way of settlement during trial, which fee shall be: [33% and then there was a 
calculation example provided, as per the Reg]” AND "[Solicitor] arranged for independent 
legal advice for them in relation to the [CFA]."  
Settlement: $8.5M with $800,000 attributable to party-and-party costs 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. What fees should be allowed to the solicitor whether under the CFA, or otherwise, for his 
services to the minor P. in this action  
B. Should the CFA be strictly interpreted  
C. What factors should be considered when assessing the CF% 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 25% contingency fee + disbursements + GST approved.  
A. Responding party ordered to pay fees of $1.84M [25% * ($8.5M -0.800M-0.338M)]; also 
ordered to pay disbursements of $65k "The fees allowed amount, in my estimation, to a 
premium of about four times the billings which would likely have accrued on an hourly basis 
[quantum meruit] and accordingly promote the goal of access to justice in that the economics 
of taking on a complex medical negligence action such as this are sufficiently favourable to 
attract experienced counsel of the calibre of the solicitor." 
B. “Submissions of Solicitor and Litigation Guardian indicated that strict wording of CF not 
applicable to pre-trial settlement; 
C. Solicitor incurred significant financial risk and incurred $65k in costs prior by settlement; 
adverse results could have placed Solicitor's law firm in serious jeopardy; P. (minor) had 
strong case on liability; Given strength of case apparent from preliminary expert reports, case 
was of low to medium risk for Solicitor; Solicitor's fees wouldn't encroach on amounts for P. 
(minor) present or future needs 
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Seguin v. Chaput (2010 ONSC 1275) 
2010 CarswellOnt 1092, 2010 ONSC 1275, [2010] O.J. No. 767, 186 A.C.W.S. (3d) 70 
Date Heard: February, 2010 
Judgement: February, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Seguin 
Defendant: Chaput 
Counsel For Plaintiff: William J. Sammon, S. Tia Hazra 
For Defendant: Pat Peloso 
Judge/s Then: Lafrance-Cardinal J. 
Quick Facts The P. was injured in a motor vehicle accident, and then attended mediation with her lawyer, 
and insurance company reps. ACTION to set aside the minutes from the settlement meeting, 
as the P. desires more money 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Rules of Civil Procedure: 1.03(1), 59.06(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 




"Secondary Issue: Does the Court have jurisdiction in this Motion to set aside the [CFA] 
between Plaintiff and Solicitor?" 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. Motion to set aside the meeting minutes set aside 
Secondary issue: "As the original claim has been satisfied by the judgment issued, a fresh 
application will have to be brought against the Plaintiff's original solicitor if [the CFA] issue 





Access Legal Services Professional Corp. v. Padjen (2010 ONSC 1412) 
 – SEE ONCA DECISION BELOW 
2010 CarswellOnt 1302, 2010 ONSC 1412, 185 A.C.W.S. (3d) 880 
Date Heard: October, 2009 
Judgement: March, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Access Legal Services Professional Corporation; Mundulai 
Defendant: Padjen 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Aliamisse O. Mundulai 
For Defendant: Jean-Paul Waldin 
Judge/s Then: Patricia C. Hennessy J. 
Quick Facts The defendant suffered a workplace injury and retained the services of the Paralegal 
Corporation Access Legal Services to represent her in an appeal before the WSIB. Mr. 
Mundulai was retained by the paralegal firm to present the plaintiff's case. His services 
included a one day hearing. The appeal was successful. Ms. Padjen was awarded pension 
arrears of $160,053.02, $72,245.01 for interest, $950.18 per month for ongoing disability 
benefits. The plaintiff Corporation and Paralegal (Mr. Mundulai is now a lawyer but was a 
paralegal at the time) sued Ms. Padjen for outstanding fees. This [CFA] is the main basis of 
the claim. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
N/A – see “Outcome” section 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
N/A – see “Outcome” section 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
N/A – see “Outcome” section 
Outcome “At the time the alleged [CFA] is said to have been signed and performed, [CFAs] between 
paralegals and their clients were considered void and prohibited by law (Tri Level…. 




Access Legal Services Professional Corp. V Padjen (2010 ONCA 669) 
 – SEE ONSC DECISION ABOVE   
2010 CarswellOnt 7748, 2010 ONCA 669, 193 A.C.W.S. (3d) 426 
 
  
Date Heard: October 8, 2010 
Judgment: October 8, 2010 
Parties Access Legal Services Professional Corporation and Aliamisse Mundulai 
(Plaintiffs/Appellant) 
Mirjana Padjen (Defendant / Respondent) 
Counsel Aliamisse Mundulai for himself 
L. Leslie Dizgun for Access Legal Services Professional Corporation 
Jan-Paul Waldin for Defendant / Respondent 
Judge/s H.S. LaForme J.A., R.A. Blair J.A., and R.G. Juriansz J.A. 
Quick Facts Client retained paralegal firm in connection with workers' compensation appeal. Paralegal 
firm retained paralegal to represent client at appeal hearing. Client won appeal and was 
awarded $160,053.02 for pension arrears, $72,245.01 for interest, and $950.18 per month for 
ongoing disability benefits. Paralegal firm billed client $21,995.05 and she paid promptly.  
About one year later, paralegal firm billed client for $73,473.18. Paralegal firm alleged client 
had signed CFA providing for contingency fee of 30% of total amount recovered. Paralegal 
firm and paralegal commenced action against client for payment of contingency fee. Client 
served request to admit but paralegal firm and paralegal failed to respond. Client brought 
motion for summary judgment dismissing action. Motion was granted. Deemed admissions 
indicated paralegal firm was unlicensed at time and that client had not signed CFA. Paralegal 
firm never sought leave to withdraw deemed admissions. Paralegal firm did not provide 
evidence to establish basis for granting leave to withdraw deemed admissions. Original CFA 
was never produced. Paralegal firm acknowledged in submissions that CFAs were void and 
prohibited at relevant time. Paralegal admitted his retainer agreement was with paralegal firm 
and not with client directly. No claim based on quantum meruit had been pleaded. Paralegal 
appealed. 





Paralegal firm alleged client had signed CFA providing for contingency fee of 30% of total 
amount recovered 
Issue/s with 
Agreement Whether or not client had signed a CFA with the paralegal firm 
Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed. 
“This appeal is utterly devoid of any merit.” (para 1) … “We fix the costs of the abandoned 
appeal against Access in the total amount of $7,000 inclusive of disbursements plus HST.” 
(para 9) … “we fix the costs of the Mundulai appeal against Mr. Mundulai personally on a 
substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $13,000 inclusive of disbursements and any 
applicable taxes.” (para 10) 
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Aywas (Litigation Guardian of) V Kirwan (2010 ONSC 2278) 
2010 CarswellOnt 4447, 2010 ONSC 2278, [2010] O.J. No. 2713, 190 A.C.W.S. (3d) 739, 99 C.P.C. (6th) 199 
Date Heard: March, 2010 
Judgement: April, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Wadi Aywas, by his Litigation Guardian Selma Hanna; Selma Hanna; Dina Aywas; 
Raad Aywas; Rafid Aywas; Dalya Aywas; Lina Aywas; minors, by their Litigation 
Guardian: Zena Aywas and Ramey Aways 
Defendant: Kirwan 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Hector H. Emond, Asfrah Syed 
For Defendant: Not listed on Westlaw 
Judge/s Then: Charles T. Hackland J. 
Quick Facts P. (then 47 y.o.) was a pedestrian and hit by the D.'s vehicle:"[P.'s] post accident course has 
been very unusual. He has suffered daily severe headaches, sleep disruption, balance 
problems, reduced memory and concentration, depression, anxiety and post traumatic stress 
syndrome... He has not been employed since the accident." Parties brought application for 
[A] court approval of tort settlement, statutory accident benefits (SAB) settlement, and [B] 
solicitor's CFA claimed on both settlements. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Family Law Act, ss. 42, 61; Insurance Act, Substitute Decisions Act 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 




B. Whether or not a CFA, in the case of an incapable person, is binding on the Court.  
Outcome Held: Application granted in part. 25% for the tort and 15% for the SAB  
A. “I agree with [P.’s] counsel's assessment of the risk of proceeding to trial [with the 
principal disability being psychiatric in nature and the P. not having suffered a head injury] 
and I consider this settlement [$550k] to be fair and prudent in the circumstances.”  
B. "The Court will allow a fee in the amount of 15% of the SAB's lump sum settlement plus 
the fees of [$36k] previously deducted on the monthly benefits received of [$366k]. The tort 
[CF%] is reduced to 25% which fairly compensates the solicitors for the work done.” “A 
[CFA] in the case of an incapable person is not binding on the Court, but is certainly a matter 
of importance to be considered as a matter of client expectations” “I regard this as a good 
settlement in a matter of average complexity. The risk assumed by the solicitors was 
moderate and related mainly to the causation aspects of the plaintiff's injuries. I do not think 
that applying the same contingency fee to the SAB's settlement as to the tort settlement is 




Young (Litigation Guardian of) V Hinks Estate (2010 ONSC 2067) 
2010 CarswellOnt 2718, 2010 ONSC 2067, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 78, 56 E.T.R. (3d) 92 
Date Heard: N/A 
Judgement: April, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Shawna Young (by her Litigation Guardian Glynn Young); Pamela Young 
Defendant: Smitiuch (Litigation Administrator of Marion Hinks Estate); Goodwin; Cessco 
Enterprises 
Counsel For Plaintiff: D.V. Orlando 
For Defendant: Not listed on QL 
Judge/s Then: Sproat J. 
Quick Facts In 1997, minor plaintiff (then 3 y.o.) suffered brain injury after collision in car driven by her 
aunt — Aunt's liability was clear. MOTION for approval of solicitor fees, inclusive of GST 
in the amount of $162k plus disbursements, inclusive of G.S.T. in the amount of $8k. 





15% CFA: “The retainer agreement entered into by the Litigation Guardian … provided that 
if successful in the tort action the fee charged would be the costs recovered from the 
defendants plus 15-20% of the damages plus interest on damages.”  
Settlement: "The case was settled for what essentially amounted to the policy limit that had 
been offered "early on". The total settlement inclusive of costs, interest, and $50,000, 
contributed by Goodwin, amounted to $651,000." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. What fees are fair and reasonable in this case? 
B. “In support of the [CFA], and the quantum of fees claimed, Mr. Orlando's affidavit makes 
reference to the fact his firm carries a high level of disbursements and bears the cost of 
disbursements incurred in a losing case." To what extent does this factor in to the strength of 
his CFA? 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. 
A. “It is incumbent on Mr. Acri to justify the reasonableness of the [$67k] his firm claims in 
relation to the tort claim and [$76k] in relation to the accident benefits settlement… I want to 
see documents evidencing his retainer and dockets and understand exactly [what Mr. Acri 
did on the case over 6 years]." "What, if any, litigation risk existed in relation to the past 
attendant care claim? In this regard, I want to review all correspondence between counsel 
touching on the issue of liability, the quantum of the claim and the settlement of the claim."  
B. "What, if any, weight can I properly attach to paragraph 50 of Mr. Orlando's affidavit filed 
in the tort regarding action regarding "losing cases" [the fact that the firm has to pay 




MPampas V Steamatic Toronto Inc. (2010 ONCA 373) 
2010 CarswellOnt 3385, 2010 ONCA 373, [2010] O.J. No. 2099, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 562 
 
  
Date Heard: May 19, 2010 
Judgment: May 20, 2010 
Parties John Mpampas, Suzanne King and Nicolas Mpampas (plaintiffs), Appellant 
Steamatic Toronto Inc. and Gerling Global General Insurance Company, Defendants 
BETWEEN John Mpampas and Suzanne King Appellant (plaintiffs) and Andrew Marcus, 
Honda Canada Finance Inc., Viki Doidge and Toyota Credit Canada Inc. Defendants 
BETWEEN John Mpampas Appellant(plaintiff) and Guarantee Company of North America 
Defendant 
Counsel John Mpampas for Appellant / Respondent by way of Cross-Appeal, for himself 
Eric Freedman for Respondent / Appellant by way of Cross-Appeal, Joel Freedman 
Judge/s Armstrong J.A., Goudge J.A., and Sharpe J.A. 
Quick Facts Client retained lawyer as legal counsel on three personal injury matters. Parties entered into 
CFA. Some legal work was done and settlement offers were being discussed. Lawyer was 
removed from record on his own motion. Lawyer brought successful motion for charging 
order for his unpaid account under s. 34 of Solicitors Act. Charging order was granted for two 
of client's three actions. Motion judge found that preconditions were satisfied that fund or 
property was in existence at time order was granted, property was "recovered or preserved" 
through instrumentality of solicitor, and that there was some evidence client could or would 
not pay fees. Motion judge held that lawyer preserved client's right to sue, which was chose in 
action and therefore property. Motion judge concluded that client could not pay lawyer's fees 
other than out of judgments or settlements. Client appealed. Cross-appeal by lawyer from 
costs award (no costs awarded). 








Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal dismissed. Costs awarded to the respondent fixed at 
$3000 inclusive of disbursements and GST. 
“We see no error in the reasons of the motion judge. The charging orders over any settlement 
funds were properly issued. The respondent acknowledges that any claim that the solicitor get 
off the record without just cause can be taken into account by the assessment officer in 
determining what fees are reasonable.” (para 1) And, motion judge acted within his discretion 
in awarding no costs. 
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Alves v. Azevedo & Nelson Barristers & Solicitors (2010 ONSC 2853) 
2010 CarswellOnt 3348, 2010 ONSC 2853, 189 A.C.W.S. (3d) 76 
Summary Only one mention of CFA and CFA not considered: Mr. "Alves alleged that he had entered 
into a [CFA] with the defendant law firm, Azevedo & Nelson ("Azevedo"), to pursue his tort 
and SABs claim." 
 
 
Skocir v. Premier Fitness Clubs (Yorkdale) Inc. (2010 ONSC 4636) 
2010 CarswellOnt 6285, 2010 ONSC 4636, [2011] W.D.F.L. 311, 191 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1068 
Summary The only mention of CFA: "In my view, the amount suggested by the solicitor for the 
defendant bears no semblance to reality given the history of this case and I reject it. Most of 
the time spent up to and including the trial before me is now wasted and unrecoverable. In 
addition, the fees expended trying to execute on the judgment are completely wasted. The 
existence of a CFA with the Plaintiff is irrelevant to my consideration of the costs the plaintiff 




Jean Estate v. Wires Jolley LLP (2010 ONSC 4835) 
2010 CarswellOnt 6817, 2010 ONSC 4835, 193 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1062, 324 D.L.R. (4th) 140, 61 E.T.R. (3d) 258 
Date Heard: June, 2010 
Judgement: September, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Applicants: Wong, Estate Trustee of Estate of Jean 
Defendant: Respondent: Wires Jolley LLP 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Glenn A. Hainey, Christopher Stanek 
For Defendant: Paul Michell, James Renihan 
Judge/s Then: A.D. Grace J. 
Quick Facts Previous action was an arbitration. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act: s.28(1); Reg 195/04: s.15; Rules of Civil Procedure: R. 3.02; Arbitration Act 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
CFA (note this is really not a normal Personal Injury or Class Action case): "The arrangement 
was not outlined in a single document. Its terms are to be drawn from a proposal of Wires 
Jolley and subsequent communications. While the parties seemed to agree the fee was to be 
equal to ten per cent of the net value of the estate's assets, the valuation date is the subject of 
disagreement."  




"The issue is whether Wires Jolley should be paid a contingency fee of [$2.05M] as ordered 
by the Honourable Fred Kaufman, Q.C., who acted as arbitrator" 
Outcome Held: Application dismissed.  
"The arbitrator did consider the relevant factors. A reading of the reasons in their entirety 
evidence the fact the Arbitrator considered the time and effort required and spent, legal 
complexity, the degree of responsibility assumed, the monetary value of the matters at issue, 
the importance of the matters to the clients, the degree of skill and competence demonstrated 
by Mr. Wires, the results achieved, the ability of the client to pay and to the extent he could, 
the clients' expectations as to the amount of the fee. While my determination of what was 




Choi v. Choi (2010 ONSC 4800) 
2010 Carswell Ont 6352, 2010 ONSC 4800, 192 A.C.W.S. (3d) 420 
Date Heard: August, 2010 
Judgement: September, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Hijung Choi and Yea Lim Choi (by her Litigation Guardian); Hijung Choi 
Defendant: Doo Hyun Choi; Roy Foss Motors; Roy Foss Leasing; Betty Ammirato; 
Francesco Ammiratio; Ka Man Cheng; Siu Hing Leung; (Third-party: Newmarket Honda) 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Mr. J. McLeish 
For Defendant: Mr. S. Moore for Defendants, Doo Hyun Choi, Roy Foss Motors Limited, No 
one for Third Party 
Judge/s Then: M. Fuerst J. 
Quick Facts The plaintiff Yea Lim ("Annie") Choi (then 9) suffered catastrophic injuries as the result of a 
motor vehicle collision that occurred during a family outing. MOTION for approval of the 
settlement and legal fees of Annie's tort claim. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Rules of Civil Procedure: R 2.08(3), R. 7.08; Insurance Act 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
15% - 20% CFA: "[P.] entered into a CFA to pay the law firm costs received from the 
defendants plus 15% to 20% of damages."  
Settlement:"The settlement totals $14.4M … approximately [$3.6k] be paid to Annie's case 
manager for outstanding fees; [$1M] be paid to the law firm for partial indemnity costs and 
disbursements inclusive of GST; and [as sought under a CFA, a further [$1.6M]" "On the 
materials before me, I cannot find that Mrs. Choi is a financially sophisticated person, as was 
the litigation guardian (and her spouse) in the 2007 decision Cogan..." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
B. What fees are fair and reasonable taking into account the existing CFA? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 7% + 7% of disbursements with no time docket provided to court by 
solicitor.  
A. I am satisfied that the amount of the settlement itself is in Annie's best interests."  
B. "I allow fees to the law firm under the [CFA] in the amount of [$1M], which is in addition 
to the sum of $1 million for costs and disbursements. The law firm therefore will receive a 
total of [$2M]." "I have considered the factors set out in both cases of Cogan… which 
incorporate those set out in the commentary to Rule 2.08(3) of the [Rules]: The risk that this 
action would be unsuccessful was minimal... Unlike the situation in both Cogan… this was 
not a complex case, nor is it suggested that the settlement resulted from the lawyer's 
persuasive advancement of some unique or novel legal argument.... The amount of 
disbursements actually carried by the law firm to the point of settlement, just under[$140k] 
was not large... no dockets were kept by those who worked on the file, which would have 
permitted me to assess the reasonableness of the fee in light of the time expended" Mr. 
Orlando swore in his affidavit, and both [P. lawyer] and [D. lawyer] told me that based on 
what is known at this time, the monthly tax free amount paid from the structure will be 
sufficient to address Annie's ongoing needs [but possibly not the purchase of a more suitable 
home by Annie’s mother]." "The prospect that the legal fees claimed might encroach on the 
amount needed to cover Annie's needs [expert hired by P. estimate present value of $17M - 
$23M] is a factor I must consider." 
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Attis v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (2010 ONSC 4508) 
2010 CarswellOnt 6727, 2010 ONSC 4508, 192 A.C.W.S. (3d) 745, 323 D.L.R. (4th) 309 
Date Heard: July, 2010 
Judgement: September, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Attis; Tesluk 
Defendant: Ontario (Minister of Health/AG) 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Samuel L. Marr for Plaintiff, S. Joyce Attis; A. Tesluk, Plaintiff for herself 
For Defendant: Paul J. Evraire, Shain Widdifield, John Soldatich for Defendant / Moving 
Party, Attorney General of Canada 
Sandra L. Secord for Respondents, John B.J. Legge, Legge & Legge, Barristers and Solicitors 
Judge/s Then: Cullity J. 
Quick Facts N/A - see "Contingency Fee Agreement" section for explanation 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act: ss. 28.1(12)(c), 28.1(12)(d), 28.1(12)(e); Reg 195/04: s.3; Rules of Civil 
Procedure: ss. 15.02, 57.07, 59.06(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
This is more of a case about payment of the D.'s costs, and there is only one mention of CFA: 
"The following chronological summary of relevant facts that led up to the present dispute may 
be helpful: ... 2. February 5, 2000 — Ms Attis and Ms Tesluk execute retainer agreements 
which contain no references to potential liability for the defendant's costs, and provide for a 
percentage contingency fee for Mr Legge's firm." 
 
Loreto v. Little (2010 ONSC 4764) 
2010 CarswellOnt 6854, 2010 ONSC 4764, 193 A.C.W.S. (3d) 643 
Summary CFA, as between a solicitor and client, not at issue here: "Frank Loreto is a lawyer. He had a 
thriving practice. It operated as a sole proprietorship. Frank Loreto had no partners. The 
lawyers who worked with him were employees. At some point, Frank Loreto indicated that he 
was prepared to take on partners…” "Mr. Justice Belobaba pointed out that the retainers were 
based on contingency billing rather than time spent. There is no disagreement about this. The 
affidavit sworn by the lawyer acting for Frank Loreo says: "Frank had a contingency fee 




Séguin v. Van Dyke (2010 ONSC 6636)  
– see further reasons below in (2013 ONSC 6576) 
2010 CarswellOnt 10279, 2010 ONSC 6636, 197 A.C.W.S. (3d) 53 
Date Heard: N/A 
Judgement: October, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Applicant: Seguin 
Defendant: Respondent: Van Dyke 
Counsel For Plaintiff: For Applicant: William J. Sammon 
For Defendant: For Respondent: John Cannings 
Judge/s Then: Martin James J. 
Quick Facts "Donna Seguin is a former client of Frank Van Dyke, barrister and solicitor. Mr. Van Dyke 
represented Ms. Seguin in a personal injury action. His fees were based on a Contingency Fee 
Agreement ("CFA"). The action was settled at mediation. The agreed settlement sum 
consisted of a global amount that did not specifically identify the amount payable for the 
plaintiff's claim, legal costs or pre-judgment interest." Ms. Seguin commenced an application 
seeking a declaration that the CFA is unenforceable and for an order that 
Mr. Van Dyke's account be assessed. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act: ss.23, 28.1, 29.1  
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
CFA: Very limited detail on CFA, i.e. "[Mr. Seguins legal fees] were based on a Contingency 
Fee Agreement ("CFA"). " 
Settlement: "The tort action was ultimately settled during mediation in the fall of 2009. At 
that time the plaintiff accepted an offer of $340,000 "all in."" "The agreed settlement sum 
consisted of a global amount that did not specifically identify the amount payable for the 
plaintiff's claim, legal costs or pre-judgment interest." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Should the CFA be enforced or set aside (s.23 of SA)? "This would leave the enforceability of 
the CFA to be the only question determined by the application. In my view, this issue is 
sufficiently discreet from the issues raised by the action that the two proceedings need not be 
tied together in some fashion at this time or that the issues raised by the application ought be 
rolled into the action." 
Outcome Held:  I am not persuaded that there is sufficient basis to grant the relief sought by the 
moving party. 
"It is contrary to the Solicitors Act for CFAs to provide for fees to be calculated on an award 
of costs except where a special application is made to the court under Section 29.1. It appears 




Séguin v. Van Dyke (2013 ONSC 6576)  
– see above also 
2013 CarswellOnt 15252, 2013 ONSC 6576, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1015 
Date Heard: October, 2013 
Judgement: November, 2013 
Parties Applicant: Séguin 
Respondent: Van Dyke (lawyer) 
Counsel For Applicant: William Sammon 
For Respondent: John Cannings 
Judge/s Then: Paul F. Lalonde J. 
Quick Facts "Donna Séguin (DOB 25th May 1962) is married to Leo Séguin. They have three daughters, 
Tammy (31), Julie (23), and Jenna (21), and two grandchildren, Cameron (9) and Sara (4). 
Ms. Séguin was involved in a motor vehicle accident on October 20, 2006, with Lianne 
Chaput, from which she sustained catastrophic injuries." MOTION by Ms. Séguin seeks a 
declaration that the CFA is unenforceable and void, as well as an order requiring Mr. Van 
Dyke to repay immediately, and with interest, the 33.3% contingency which he charged on 
costs, including disbursements and HST.   
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, ss.23, 24, 28, 28.1 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
I am including the full CFA agreement to show that, aside from the inclusion of costs within 
the CFA (the issue dealt with in this motion), the CFA seems to comply with the other 
requirements (e.g., in writing, sets out the % and has an example calculation). 
Ms. Séguin entered into a Contingency Fee Agreement with Mr. Van Dyke dated May 11, 
2007. The following are the relevant provisions of the Agreement: 
(a) No Trial 
It is agreed that with respect to the Action, it is a civil proceeding, the final account for 
services (excluding disbursements and G.S.T.) with respect to the Action is to be contingent 
on FVD securing a settlement. The fee shall be 33.3% of the settlement amount, including all 
amounts received for costs and disbursements received in relation to the civil proceeding. 
This estimate includes hourly rates and a premium based on results achieved. 
Example #1: Award - $10,000.00 (all inclusive of costs and disbursements) 
Fee (33.3%) - $3,330.00 plus disbursements and G.S.T. 
Example #2: Award - $150,000.00 plus costs of $30,000.00 plus disbursement of $5,000.00 
Fee (33.3%) - $61,605.00 plus disbursements and G.S.T. 
(b) Trial 
It is agreed that with respect to the Action, if the matter proceeds to trial, FVD will be entitled 
to receive 100% of any costs awarded by the Court in addition to 33.3% of the amount 
awarded for damages by the Court. 
Example: Damages Awarded $450,000.00 plus costs of $75,000.00 
Fee: $224,850.00 ($450,000.00 × 33.3% + $75,000.00) 
 
Recommended Settlement 
13. In the event that I recommend a settlement for acceptance but you choose to proceed 
further in the proceeding, you will be obligated to pay FVD 35% of the settlement proposed, 
plus disbursements and G.S.T. and thereafter will retain myself on the basis of an hourly rate. 
You acknowledge that my hourly rate is $200.00 per hour. 
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"In the present motion before the Court, Ms. Séguin seeks a declaration that the CFA is 
unenforceable and void, as well as an order requiring Mr. Van Dyke to repay immediately, 
and with interest, the 33.3% contingency which he charged on costs, including disbursements 
and HST. Ms. Séguin posits that this amounts to $22k." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Is the CFA so flawed as to render it unenforceable? 
Outcome Held: Application granted.  
"In the case at bar, I am concerned with an agreement which, on its face, breaches the 
Solicitors Act." "Beaudoin agreed that a CFA could survive if the deficiencies were minor or 
of a technical variety. At para. 122, he states: Justice Aston differentiated between "minor" or 
"technical' breaches and "significant" ones. This implies that a CFA may be enforced 
regardless of certain breaches. One can accept this analysis when one looks at the list of 
deficiencies ... In Laushway, the judge was faced with minor deficiencies. In the case at bar, 
the breach is fundamental and not technical...” 
Additional 
Reasons given in 
[#06] Seguin v. 
Van Dyke (2013 
ONSC 7759): 
Dealing with costs in the above motion: "The Respondent did not reasonably expect that costs 
of this motion would be over $20,000.00. The Respondent's own costs are $13,467.91. 
Furthermore, the costs for the two previous motions between the parties were assessed at 
$6,500.00 and $8,000.00 plus HST. Having considered the costs as claimed and the factors 
enumerated in Rule 57.01, I find that a fair and reasonable award of costs is $10,000.00. I 
order that the Applicant shall have her costs of the motion fixed in the sum of $10,000.00 plus 




Dolan (Litigation Guardian of) v. Reid (2010 ONSC 6608) 
2010 CarswellOnt 10415, 2010 ONSC 6608, 198 A.C.W.S. (3d) 608 
Date Heard: N/A 
Judgement: November, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Applicant: Dolan (Litigation Guardian of) 
Defendant: Respondent: Reid 
Counsel For Plaintiff: For Appicant: Robert Deutschmann 
For Defendant: No one 
Judge/s Then: G.E. Taylor J. 
Quick Facts "On October 27, 2007 [then 11 y.o.], Kassandra was at the home of Winston and Paula Reid 
visiting with their daughter, Rachel. Kassandra was to spend the night with Rachel at the Reid 
home. Kassandra fell asleep on the couch while watching TV. She awoke to find the Reid's 
Springer Spaniel/Labrador Retriever dog staring directly into her face. Without warning or 
provocation the dog bit Kassandra in her face causing injury to her right cheek and lip." 
APPLICATION by litigation guardian of infant plaintiff for approval of settlement reached in 
personal injury action approval of 20% counsel fee. 





20% CFA: "the amount to be paid to Kassandra's solicitors was based on a [CFA] signed by 
Lisa Dolan, providing for fees to be calculated on the basis of a 20% contingency."  
Settlement: of $75k 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Are counsel’s fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Application granted. 7% + disbursements of [$1.4k]  
"I am prepared to approve solicitor's fees of [$5.5k] plus disbursements of [$1.4k] plus 
applicable taxes." "Based on my review of the client ledger, I conclude that this file was not 
one involving a significant degree of complexity. I disagree with Mr. Deutschmann's 
assessment that the risk undertaken by him was moderate. Liability was clear. After a demand 




394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek (2010 ONSC 7238) 
2010 CarswellOnt 9939, 2010 ONSC 7238, [2010] O.J. No. 5692, 195 A.C.W.S. (3d) 959 
Summary Only mention of contingency fee: "However, if that was the arrangement, it should not 
disentitle Mrs. Purvis to recover costs payable by the opponent. This approach is common for 
contingency fee and pro bono retainers." 
 
Broesky v. Lüst (2011 ONSC 167) 
2011 CarswellOnt 188, 2011 ONSC 167, 199 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1333, 330 D.L.R. (4th) 259 
Quick Facts Lack of written agreement is the only real issue here "There are significant factual disputes 
with respect to the retainer. The Plaintiff says that during the initial telephone call … she 
made it clear to the Defendant that she wanted to retain him on all matters arising out of the 
motor vehicle incident ..." "There were many other factual issues raised in the hearing... she 
maintained that she and the Defendant discussed a 20 percent contingency fee arrangement 
during their first telephone call in August 2001. There is no note of this in the Defendant's 
file." 
 
Billings (Litigation Guardian of) v. Lanark Mutual Insurance Co. (2011 
ONSC 2564) 
2011 CarswellOnt 3008, 2011 ONSC 2564, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 635 
Judge/s Then: Beaudoin J. 
Quick Facts "... after 6 weeks of trial and one week of deliberations, a jury returned a verdict on favour of 
the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs had brought a claim against their insurers Lanark after a fire 
destroyed their home and contents. The Defendant Insurer denied their claim on the basis of 
arson." case is more about the indemnity scale and pretty well the extent of the discussion on 
the CFA agreement is as follows: "I disagree with his submission that hourly rates are 
irrelevant in assessing the reasonableness of a CFA. Information about the actual hourly rates 
is an important litmus test in assessing the reasonableness of a claim for cost." 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 




Ledroit v. Rooplall (2011 ONSC 2751) 
2011 CarswellOnt 2892, 2011 ONSC 2751, [2011] O.J. No. 2022, 202 A.C.W.S. (3d) 178 
Date Heard: April, 2009 
Judgement: May, 2011 
Parties Client Moving Party: Rooplall 
Responding Party: Ledroit, Solicitor 
Counsel For Defendant: G. Schible 
For Solicitor: K. Souch 
Judge/s Then: Daley J. 
Summary "The client had instituted an action against a physician alleging sexual abuse. The client was 
represented by another solicitor up until July of 2009, at which time she retained Ledroit to 
continue on with the action on her behalf."  
This case is more about a dispute with respect to what retainer applied, and not about the fee 
charged: "The solicitor contends that his initial [CFA] retainer, as discussed below, was 
terminated with the client and a new retainer agreement was entered into on the day the 
client's action was scheduled to proceed to trial.": "On July 27, 2009 the client entered into a 
Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement ("CFRA") with the solicitor on the basis that he would 
receive 25% of the amount recovered if the action settled before trial plus the costs 
contribution from the defendants." "The solicitor advised the client on January 4, 2010 [the 
date scheduled for trial] that he was terminating the CFRA [because she had been dishonest 
and the lawyer discoverd that dishonesty on the date of the trial] and giving the client two 
options, namely: (a) to retain a new lawyer or (b) to retain him on different terms, namely, 
that the solicitor would be paid for all work done to date and thereafter on an hourly rate basis 
regardless of success ["total fees through to the completion of trial in the sum of [$260k] plus 
disbursements and taxes."]." 
Settlement: "Following the new retainer agreement, and prior to the trial commencing, the 
solicitor engaged in settlement negotiations with the defendant's counsel on behalf of the 
client. On the afternoon of January 4, 2010, she accepted an offer to settle her action in the 




Karkar v. Karkar (2011 ONSC 2550) 
2011 CarswellOnt 5171, 2011 ONSC 2550, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 156 
Summary Only mention of CFA: "The applicant seeks an order granting her interim disbursements in 
the amount of $25,000.00 on the grounds that she has no income other than the support 
payments made by the respondent, she does not qualify for legal aid, and her lawyer is not 
prepared to proceed to trial on contingency." 
 
Ontario (Public Guardian & Trustee) v. Charland (2011 ONSC 2961) 
2011 CarswellOnt 4009, 2011 ONSC 2961, 202 A.C.W.S. (3d) 474 
Judge/s Then: Moore J. 
Summary "The matters in issue in these actions arise from a motorbike/motor vehicle collision that 
occurred on September 12, 1998. At that time, Joshua was...13... As a result of the collision, 
Joshua was thrown approximately 50 feet and landed on a gravel road. He suffered 
catastrophic brain injuries with resulting obvious and debilitating cognitive and physical 
impairments." This case does not involve a CFA, but provides a nice ovetview of the Cogan 
factors: "Although legal fees are not sought in this matter on the basis of a [CFA], I have 
considered the factors that moved Smith J in the Cogan case" "Having referred to the Cogan 
factors and those outlined in rule 57, Hackland J. allowed a fee equivalent to 15% of the 
settlement of accident benefits claims and 25% for fees in the tort settlement before him in the 
Aywas case. In that case, the retainer agreement called for a 35% contingency fee on both tort 
and accident benefits claims and the legal expenses claimed equated to a premium of 
$142,195 over docketed time of $226,350. His Honour saw a good settlement in a matter of 
average complexity. The risk assumed by counsel was determined to be moderate and related 
mainly to the causation aspects of the plaintiff's injuries. He determined not to apply the same 
contingency fee to accident benefit and to tort-based settlements." 
Settlement: "... payment by defendants of [$2.21M], inclusive of all claims of all claimants for 
damages, interest and costs." "The net settlement funds remaining after deducting legal fees 
and associated taxes in the accident benefits settlement becomes [$1.06M]. Disbursements 




Laushway Law Office v. Simpson (2011 ONSC 4155)  
– see ONCA decision below 
2011 CarswellOnt 6238, 2011 ONSC 4155, 205 A.C.W.S. (3d) 857, 336 D.L.R. (4th) 632 
Date Heard: February - September, 2010 
Judgement: July, 2011 
Parties Solicitors: Laushway Law Office ("LLO"); Barry Laushway 
Client: Simpson 
Counsel For Solicitors: John J. Cardill 
For Client: Himself  
Judge/s Then: Robert N. Beaudoin J. 
Quick Facts "Simpson was injured in a motor vehicle accident... Although trained as a lawyer, Simpson 
was not in practice at that time. Acting as his own counsel, he commenced legal proceedings 
in Kingston … to recover damages resulting from the injuries he sustained in the accident 
against the tort defendant..." "This is an assessment of a solicitor's account between the 
Laushway Law Office ("LLO") sought by their former client Robert Burton Simpson 
("Simpson"). The final account was in the amount of [$172k] and was based on a contingency 
fee agreement ("CFA")." 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, ss.16, 24, 28.1; Contingency Fee Agreements O. Reg 194 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
33% CFA: "P. retained a Kingston lawyer, John Zuber ("Zuber"), to conduct the litigation on 
his behalf ["the agreement with Zuber allowed for an estimated 33% of any award including 
damages costs and disbursements"]… there was a breakdown in the relationship with Zuber 
and Simpson sought new counsel. In May of 2005, he retained the [law firm] LLO to act on 
his behalf..." "On March 1, 2006 Simpson formally entered into a new CFA with LLO [, 
which provided that] legal fees would be 30% of the total amount recovered for the claim and 
that the client would be responsible for the disbursements over and above the 30%."  
 
Settlement: "The applicant's claim was settled at a pre-trial conference held in November 
2007 for a total payment of $751k plus assessable disbursements. Simpson's claims had been 
settled at $650k and the defendants agreed to pay 15% costs on that sum." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Is the CFA valid and enforceable, i.e. does it comply with the relevant provisions of the SA 
and is it reasonable? 
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Outcome Held: CFA is valid and enforceable. 
"In jurisdictions in which CFAs are subject to review by the court, the lawyer must bear the 
onus of demonstrating that the fee is reasonable, … The reasonableness of the fee should of 
course be assessed by reference to the risk as it appeared at the time the assessment was 
negotiated, and not as of the time of the assessment, when it may falsely appear with the 
benefit of hindsight that the risk of failure was minimal all along" "I conclude that a CFA that 
does not meet the requirements of O. Reg 195/04 is not inherently void or voidable. The terms 
of the CFA and any breaches must be examined to determine whether they are "minor" or 
"technical" or if they are "significant". ..." 
"[in this case], There was substantial risk to the Solicitors, as chronic pain files are by their 
very nature risky. Further, the likelihood of success was in doubt due to Simpson's nature. It 
was repeatedly stated by several individuals that Simpson was not going to be credible or 
likable on the stand, and there was a good chance that this would affect the amount awarded 
to him." 
Additional 






"An important issue to be decided was the validity of the CFA entered into between RBS and 
LLO... [in the previous proceeding (2011 ONSC 4155),] Following six days of hearing, I 
concluded that the CFA entered into between RBS and LLO was valid and enforceable and 
that, in any event, the fees charged by LLO were fair and reasonable on a quantum meruit 
basis. ..." "In this case, the solicitors had actually been paid their account. … Moreover, there 
was more in issue than the quantum of the fees charged by LLO. RBS wanted to test the 
validity of the CFA and [another Justice (not Beaudoin)] directed that this issue be dealt with 
at trial."  
"The first [issue] was whether the [CFA] was void or voidable insofar as it did not comply 
with the regulations under the Solicitors Act. The second issue addressed any potential 
negligence on the part of the solicitors in failing to amend their statement of claim in time 
thereby triggering a postponement of the trial date." "In my view, the fair and reasonable 
result in this case would be to allow the solicitors their costs on a partial indemnity basis for 
all of their time up to and including the first three days of the trial and to award them costs on 
a substantial indemnity basis thereafter since the client's conduct during the last three days 
was so outrageous as to be deserving of sanction … His repeated attacks on the integrity of 




Laushway Law Office v. Simpson (2013 ONCA 317)  
– see ONSC decision above 
2013 CarswellOnt 5534, 2013 ONCA 317, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 11 
 
  
Date Heard: April 12, 2013 
Judgment: May 10, 2013 
Parties Laushway Law Office, Barry D. Laushway (solicitors), Respondents/Responding Parties 
Robert Burton Simpson (client), Appellant/Moving Party 
Counsel Robert Burton Simpson, for himself (trained as a lawyer) 
John J. Cardill, for Responding Parties 
Judge/s John Laskin J.A., In Chambers 
Quick Facts Moving party, Simpson was injured in a car accident in 1997. Eventually he retained Barry 
Laushway of the Laushway Law Office (LLO) to represent him. Simpson and LLO entered 
into a CFA. Simpson, now moving party, asked for order to further extend time for perfecting 
appeal from judgment. He had already been granted two lengthy extensions. See ‘CFA 
Breakdown’ for more details… 





Under the parties’ CFA, LLO was to be paid legal fees equal to 30% of any recovery. 
In November 2007, Simpson's claim was settled at a pre-trial conference for $750,000 plus 
disbursements. After some adjustments to settle the claims of ODSP and Ontario Works, 
Simpson received the net amount of $516,473.64, and LLO received a net fee of $138,456.24. 
At the time of this motion, the fee has been paid, and subject to these proceedings, LLO has 
the funds. Simpson then challenged the enforceability of the CFA. In November 2008, 
McLeod-Beliveau J. ordered a hearing of that issue. Shortly after, Barry Laushway died. At 
the hearing on July 4, 2011 Beaudoin J. found the CFA to be enforceable, and in the 
alternative would have upheld the amount claimed on quantum meruit basis. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
No issues with agreement on this motion. Simpson is looking for an extension on his appeal 
of Beaudoin J.’s decision that the CFA is enforceable. 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. 
Simpson had not shown any merit in proposed appeal. The reasons of trial judge were 
thorough and appeared to be well reasoned. Although he found that CFA was enforceable, 
even if it was not enforceable, he also found that fee received by law firm was fully justified 
on quantum meruit basis. Simpson’s' general and conclusory contentions in notice of motion 
did not raise any arguable ground of appeal arising from reasons. 
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Miller (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bender (2011 ONSC 4379) 
2011 CarswellOnt 6645, 2011 ONSC 4379, 205 A.C.W.S. (3d) 80 
Date Heard: July, 2011 
Judgemet: July, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff/Applicant: Brayden Miller and Alicia Miller, by their Litigation Guardian; Caroline 
Miller; Amber Miller 
Defendant/Respondent: John Bender; Mark Bender; Intact Insurance  
Counsel For Plaintiff: Robert M. Ben 
For Defendant: No one 
Judge/s Then: Turnbull J. 
Quick Facts a tort action and an accident benefits claim (no further detail provided in the case). "Counsel 
for the plaintiffs brought two applications... for [A] approval of the settlement of the tort 
action and the accident benefits claims and [B] approval of the Management Plan proposed 
by Brayden's parents." 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, s.28.1 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04  
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
CFA: "I have had a chance to review the retainer agreement ... It raises a number of questions 
for the court to consider. It provided that the fees would be comprised of the partial 
indemnity costs recovered by the plaintiffs plus 15-25% of the total recovery made by the 
plaintiffs."  
"The fees sought are approximately [$585k] (" [$517k] by Thomson Rogers and 
approximately [$72k] by the former solicitors for the plaintiffs, Giffen Lee." 
Settlement: "[$1.08M] in the tort action and [$1.25M] in the Accident Benefit claim" 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Are the solicitors’ fee reasonable and does it comply with the relevant provisions of the SA?  
Outcome Held: "It is ordered that the sum of [$250k] may forthwith be paid out of the proceeds of the 
settlement to the plaintiffs' counsel Thomson Rogers as a partial payment [additional 
documents are required: see below] of their fees for services rendered to the plaintiffs plus 
the sum of [$65k] for disbursements incurred by them on behalf of the plaintiffs"  
"In reviewing the Retainer agreement, it appears to me at first glance that it does not comply 
with many of the requirements for such an agreement under the Solicitors Act. In particular, 
section 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act provides as follows:..." "Section 28.1(12) of the 
Solicitors Act enables the Lieutenant Governor in Council to make regulations governing 
contingency fee agreements and several aspects of those agreements. Pursuant to that 
enabling power, Regulation 195/04 was passed and was in effect at the time that the plaintiffs 
signed their retainer agreement with Thomson Rogers.The Retainer Agreement signed by the 
plaintiffs and prepared by Thomson Rogers does not comply with the Regulation in many 
respects... Because of my concern that the Retainer Agreement may violate the provisions of 
the Regulation and the Solicitors Act, I have asked Thomson Rogers to provide additional 
information to the court in affidavit form on that issue and on other issues such as dockets 
showing time actually spent, the nature of the services provided and who provided the 
services, the hourly billing rate applicable for each individual working on the file and such 




Consky v. Farooq (2011 ONSC 5148)  
– see ONCA decision below 
2011 CarswellOnt 8957, 2011 ONSC 5148, [2011] O.J. No. 3890, 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 152 
Date Heard: N/A 
Judgement: August, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff: Consky 
Defendant: Farooq 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Frank Feldman 
For Defendant: Michael Czuma 
Judge/s Then: D.L. Corbett J. 
Quick Facts "It all started back on May 3, 1999. Mr. Farooq was a student pilot. He was injured when 
another student pilot collided with him on the tarmac at a flight training school." "Mr. Farooq 
claimed to suffer serious injuries in the accident. He alleged total and permanent disability. 
On May 7, 1999, he retained Mr. Consky to claim for his losses." This is a MOTION to 
oppose confirmation of the Report of Assessment Officer Boyd is dismissed. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act,s.28.1  
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
CFA: "Mr. Farooq had a fee agreement with Mr. Consky. Mr. Farooq says that he understood 
the agreed fees would be 10% of the total settlement." notable but not super relevant: "Mr. 
Consky expected to be paid his fees from the settlement proceeds. Mr. Farooq had other ideas. 
He terminated Mr. Consky's retainer after settlement was agreed, but before it was 
implemented. Then he tried to obtain the full settlement proceeds behind Mr. Consky's back. 
Counsel for the defendant gave Mr. Consky notice. The funds were ordered paid into court, 
and Mr. Farooq was ordered to pay costs for Mr. Consky's motion to protect his fees." 
Settlement: $250k (plus costs of $54k)  
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
"Was the Fee Agreement Illegal? If So, Did the Assessment Officer Err in Failing to Find the 
Agreement Illegal?"  
"Mr. Farooq argues that the fee agreement breaches s.28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act. That 
provision prohibits contingency fee agreements that include both recovered costs plus an 
additional fee payable to the solicitor (unless there are special circumstances and the 
agreement is approved on joint application to a judge). Although this provision was not 
enacted until 2004, some five years after the fee agreement was agreed, Mr. Farooq argues 
that the litigation was not concluded until 2008, and thus s.28.1(8) applied at the time that fees 
were calculated. Mr. Farooq argues that, in this event, s.20(3) of the Solicitors Act has the 
effect of limiting Mr. Consky's entitlement to the costs portion of the settlement."  
Outcome Held: "The motion to oppose confirmation of the Report of Assessment Officer Boyd is 
dismissed. The Report [to fix Mr. Consky's account at $76k] is confirmed, [thus,] the [CFA] is 
now immaterial. "[as an aside,] the amendments to the Solicitors Act do not have 
retrospective effect to existing fee agreements." "Total costs of $13,245 were awarded in Mr. 




Consky v. Farooq (2013 ONCA 393)  
– see ONSC decision above 
2013 CarswellOnt 7939, 2013 ONCA 393, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 269 
 
  
Date Heard: June 10, 2013 
Judgment: June 11, 2013 
Parties Abdul Kasim Farooq, Appellant 
Harvey S. Consky, Solicitor, Respondent 
Counsel Michael Czuma, for Appellant 
Frank Feldman and Darrell Paul, for Respondent 
Judge/s Laskin J.A., Rosenberg J.A., Tulloch J.A. 
Quick Facts Appellant appealed confirmation of assessment of retainer agreement from Justice Corbett’s 
decision in Consky v. Farooq (2011), 2011 ONSC 5148. Appellant claimed that 
retainer agreement was a CFA that violated the Solicitors Act. Appellant sought to set aside 









Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed with costs fixed at $7000, inclusive of disbursements and applicable 
taxes. 
Here is the entire substance of the Court’s decision:  
“(1) We agree with Justice Corbett that the retainer agreement was not a contingency fee 
agreement. 
(2) Even if it was a contingency fee agreement, the Solicitors Act does not apply 
retrospectively to it. 
(3) The appellant disavowed the agreement and asked for an assessment of the fairness and 
the reasonableness of the account. That is what he got.” 
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Oakley & Oakley Professional Corp. v. Aitken (2011 ONSC 5613) 
2011 CarswellOnt 12301, 2011 ONSC 5613, 209 A.C.W.S. (3d) 52 
Date Heard: N/A 
Judgement: September, 2011 
Parties Applicant: Oakley & Oakley Professional Corp. 
Respondents: Aitken and others 
Counsel For Applicant: Paul Harte 
For Defendant: N/A 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts Formerly a class action of 99 individuals but those individuals separated into individual 
actions: "who, in 99 separate actions, claim damages for medical malpractice against 
gynaecologist, Richard Austin." APPLICATION “for permission to include in its contingency 
fee agreements with the 99 clients any award of costs to the clients in their respective actions 
against Dr. Austin. Because the award of costs would be in addition to the [CFAs] with the 99 
clients, court approval is required. Under s. 28.1 (8), court approval is available in 
"exceptional circumstances." 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, s.28.1(8) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
25% or 30% CFA: "Under the contingency fee agreements Oakley & Oakley agree to assume 
the risk of both fees and disbursements [signed by each of the 99 clients]. The agreements 
provide for a contingency fee of 25% or a contingency fee of 30% where it is anticipated that 
a limitation period defence could be raised by Dr. Austin...  As may be noted, the [CFAs] 
provide for both a percentage of recovery plus any amount paid by Dr. Austin for costs"  
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Do these circumstances qualify as “exceptional” within the meaning of the SA, as to warrant 
award of costs in addition to the CFA? 
Outcome Held: Application granted.  
"The circumstances of the 99 medical malpractice actions viewed individually or viewed 
collectively constitute exceptional circumstances that justify granting approval under s. s. 28.1 
(8) of the Solicitors Act." "Generally speaking, medical negligence litigation is a challenging 
area of civil litigation, and the 99 actions against Dr. Austin are all complex and difficult. This 
type of litigation inevitably requires the parties to retain expert witnesses to testify about the 
standard of care and whether there was negligence.... It appears that, but for ... [the lawyers'] 
agreement to enter into [CFAs], the individual plaintiffs would not have been able to advance 
their claims." 
"In Williams... involving a party under a disability, Justice Roccamo approved a contingency 
fee of 28% plus any costs awarded or paid by the defendant. She held that counsel's 
assumption of significant and unusual risk, together with complications arising from feuding 
plaintiffs amounted to extraordinary circumstances that justified granting approval." "In 
Cogan, ... , Justice Hackland agreed with Williams... but distinguished it from the 
circumstances of Cogan, which was a complex obstetrical negligence case but one in which 
the financial risk assumed by the lawyer under a [CFA] was moderated by the circumstance 
that there were admissions of liability... Justice Hackland stated: 30. As to what constitutes 
special [exceptional] circumstances...." 
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Dryden v. Oatley Vigmond LLP (2011 ONSC 7303) 
2011 CarswellOnt 14463, 2011 ONSC 7303, [2011] O.J. No. 5565, 210 A.C.W.S. (3d) 544 
Date Heard: November, 2011 
Judgement: December, 2011 
Parties Moving Party: [Mr.] Dryden 
Responding Party: Oatley Vigmond LLP 
Counsel For Moving Party/Himself: John Dryden 
For Solicitor/Responding Party: Shenthuran Subramanian 
Judge/s Then: Michael G. Quigley J. 
Quick Facts "This litigation arose out of a 1997 motor vehicle accident. Mr. Dryden had previously 
retained several solicitors before he came to Mr. Oatley."MOTION: "to set aside the Report 
and Certificate of Assessment [which reduced the lawyers' CF % to 30%]" 





CFA "Mr. Oatley agreed to represent Mr. Dryden. He accepted the case on a contingency fee 
basis"  
Settlement: "The action was settled for [$285k] in respect of his claims and interest, plus 
[$42.5k] for costs inclusive of sales tax, and [$47.5k] for disbursements. Following that 
settlement, ... the solicitor's law firm rendered its account to Mr. Dryden for [$128k] for its 
services... in accordance with the signed contingency fee retainer agreement"... That left Mr. 
Dryden with a net settlement of [$225k]..." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
"In her [Report and Certificate of Assessment], [the assessment officer] found that the [CFA] 
that had been established between the law firm and Mr. Dryden was unjustified. Further, she 
concluded that the [$128k] account that had been rendered to Mr. Dryden was excessive and 
should be reduced by almost [$43k] [from the original $128k] to [$85k]." 
Outcome Held: "Mr. Dryden's application to oppose the certification of the Assessment Officer's award 
is dismissed ..."  
[the case doesn't really discuss the reasonableness and fairness of the fee]: "In considering my 
jurisdiction relative to the approval or rejection of the Certificate of Assessment, it is 
important to acknowledge that it is settled law that the court is to be concerned only with 
questions of principle on an appeal from a Certificate of Assessment reached by an 
assessment officer. I am not to be concerned with mere questions of amount, or the manner in 
which the assessment officer has exercised her discretion, unless the amounts are so 
inappropriate or the assessment officer's decision is so unreasonable as to suggest the 




Merovitz Potechin LLP v. Cantor (2011 ONSC 79) 
2012 CarswellOnt 456, 2012 ONSC 79, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 875 
Summary This case involves a former law firm employee alleging a constructive trust of the firm's CFA 
agreements: "The personal injury work at MP was undertaken on a contingency fee basis. The 
standard retainer agreement set out that there would be a fee of 30 percent of the client's total 
recovery if MP was successful on the client's behalf. There is no issue that the wording of the 
contingency fee retainer agreement was approved by MP." "The statement of claim seeks a 
declaration that a constructive trust be imposed over a portion of the contingency fee 
recovered by the defendants on the personal injury files transferred from MP to LM, once 
[they are actually] settled." 
 
Ahou (Guardian of Property) v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. (2012 ONSC 1601) 
2012 CarswellOnt 2931, 2012 ONSC 1601, 214 A.C.W.S. (3d) 372 
Date Heard: March, 2012 
Judgement: March, 2012 
Parties Applicant: Ahou (Guardian of Property) 
Respondent: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Counsel For Applicant: Ms T. Romano 
For Respondent: No one 
Judge/s Then: MacKenzie J. 
Quick Facts "Very briefly, Sara Ahou (born July 22, 1991) was a child of tender years, one month shy of 
her sixth birthday when on June 8, 1997 she suffered significant injuries while riding her 
bicycle... She suffered extensive injuries, both physical and mental, full particulars of which 
are set out in the materials and are not in issue here. Suffice to say, they were sufficiently 
serious to be fairly characterized as catastrophic." In pursuance of the settlement, MOTION 
was brought under Rule 7.08 for approval of the settlement and the fees of $219k and the 
disbursements of $37k all-inclusive, being sought by Counsel. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.57.01(1) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
CFA: 20% "[Sara's] ... statutory guardian of property, ... entered into a retainer agreement 
with the law firm (Counsel) ... to act on their behalf ... One of the terms of this agreement was 
that the fees were to be "20% plus party to party costs, plus disbursements." The 1997 retainer 
agreement predated the 2002 amendments to the Solicitor's Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, which 
permitted contingency fees in the type of litigation here."  
Settlement: "... settlement of all statutory accident benefits (SABs) claims.... The total 
settlement amount is [$1.28M]" 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Are counsel’s fees fair and reasonable, and in compliance with the R 57.01? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 17%  
"the minor plaintiff's guardian herein has no objection to the claim for fees and 
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disbursements." "In its report, the Public Guardian and Trustee has referred to current case 
law from this court in which the rule of thumb for fees for plaintiffs' counsel in SABs claims 
is about 15 percent of the amount of the settlement amount for such claims: see Aywas...  In 
response to Aywas, ... Mr. Gluckstein has cited two other cases dated from 2007 (i.e. three 
years before the Aywas case in 2010) wherein the legal fees in relation to the accident benefits 
claims were set at approximately 18% of the settlement of damages recovery in one case... 
and 16% percent in the other case ...."  
"These types of actions by their nature necessarily require counsel to take into account the 
difficulty of ascertaining ultimate disability and impact of injuries to children of tender years. 
Here counsel ... delivered services over an extended period of time, i.e. 13 years, should not 
have the value of their services discounted by further debits against the amount of fees that 
are in all other respects reasonable on their face and that take into account the Rule 57.01(1) 
factors ... the spread from the "usual" 15 percent to the present rate of 17 percent can hardly 





Henricks-Hunter (Litigation guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (2013 
ONSC 5245)  
– see ONCA decision below 
2013 CarswellOnt 11234, 2013 ONSC 5245, 231 A.C.W.S. (3d) 256 
Date Heard: July, 2013 
Judgement: August, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Henricks-Hunter, by her litigation guardian, the Office of the Public Guardian and 
Trustee 
Defendant: 814888 Ontario Inc. carrying on business as Phoenix Concert Theatre; Sherbourne 
Community Clinic 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Richard Shekter, for Plaintiff, Stephanie Marie Henricks- Hunter; J. Gardner 
Hodder, for Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP; Sidney Peters, for Public Guardian and Trustee 
For Defendant: 
Judge/s Then: Darla A. Wilson J. 
Quick Facts "Stephanie fell from a second storey balcony on October 27, 2005 while at a concert at the 
Phoenix Concert Theatre. According to the evidence before me, she climbed on to a balcony 
that had been marked "off limits" after having consumed a significant amount of alcohol. At 
the time, she was 34 years of age. As a result of the fall, she sustained a severe traumatic brain 
injury with associated serious cognitive deficits. She was deemed incapable of managing her 
finances and person and the office of the PGT was appointed to manage her financial affairs 
in 2006. Her parents retained authority over her person. Stephanie was at a long term care 
facility in Toronto receiving 24 hour a day care until 2009 when she moved to Missouri where 
her family resides." MOTION by law firm for order that Contingency Fee Agreement 
between plaintiff through her litigation guardian, Public Guardian and Trustee and plaintiffs' 
counsel be declared fair and reasonable in accordance with s. 24 of Solicitors Act. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, s 24. 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
CFA: "... for amounts recovered as net damages on behalf of Stephanie, the solicitor is 
entitled to recover fees of 25% up to $2.5M dollars plus taxes and disbursements. Pursuant to 




Should the legal fees determined under a CFA reflect the docketed time or should they be 
based on the amount recovered for the client? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
A. "The offer of net damages for Stephanie of $1,799,420 represents about 20% of the 
damages as assessed by HSH or 25% of the damages from the defence perspective." Clearly, 
the damages of Stephanie would assess in the $7-$9 million dollar range; however, when 
determining whether or not the results achieved were poor or stellar or something in between, 
the Court must look at the facts of the case and the insurance monies available to respond to 
the claim. In this case, the maximum funds that could be accessed from Phoenix pursuant to 
the insurance policy were $2 million. As Mr. Shekter pointed out in his materials, the 
settlement proposal for Stephanie is 91% of that policy." "In this case, the liability issue was 
significant. In my opinion, this is a case where there could have been a finding at trial that 
there was no liability on either Defendant. Independent counsel is of the view that a finding of 
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contributory negligence of Stephanie in the 75% range was not beyond the realm of 
possibility. I agree. In all of the circumstances, I am of the view that the results achieved by 
HSH for Stephanie were very good."  
B. "On July 12, 2012, the Court of Appeal released its decision allowing the appeal. It stated 
that there is a two-step process that must be followed when enforcement of a CFA is sought: 
the fairness of the agreement must be assessed as of the date it was entered into; and the 
reasonableness of the agreement must be assessed as of the date of the hearing [emphasis 
mine]" time expended: " When the matter was initially reviewed by Justice Wilkins, he was of 
the view that the materials submitted by the solicitors in support of the requested fees were 
inadequate and he requested full particulars of docketed time and particulars of "undocketed 
work". In refusing to approve the proposed fee he was mindful of the fact that the docketed 
time on the file from lawyers and clerks was $236,676.80 and he added an additional 
$88,323.20 in fees, approving a fee of $371,831.27 all inclusive. As the Court of Appeal 
noted, this amount was determined "almost exclusively" by dockets and hourly rates... I am 
guided by the comments of the Court of Appeal in Raphael Partners, where it was noted that 
the determination of the proper fee in a CFA is not based on the value of the time spent, but 
rather on the amount recovered for the client... As noted by the Court of Appeal in Raphael 
Partners, at para. 54, "...the time spent by the solicitors...while a relevant factor, does not 
control the question of whether the solicitors were entitled to the maximum fees charged 









Decision by Wilkins J on APPLICATION by lawyer for catastrophically-injured plaintiff to 
have trial judge recuse himself over potential issue of bias. 
A good case for what not to do when submitting a CFA to the court for approval: "The 
solicitor's contingency fee agreement seeks a recovery of $516,000, or 100% of his 
contingency fee, in a circumstance in which the Plaintiff is recovering approximately 15% of 
the value of her case and of the settlement funds... (i.e., "The solicitor's affidavit made it quite 
clear that the $2.05M [settlement] payment represented approximately 15% of the value of the 
Plaintiff's case.") 
[…] 
In the absence of representation and given the obvious conflict of interest that the PG&T has, 
having drafted the CFA and having supported it against Ms. Henricks-Hunter, all sorts of 
other issues are clearly put into play, and those issues should properly be canvassed before the 
Motions Judge determining the question of reasonableness [of counsel's fee]." "The issue of 
reasonableness [of counsel's fee] as at the time of the settlement was sent back to the Motions 
Court to be determined in that forum." "In the case at bar, there are so many other factors in 
play that involve a great deal broader interpretation and a much wider view on the part of the 
Court in order to ensure that in the overall picture, there is justice not just for the solicitor who 
wants to recover 100% of his fees (100% of his contingency fee being [$516k], his docketed 
time being [$234k], or such other fee as might be appropriate) ..." "The CFA sought to be 
enforced against the lady under a disability was presented in the Court of Appeal as being 
important to the justice system and access to justice. Needless to say, no evidence was ever 
presented in this matter to show that the contingency fee in issue in any way, shape or form 
contributed to Ms. Henricks-Hunter's access to justice or how the justice system was benefited 
by the solicitor's recovery of a contingency fee, or how Ms. Henricks-Hunter was in any way, 
shape or form advanced in her claims by reason of that agreement. In the endorsement set 
aside by the Court of Appeal, a fund of $325,000 including taxes was made available to pay 
the solicitor's fees, plus the disbursements incurred, which disbursements, on a closer view, 
disclosed a significant number of office expenses and items such as "drinks" and "finding a 




This other earlier decision by Wilkins J. does not discuss the fee % and focused on the 
following question: "RULING to determine whether public guardian and trustee required 
independent counsel for determination of reasonableness of CFA...  In all these matters, a 
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(Litigation 




1000 year old duty of parens patria falls on the Court to act in the best interest of those who 
cannot act for themselves, and in circumstances where the government authority whose job it 
is to protect Stephanie's interests gets in conflict, independent counsel is required." 
 
Henricks-Hunter (Litigation Guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (2012 
ONCA 496)  
– see ONSC decisions above 
2012 CarswellOnt 8969, 2012 ONCA 496, [2012] O.J. No. 3207, 219 A.C.W.S. (3d) 683, 28 C.P.C. (7th) 227, 294 
O.A.C. 333 
Date Heard: July 6, 2012 
Judgment: July 12, 2012 
Parties Howie Sacks and Henry LLP, Appellant 
Stephanie Marie Henricks-Hunter, Respondent 
Counsel J.G. Hodder, for Appellant 
No one for Respondent 
Judge/s D. O'Connor A.C.J.O., J.C. MacPherson, Paul Rouleau JJ.A. 
Quick Facts Client was seriously injured in fall from catwalk at concert premises. Public guardian became 
client's guardian of property and entered into a contingency fee  
agreement (CFA) with appellant law firm on client's behalf. Action was settled for gross 
amount of $2,050,000.00. Law firm sought $516,536.92 in accordance with CFA. Motion 
judge fixed fees and disbursements at total of $371,831.27. Law firm appealed.  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 24 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, s. 5(1) 





On March 2, 2006, the guardian entered into a CFA with the appellant on Stephanie's behalf. 
Pursuant to that agreement, the appellant agreed to defer rendering an account to Stephanie for 
disbursements or legal fees until a successful conclusion of her action. The CFA also 
provided: (paras 4-6) 
 appellant was to receive fees equal to 25% of any judgement or settlement up to $2.5 
million, and 20% on any judgement or settlement in excess of that amount 
 appellant was to receive 100% of all out-of-pocket expenses and disbursements 
 respondent, Stephanie was to recover any partial indemnity costs awarded, and any 
amount attributed to costs in any settlement or judgement would be excluded from the 
application of the CFA 
The claim was settled in October 2009 at mediation without the need for a trial. The gross 
settlement amount was $2,050,000. (The liability insurance carried by Phoenix [the 
defendant] had limits of $2 million.) Appellant requested $516,536.92 in fees from respondent 
in accordance with their CFA. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Failure to consider CFA: Whether or not the motion judge erred in failing to consider 




24 of the Solicitors Act. 
Failure to consider relevant factors: And, in the alternative, if the two-part test does not 
apply to persons under a disability, then whether or not the motion judge's reasons were 
inadequate, such that he failed to consider the relevant factors in arriving at an appropriate fee. 
Outcome Held: Appeal allowed 
Matter remitted to motion judge for determination of the reasonableness of CFA in 
accordance with appellate reasons. Motion judge erred in failing to consider whether CFA 
should be enforced and by proceeding directly to determination of amount of fees without 
regard to the existing CFA. The CFA was fair, but appellate court was not well placed to carry 
assessment of reasonableness of CFA. 
Followed:  Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 164 O.A.C. 129, 24 C.P.C. (5th) 33, 61 O.R. 
(3d) 417, 2002 CarswellOnt 3077, 218 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (Ont. C.A.)  
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Warnica v. Van Moorlehem (2012 ONSC 4241) 
2012 CarswellOnt 9143, 2012 ONSC 4241, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 453 
Date Heard: May, 2012 
Judgement: July, 2012 
Parties Applicant: Warnica 
Respondent: Moorlehem 
Counsel For Applicant: Stephen J. MacDonald 
For Respondent: Victor T. Bulger 
Judge/s Then: Michael G. Quigley J. 
Quick Facts "The solicitor, Moorlehem, represented Meagan Warnica in a tort claim she brought after she 
was injured in a motor vehicle accident.... Meagan's claims and those of another passenger in 
the vehicle were settled when the matter was mediated before trial, but there was only a 
limited amount of insurance funds available to compensate both Meagan and the other 
passenger of the vehicle because the City of Mississauga, who was allegedly at fault, would 
not admit any liability without going to trial. A decision was made not to pursue the City for 
damages for its alleged liability, given the costs risks associated with pursuing them alone. 
The Warnicas decided to settle the case." APPLICATION by plaintiffs to refer account 
rendered by their counsel [Moorlehem] for assessment. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 




30% CFA "... 30% of the settlement amount as the percentage based compensation that had 
been agreed at the outset when he was retained."  
Settlement: "Under [the] mediated settlement the two injured passengers had to share the 
available [$1M] insurance limit. After costs, disbursements and the addition of a de minimis 
without liability contribution by the City, Meagan Warnica's action was settled for the all-
inclusive amount of [$570k]" 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Are the solicitor’s fees fair and reasonable given that…"It is obvious that the amount of fees 
charged, along with disbursements and taxes, represent 37% of the entire amount that was 
awarded to the applicant by way of settlement." "... Warnica and her family expected to 
achieve greater success, were continually assured by the solicitor... that they had a very strong 
case, and yet the amount of the award received was plainly inadequate to fully compensate the 
applicant for the injuries she sustained and the damages that resulted." 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed.   
"Fees and disbursements of in excess of $200,000 is handsome payment for pretrial work 
where there is so little evidence of what was done. In my view, the solicitor needs to be at 
least able to demonstrate what it is that he actually did to earn the 30% contingency fee he 
claims. He has not done that. The appropriate mechanism to permit that to happen, and also to 
ensure that he is paid a fair fee for the service he provided… is not to declare the agreements 
void or unenforceable. Rather, it is to refer the matter for assessment to ensure that the fee [is] 
commensurate to the service provided, and relative to the recovery achieved on behalf of the 
client." “…[there are] special circumstances that justify the referral of the solicitor's account 
for assessment... given the solicitor's failure to comply with either the contingency fee 
requirements of the Solicitors Act or the court approval requirements of Rule 7 for persons 
under disability, his possibly unjustified apparent elevation of the clients' expectations, the 
effort seemingly applied to the case, and the absence of detail in his own accounts that even 
begins to permit one to assess whether the clients got money's worth or not." 
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McAndrew (Litigation Guardian of) v. Roberts (2012 ONSC 4712) 
2012 CarswellOnt 10143, 2012 ONSC 4712, 220 A.C.W.S. (3d) 519 
Date Heard: N/A 
Judgement: August, 2012 
Parties Plaintiff: Heather McAndrew, a Minor, by her Litigation Guardian Jane McAndrew;  
Defendant: Todd Roberts and TAC Mechanical Inc. 
Counsel For Plaintiffs: Mr. Michael D. Smitiuch 
For Defendants: Ms Patti Shedden 
Judge/s Then: J.C. Wilkins J. 
Quick Facts "...the Plaintiff, Heather McAndrew, a 14 year old who was injured in a motor vehicle 
accident, sustaining a fracture of the right femur and a non-displaced facial bone fracture, 
which are described as "linear fractures in the anterior wall of the right maxillary sinus and in 
the right orbit," with significant soft tissue swelling." MOTION for the approval of an infant 
settlement and of counsel's fees. 





CFA: "There was a contingency fee agreement entered into by the litigation guardian [% 
unavailable]." 
Settlement: " The proposed settlement of the action is $85,000 including damages, interest, 
contribution towards legal fees, HST on costs and contribution towards disbursements." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Are counsel’s fees fair and reasonable under the CFA, such that the agreement is 
enforceable? 
Outcome Held: Motion denied. Referred to Office of the Children’s Lawyer 
“The material filed is inadequate with respect to the issues required to be addressed on an 
application to enforce a contingency agreement." BUT "Having regard to the deficiencies of 
the material and the report of the assessments of the damages as well as the deficiencies in 
respect of the material that support the request to enforce the contingency fee agreement, this 
matter is referred to the Office of the Children's Lawyer to review and report on all issues, 
including the settlement, the contingency fee agreement's compliance with the statute and all 
of the issues of fairness and reasonableness as referred to by the Court of Appeal in Raphael, 




Meady v. Greyhound Canada Transportation Corp. (2012 ONSC 5568) 
2013 CarswellOnt 14103, 2013 ONSC 5568, [2013] O.J. No. 4634, [2014] W.D.F.L. 188, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 322, 
55 M.V.R. (6th) 120 
Quick Facts Police officers placed SD on bus after earlier incident in which SD exhibited anxiety and mild 
paranoia. SD told driver AD that people on bus wanted to hurt him and suddenly grabbed 
wheel of bus, forcing it across highway where it rolled into ditch. Plaintiffs, passengers who 
suffered injuries in accident, brought action against, inter alia, police officers and bus 
company, alleging negligence in placing SD on bus. Action was dismissed. Dispute arose as 
to costs. Defendant police officers brought application for costs totalling $790,363.93 jointly 
and severally on partial indemnity basis to date of offer to settle and on substantial indemnity 
basis thereafter. Defendant bus company brought application for costs totalling $1.22 million 
jointly and severally on substantial indemnity basis. 
Summary Only mention of CFA: "He references the decision in Danso-Coffey v. Ontario, [2009] O.J. 
No. 1136 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 8, where Hackland J. notes: 
[T]he question of what constitutes an appropriate hourly rate for any claim for costs is to be 
determined by referring to the criteria in rule 57.01 and not by the terms of the retainer 
between counsel and his or her client. This is subject to the proviso that costs must not be 
awarded in excess of counsel's hourly rate in non-contingency fee situations." 
 
Kamboj v. Sidhu (2013 ONSC 2478) 
2013 CarswellOnt 5752, 2013 ONSC 2478, [2013] O.J. No. 2149, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1002 
Quick Facts Only one mention of CFA: "It appears that Mr. Voudouris met with the plaintiff in February 
2011 at which time the plaintiff signed a Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement (the "Retainer 
Agreement"). The Retainer Agreement was dated February 28, 2011 and covered all potential 
claims the plaintiff may have had with respect to the September 2008 accident, including the 
claims made in this action. However, at no time after the Retainer Agreement was signed, did 
Mr. Voudouris serve a notice of appointment of lawyer. As far as the court record was 




Melvin (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ontario (Minister of Correctional 
Services) (2013 ONSC 5432) 
2013 CarswellOnt 11868, 2013 ONSC 5432, 232 A.C.W.S. (3d) 353 
Quick Facts Plaintiff was assaulted while being held in custody in jail. Plaintiff suffered serious closed 
head injury. Plaintiff commenced action against provincial Crown and jail for damages for 
negligence. Plaintiff's guardian of property was appointed as his litigation guardian. Crown 
and jail agreed to settle for $750,000 and this amount was accruing interest. Plaintiff did not 
want his settlement to be structured. Plaintiff brought motion through litigation guardian for 
order approving settlement and his solicitors' fees. 
Summary Not a case involving a CFA: "The PGT appears to regard the requested fees as being in the 
nature of a contingency fee. I agree with the solicitors that this is not a contingency 
arrangement but rather is a fee for service case, based on time expended." "In 2003, when Mr. 
Courtis was initially retained, he told Mr. Melvin that the fees that would be charged at the 
end of the case would be the amount received for party and party costs (now partial indemnity 
costs) plus somewhere between 15% to 25% of the total amount received. This was not a 
contingency fee arrangement but rather an estimate at the outset of the case of the legal costs 




Traffic Law Advocate (E.E.) Professional Corp. v. Yang (2013 ONSC 2887) 
2013 CarswellOnt 6872, 2013 ONSC 2887, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 857 
 
  
Date Heard: May 15, 2013 
Judgment: May 22, 2013 
Parties Traffic Law Advocate (E.E.) Professional Corporation, (plaintiff), Respondent 
Guo Yang, Defendant, Appellant 
Counsel Miguel Maruszki, for Plaintiff / Respondent 
Guo Yang, for himself 
Judge/s Herman J. 
Quick Facts Appellant was client of respondent paralegal firm. Firm brought action against client for 
unpaid fees. CFA between parties was found to be illegal, but firm was entitled to fees on 
quantum meruit basis. Firm was found to be entitled to $772.06 in fees. Client claimed that 
firm should not have been able to amend pleadings during trial, to plead quantum meruit. 
Client also claimed that hourly fee rate determined by judge was improper. Client appealed 
from judgment of Small Claims Court on above grounds. 





"By written Retainer signed on July 24, 2006, the defendant retained TLAI for paralegal 
services to pursue a claim for Accident Benefits (the "Retainer") ... The Retainer was a 
contingency arrangement providing for remuneration for TLAI for its services at the rate of 
20% of the sum of all benefits and expenses obtained on behalf of the defendant, plus GST. It 
also provided that in the event that the Retainer was terminated then, the remuneration for the 
plaintiff was to be based on a specified hourly rate set out in the Retainer." (from Small 
Claims Court decision) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. Whether or not the Deputy Judge erred in law when he allowed TLA to amend its pleading 
to add the cause of action of quantum meruit at the particular stage in the proceeding; and 
B. Whether or not the Deputy Judge applied the wrong hourly rate ($200/hr) when he 
determined the amount Mr. Yang owed TLA (in a different case he had applied a $100/hr 
rate) 
Outcome Held:  Appeal dismissed. 
Given the finding that the client had accepted the bulk of the charges, the amount awarded 
under quantum meruit was not unreasonable. Client claims that his acceptance of charges was 
due to belief in the legality of the CFA did not change fair and reasonable amount to be 
awarded. Determination of reasonable compensation was case-specific, and was not based on 
hourly rate as client claimed but rather on full examination of facts. Small Claims court judge 
made no error in principle. 
Followed: Housen v. Nikolaisen (2002), 10 C.C.L.T. (3d) 157, 211 DLR (4th) 577 
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Jane Conte Professional Corp. v. Smith (2014 ONSC 6009) 
2014 CarswellOnt 14894, 2014 ONSC 6009, [2014] O.J. No. 5033, 246 A.C.W.S. (3d) 706, 329 O.A.C. 96 
Date Heard: October 8, 2014 
Judgment: October 15, 2014 
Parties Josephine Smith (defendant), Appellant 
Jane Conte Professional Corporation (plaintiff), Respondent 
Counsel B. Weintraub, for Appellant 
A. Andreopoulos, for Respondent 
Judge/s Nordheimer J. 
Quick Facts In November 2009, defendant retained plaintiff law firm to assist in a personal injury claim 
arising out of motor vehicle accident. Defendant signed  
contingency fee retainer agreement prepared by plaintiff. Defendant later terminated 
plaintiff’s services, and plaintiff firm submitted a final account amount to defendant.  On 
March 7, 2014, plaintiff commenced action in small claims court for amount of fees. On April 
29, 2014, defendant brought motion to strike out and dismiss plaintiff's claim. Defendant's 
motion was dismissed by deputy judge without reasons. Defendant appealed  
Statute & Rules 





The appellant signed a Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement prepared by the respondent. The 
Agreement provided that: (para 3) 
 respondent would be paid 30% of the amount of the appellant’s recovery, together 
with any costs awarded to the appellant 
 if appellant terminates the respondent’s services, the appellant would have to pay for 
the services provided up to that point based on the respondent’s hourly rates 
Appellant terminated the respondent’s services and respondent issued a “final” statement of 
account for $17,095.63. After some discussion with the appellant’s new counsel regarding the 
amount of the account, the respondent delivered a new “final” account of $26,051.59 for their 
services up until the point of termination.  
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Can CFA’s contain non-contingent components? I.e. Whether or not the CFA ceased to be 
a CFA because it contained a provision providing for the application of hourly rates in 
determining the client’s fee, where services are terminated. (paras 21, 22) 
Jurisdiction: Whether or not Small Claims Court had jurisdiction to consider a claim made 
by a lawyer based on a written fee agreement, including a CFA in particular 
Was the CFA enforceable given the costs provision and failure to seek judicial approval? 
Section 28.1(8) states that a contingency fee agreement that provides for the lawyer to receive 
costs awards must be approved by the court and only under "exceptional circumstances". 
Further, s. 28.1(9) expressly provides that a CFA, that contains such a provision regarding 
costs, is unenforceable unless it has been approved by the court (the whole CFA, not just the 
costs provision).  
Outcome Held: Appeal allowed. Order of Deputy Judge set-aside and order granted dismissing the 
proceeding in Small Claims Court. 
S. 28.1(2) of the Solicitors Act states that CFA may extend “in whole or in part” to the 
remuneration paid to the solicitor. Therefore, CFA’s may contain non-contingent components 
of the fee arrangement. 
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Chen v. Singer, Kwinter LLP (2013 ONSC 6712) 
2013 CarswellOnt 15023, 2013 ONSC 6712, 234 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1060 
Date Note: this is not really a fee approval case, but the court does uphold a CFA 
Judgement: October, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Wei Chen 
Defendant: Singer, Kwinter LLP 
Counsel For Plaintiff: for himself 
For Defendant: Veronica Marson 
Judge/s Then: Frank J. 
Quick Facts "Mr. Chen was injured in a car accident in 2001. He retained Singer, Kwinter ... to act on his 
behalf in prosecuting the personal injury action arising out of that accident. Singer, Kwinter 
was the fifth law firm to go on record for Mr. Chen in that action." These are 
APPLICATIONS arising out of Wei Chen's assessment of Singer, Kwinter LLP's 
account for legal fees in a personal injury action settled on November 30, 2010. Mr. Chen 
challenges the Report and Certificate of the Assessment Officer [assessed Singer, Kwinter's 
account in the amount of $110,000] and Singer, Kwinter seeks confirmation of that Report 
and Certificate. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, s.3  
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
CFA: no physical copy of the agreement could be produced; “A focus of 
Mr. Chen's impassioned submissions on this appeal was his denial of having entered into the 
contingency fee arrangement that Singer, Kwinter maintains was entered into on March 5, 
2010.”  
Settlement: "Mr. Chen signed instructions directing Singer, Kwinter to settle this action for 
$340k net of fees, disbursements and taxes totaling $110k. The fee component was $62k." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Should the alleged CFA factor into the determination of fair and reasonable fees, contra the 
assessment officer’s finding? 
Outcome Held: Mr. Chen's application is dismissed; SK’s application granted. 
“there is no basis on which this court can interfere with the assessment of the assessment 
officer.” 
On CFA: “…whether the terms of the March 5, 2010 retainer agreement, which provided for a 
percentage payment to Singer, Kwinter, prevailed is irrelevant to the quantification of the 
fees. The assessment officer did not rely on the retainer agreement. Instead, he 
assessed Singer, Kwinter's account on the basis of quantum meruit.” 
  
Small claims court had no jurisdiction to consider claim made by lawyer based on written 
fee agreement, including contingency fee agreement. Pursuant to the Solicitors 
Act, agreement between lawyer and client respecting amount and manner of payment was to 
be determined by court in which legal work was done and, if work was not done in any court, 
by Superior Court of Justice. In addition, the CFA had not been approved by court and was 
prima facie unenforceable for its inclusion of the costs provision [per s. 28.1(8) and (9)]. 
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Rops (Litigation guardian of) v. Intact Insurance Co. (2013 ONSC 7366) 
2013 CarswellOnt 18789, 2013 ONSC 7366, 239 A.C.W.S. (3d) 348 
Date Heard: N/A 
Judgement: December, 2013 
Parties Applicant: Rops, by his litigation Guardian Micheal Rops 
Respondent: Intact Insurance Company 
Counsel For Applicant: B. Legate, K. Finley 
For Defendant: No one 
Judge/s Then: L.C. Leitch J. 
Quick Facts "Aaron was injured when he was aged 11 in an all-terrain vehicle crash. He suffered what are 
described as significant injuries that required three surgeries. The materials state that after 
diligently pursuing rehabilitation, he continues to suffer from a limp, scarring, numbness in 
his left thigh, pain, loss of mobility, instability, fatigue and loss of stamina." An 
APPLICATION was filed on behalf of the plaintiff for an order approving the Contingency 
Fee Retainer Agreement between Legate & Associates, LLP and Michael Rops… [et al.] 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, s.5(1) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
CFA: "...contemplates a base contingency of 30% and "increases according to the stage of the 
litigation to reflect the greater risk and vastly increased costs going forward to trial", capping 
at 40% if the claim settles any time after the pretrial."  
Settlement: "Ultimately, the accident benefits claim was settled and the respondent insurer 
will pay $14,500 to resolve the infant plaintiff's accident benefits claim." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable and in accordance with the SA? 
Outcome Held: Application dismissed.  
"I note that in Henricks-Hunter at para. 21, the Court of Appeal commented that in that case it 
was apparent that the contingency fee agreement in issue was fair when it was negotiated, and 
it was noted "in particular, that when it was negotiated there was considerable uncertainty as 
to the likely success of the claim and the extent of the investment that would be required of 
the solicitors to bring the action to a favourable conclusion". It seems to me that similar 
commentary cannot be made in relation to the accident benefits claim. Therefore, again, I am 




Soullière (Litigation Guardian of) v. Robitaille Estate (2014 ONSC 851) 
2014 CarswellOnt 1505, 2014 ONSC 851, [2014] O.J. No. 639, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 795 
Date Judgment: February 5, 2014 
Parties Christopher Soullière by his Litigation Guardian Martin Soullière, Marcelle Robitaille, Rene 
Soullière, and Elizabeth Soullière, Chantal Lefebvre, Plaintiffs 
The Estate of Isabelle Robitaille and Guy Laberge, East Hawkesbury Township and The 
Corporation of the United Counties of Prescott and Russell, Her Majesty the Queen in Right 
of Ontario, Defendants 
Counsel Derek Nicholson, for Plaintiffs 
Mark Charron, for Defendant, Corporation of the County of the United Counties of Prescott 
and Russell 
Judge/s Toscano Roccamo J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiff C became disabled after he was catastrophically injured in car accident. Lump sum 
accident benefit of $208,551.00 was used to purchase and renovate home for C. In settlement 
of tort action, $9 million would be paid to plaintiffs who would also keep $970,266, which 
was their pro rata share of amounts paid into court by insurer of driver of vehicle in which C 
was passenger. Settlement was based on notional discount of 50% of estimated value of 
plaintiffs' claims given liability and litigation risks inherent in action. Counsel for plaintiffs 
brought motion for approval of contingency fees in amount of $2,398,849.15 plus applicable 
taxes (representing 15% of accident benefits and 25% of tort settlement, less $500,000 
attributed to costs). In addition, counsel has sought an order for the payment of 
disbursements, plus applicable taxes in the amount of $1,144.12, on top of the earlier order 
(dated January 15, 2014) for the payment of $187,558.22 for disbursements incurred in these 
proceedings. 
Counsel spent an estimated 1,446.7 hours on the file to the date of this motion, for a value of 
$407,336.55 before taxes. The contingency fees, therefore, result in a payment of 
approximately $1,991,512.60 over and above the value of the docketed fees, after taxes are 
considered. (para 8) 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 28.1 [en. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4] 
Motion under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
Christopher's litigation guardian, Martin Soullière, entered into a CFA on March 26, 2009. 
The agreement provided for: 
 30% contingency fee for the tort action 
 15% contingency fee for the settlement of accident benefits. 
In order to facilitate settlement, counsel agreed to adjust % in the tort claim to 25%, but 
maintains that 15% would apply to the SAB settlement. Counsel also sought payment for 
disbursements (see ‘Quick Facts’). 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Whether or not to approve counsel’s fees in accordance with the CFA? I.e. was the CFA 
either unfair or unreasonable (per test and factors to consider in Raphael Partners v Lam)? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
Christopher's needs for attendant care and medical and rehabilitation expenses would be 
adequate to give effect to the essential services he needs, after payment of the contingency 
fees sought by counsel, and after deducting amounts for disbursements and trial expenses 
addressed by my order of January 15, 2014. (para 15) While the contingency fees sought 
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Baines v. Linett & Timmis Barristers & Solicitors (2014 ONSC 2348) 
2014 CarswellOnt 4769, 2014 ONSC 2348, 239 A.C.W.S. (3d) 784, 33 C.C.L.I. (5th) 128 
 
  
amount to over five times the time expended by counsel plus disbursements and taxes, this 
alone would not render the fees unreasonable in the appropriate case (para 27) In this case, 
there is little doubt that consideration of the other Raphael factors favours payment of the 
fees sought by counsel. (para 28)  The results in this case were undoubtedly enhanced by 
counsel's willingness to prepare for and pursue a costly trial to its mid-point, with all its 
attendant risks on liability. (para 29) I have little doubt that, absent counsel's willingness to 
accept the risks, the social objective of providing access to justice for injured children and 
parties under disability of limited financial means would not have been met. (para 32) 
Followed: Henricks-Hunter (Litigation Guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (2012 ONCA 
496); Raphael Partners v. Lam  (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.) 
Date Heard: March 27, 2014 
Judgment: April 14, 2014* 
Parties Eleanor Denise Baines, Plaintiff 
Linett & Timmis Barristers & Solicitors, Defendant 
Counsel Eleanor Denise Baines, Plaintiff, for herself 
Bruce Hutchinson, for Defendant 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Client retained law firm in 2000 to represent her in personal injury proceedings. In 2008, 
client fired law firm after unsuccessful mediation. Self-represented client took action to trial 
and was unsuccessful. Client blamed law firm for poor result at trial and sued law firm for 
negligence, seeking damages and return of legal fees. Law firm brought motion for summary 
judgment, seeking dismissal of action 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 





NA – no information as to what the alleged contingency fee agreement provided for. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Plaintiff, Ms. Baines claims that she understood that retainer was a CFA. Linett & Timmis 
denies this understanding and a CFA is not confirmed by the written retainer agreement. 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. Action dismissed. 
On CFA issue: “It […] is not necessary to decide the issue about the nature of the retainer, 
because ultimately the summary judgment motion will turn on whether Ms. Baines can prove 
damages.” (para 10) 
Followed:  Aguonie v. Galion Solid Waste Material Inc. (1998 – Ont CA);  Combined Air 
Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch (2014 SCC 7) 
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St. Jean v. Armstrong (2015 ONSC 13) 
2015 CarswellOnt 199, 2015 ONSC 13, [2015] O.J. No. 131, 249 A.C.W.S. (3d) 313 
Date Heard: December 18, 2014 
Judgment: January 14, 2015 
Parties Cindy St. Jean, Claude Pothier and Adam Pothier, a minor by his Litigation Guardian Claude 
Pothier, Plaintiffs 
Richard Armstrong, Co-op Taxi and Marcel Desjardins, Defendants 
Counsel Erin Cullin, Lindsay McNicholl, for Plaintiffs 
No one for Defendants 
Judge/s Robert G.S. Del Frate J. 
Quick Facts Minor plaintiff, when riding bicycle, was involved in collision with defendant's vehicle. 
Plaintiffs retained law firm to bring action against defendants. Parties entered into settlement 
agreement with defendants. Plaintiffs brought motion for approval of agreement and costs, 
and for sealing order on the basis of solicitor-client privilege. 
Statute/Rules 




CFAs signed by Pothier on August 1, 2006 and January 30, 2014, which provide: 
 1/3 of damages awarded in the accident benefits (AB) claim 
 latter agreement expands the original agreement by explaining that the fees on the 
tort action and the AB claim would be subject to the one-third amount. 
 if retainer terminated, then client liable for  "reasonable legal fees" will be calculated 
based upon the number of hours or work performed for the Client as a percentage of 
the total work required to complete the file + disbursements 
This results in fees of $466,000, HST of $37,280 and disbursements of $84,510 for a total of 
$587,790. 
“It appears somewhat unusual that the CFA would be executed in excess of two years after 
the firm was retained and that an additional CFA would be asked to be signed after both 
claims had been resolved.” (para 44) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. Whether or not to approve counsel’s fees in accordance with the CFA? I.e. was the CFA 
either unfair or unreasonable (per test and factors to consider in Raphael Partners v Lam)? 
B. Would disclosure of CFA infringe on S-C privilege? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted in part. 
“In my view, knowing that the accident benefits had been lumped out without the usual steps 
in litigation and that there was no financial risk to the firm, a fee of one-third of the lumped 
out sum is not fair or reasonable (for the AB claim) […] However, on the tort action, in spite 
of the delay in signing the CFA as stated previously, with or without the CFA, the one-third 
being requested by the law firm is reasonable.” (paras 46, 47) “Accordingly, fees for the AB 
claim will be fixed at $170,000, inclusive of HST, and fees for the tort action will be fixed at 
$183,333, inclusive of HST, for a total of $353,333 [and] Disbursements are fixed at 
$84,510, inclusive of HST.” (paras 52, 53) 
As regards the second element of the motion, request for sealing ordered denied. There was 
no evidence establishing that disclosure would infringe on solicitor-client privilege. Facts of 
this case were not unusual. Infringement of privilege regarding CFA was minimal, if at all. 




view of pleadings already filed. There was nothing extraordinary to justify such order. 
Followed: Adler (Litigation Guardian of) v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
(92 OR (3d) 266 (Ont SCJ); Henricks-Hunter (Litigation Guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario 
Inc. (2012 ONCA 496); Raphael Partners v. Lam  (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.);  
Symington (Litigation guardian of) v. Adam (March 7, 2008), Doc. 05-0080, 0186-0 (Ont. 
S.C.J.) 
Additional 
Reasons given in 




Parties made submissions regarding costs. Issue of costs was already adjudicated and slip 
rule under R. 59.06(1) CFA did not apply. CFA award was appropriate in tort action and 
provided that HST would be over and above any award for costs. Trial judge exercised 
discretion and included HST in assessment of costs. 
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Erickson & Partners v. Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care) 
(2014 ONSC 4339) 
– see ONCA decision below 
2014 CarswellOnt 10770, 2014 ONSC 4339, 243 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1019, 38 C.C.L.I. (5th) 83 
 
Date Heard: April 1, 2014 
Judgment: July 21, 2014 
Parties Erickson & Partners, Applicant 
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care), 
Respondent 
Counsel Brian Babcock, for Applicant 
Rita V. Bambers, Sonal Gandhi, for Respondent 
Judge/s J. deP. Wright J. 
Quick Facts Applicant solicitors were retained to represent plaintiffs in two actions for damages for 
personal injuries pursuant to CFAs.  By operation of s. 39 of reg. 522 under Health 
Insurance Act, solicitors also represented respondent provincial government, Ministry of 
Health and Long Term Care or Ontario Health Insurance Plan, in subrogated claims for 
amounts paid under Plan. Legislation provided that, in return, whether litigation successful or 
not, Plan required to pay proportion of taxable costs. Solicitors and Plan disagreed on how 
Plan's obligation to pay costs should be calculated. Solicitors applied for declaration 
that CFAs complied with s. 28.1 of Solicitors Act and for directions concerning proper 
interpretation of s. 39 of reg. 522.  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s 61. 
Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s. 1 “insured person”, 30, 30(1). 




CFAs provided for: 
 fee of 25% of damages recovered by judgment or settlement 
 + % of damages equal to amount awarded as costs 
 + amount awarded as disbursements 
 + any disbursements not recovered 
 + HST on all of the above 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. The enforceability of their CFAs with the injured plaintiffs, i.e. Does the CFA comply 
with the Solicitors Act and Regulation? and… 
B. The proper manner of dividing, between the injured party and the Plan, responsibility for 
payment under those agreements. 
Outcome Held: Contingency found not to be enforceable. 
A.   No.  By including recovery for percentage of costs awarded, without court approval and 
without including certain compulsory statements, CFAs failed to comply with s. 28 and ss. 
2(5) and 3(3)(i) of the Regulation 195/04. 
B In determining plan's obligation to pay proportion of taxable costs, taxable amount of 
solicitors' fees should be ascertained by agreement of all parties, including plan, or 
assessment, full breakdown given at para 61. 
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Erickson & Partners v. Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care) 
(2015 ONCA 285)  
– see ONSC decision above 
2015 CarswellOnt 6169, 2015 ONCA 285, 125 O.R. (3d) 762, 253 A.C.W.S. (3d) 196, 334 O.A.C. 74, 49 C.C.L.I. 
(5th) 187 
Date Heard: April 1, 2015 
Judgment: April 27, 2015 
Parties Erickson & Partners (applicant), Appellant 
Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care), 
Respondent 
Counsel Brian A. Babcock, for Appellant 
Rita V. Bambers, Sonal Gandhi, for Respondent 
Judge/s K. Feldman, M.L. Benotto, David Brown JJ.A. 
Quick Facts Applicant solicitors were retained to represent plaintiffs in two actions for damages for 
personal injuries pursuant to CFAs. By operation of s. 39 of reg. 522 under Health Insurance 
Act (ON), solicitors also represented respondent provincial government, Ministry of Health 
and Long Term Care or Ontario Health Insurance Plan, in subrogated claims for amounts 
paid under Plan. Legislation provided that, in return, whether litigation successful or not, 
Plan required to pay proportion of taxable costs. Solicitors and plan disagreed on how plan's 
obligation to pay costs should be calculated. Solicitors' application for declaration 
that CFAs complied with s. 28.1 of Solicitors Act and for directions concerning proper 
interpretation of s. 39 of reg. 522 resulted in finding that contingency was not enforceable… 
Trial judge found that by including recovery for % of costs awarded, without court approval 
and without including certain compulsory statements, CFA failed to comply with s. 28.1. 
Trial judge also found that: 
 in determining plan's obligation to pay proportion of taxable costs, taxable amount of 
solicitors' fees should be ascertained by agreement of all parties, including Plan, or 
assessment. 
 amount of recovered costs attributable to Plan should be ascertained by multiplying 
Plan's share of damages and interest by amount of costs recovered and divided by 
amount of damages and interest personally recovered by insured. 
 amount of recovery made on behalf of Plan was sum of Plan's share of damages and 
Plan's share of costs receivable. 
 Plan's share of taxable costs could then be determined by multiplying amount of 
recovery made on behalf of Plan by amount of taxable costs divided by total amount 
recovered. 
Law firm appealed. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, ss 11(1), 30, 30(1), 31, 31(1), 33 




CFA between appellant solicitors and plaintiffs in original claims provided for fee of 25% of 
damages recovered by judgment or settlement + % of damages equal to amount awarded as 
costs + amount awarded as disbursements + any disbursements not recovered + HST 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
This appeal concerned the proper calculation of the Plan's portion of costs in the scenario 
where the insured person makes a recovery in the action, through the interpretation of s. 




Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed. Respondent awarded costs in the amount of $7,500. 
Where an insured person makes a recovery, the amount of costs obtained by judgment or 
settlement should be deducted from the total costs of the insured person's lawyer, and the 
Plan's proportionate share of the taxable costs otherwise payable by the insured person 
should be calculated as follows: 
Costs x recovery made on behalf of the Plan (Plan's damages + pre-judgment 
interest) total recovery of the insured person (including Plan's damages + all 
pre-judgment interest) (para 33) 
Followed: Mason (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ontario (Ministry of Community & Social 
Services) (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 604 
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Davis v. Cox-Kikkajoon (2015 ONSC 1946) 




Date Heard: March 19, 2015 
Judgment: March 25, 2015 
Parties Jerome Davis, Applicant 
Heikki Cox-Kikkajoon and Boland Howe LLP, Respondents 
Counsel Applicant, for himself 
Heikki Cox-Kikkajoon, for Respondents 
Judge/s R.D. Gordon R.S.J. 
Quick Facts Client hired number of different law firms to represent him in relation to injuries he sustained 
when struck by motor vehicle. Client entered into CFA retainer with latest law firm (Boland 
Howe LLP). Tort claim was settled. Law firm sent its account and cheque to claimant for 
balance of settlement funds. Client brought motion: 1) for determination of validity of CFA; 
2) order compelling law firm to produce full and detailed disclosure of all disbursements of 
settlement funds; 3) order compelling full disclosure of all documentation relating to motor 
vehicle accident by insurer; 4) and order to determine if threshold was met with respect to 
injuries suffered by client in accident law firm brought cross-motion to have client declared 
vexatious litigant  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 140 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 24 




Details of CFA not provided 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Sole issue with CFA: Is the CFA “fair and reasonable” given that it did not include the 
required statement that Mr. David retained the right to make all critical decisions regarding 
the conduct of the matter? 
Outcome Held: Both motions dismissed. 
“If I were to accept that Mr. Davis was unaware of his ability to make critical decisions 
regarding the litigation, I would agree that the failure to include the required provision in the 
CFA would be fatal to it. However, the evidence before me is quite clear that Mr. Davis was 
fully aware of his right to control this litigation and his retainer with Boland Howe LLP.” 
(para 21) Issue of the reasonableness of the CFA fees remitted back to assessment officer. 
Followed: Lukezic v. Royal Bank (2012 – Ont CA) 
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Umbach (Litigation guardian of) v. Wilmot (Township) (2014 ONSC 2995) 
2014 CarswellOnt 6331, 2014 ONSC 2995, 240 A.C.W.S. (3d) 838, 60 C.P.C. (7th) 188 
 
  
Date Judgment: May 14, 2014 
Parties Timothy Andrew Umbach, by his Litigation Guardian, Lynda Umbach, Dale Umbach and 
Lynda Umbach, Plaintiffs 
The Corporation of the Township of Wilmot, Defendant 
Counsel Charles E. Gluckstein, for Plaintiffs 
James H. Bennett, for Defendant 
Judge/s C. Stephen Glithero J. 
Quick Facts On September 23, 2008, at the age of 17, plaintiff injured driver lost control of his vehicle 
while negotiating curve on gravel road in defendant township, resulting in severe brain injury 
and death of his passenger. Injured driver, though his litigation guardian, and his parents 
brought action for damages for personal injuries. After mediation, parties agreed to settle for 
$1.5 million comprising damages of $1.25 million, interest of $161,500 and disbursements of 
$88,500. Pursuant to CFA, injured driver's counsel was to receive 33 per cent of settlement for 
fees, being $466,125, although counsel agreed to forego HST, resulting in total fees of 
$412,500. During hearing, counsel agreed to further reduce his fees to 25 per cent of 
settlement, being $312,500 plus $40,625 HST. Injured driver and parents brought motion for 
approval of settlement 
Statute/Rules 




The amount claimed in motion material was 33% of the $1,250,000 damages for the tort claim 
equalling $412,500. The HST on that amount was waived by counsel, representing a saving to 
the plaintiff in the amount of $53,625. In submissions, Mr. Gluckstein (counsel) indicated he 
would be prepared to reduce fees to 25% + HST, this option would afford the plaintiff further 
savings from the first option (33% - HST) of  $59,375. (see ‘Quick Facts’) 
CFA was not court approved and thus was not binding on Glithero J. in his decision. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Whether or not the proposed legal fees ought to be approved as claimed on a contingency fee 
basis? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
“These plaintiffs would not have had access to litigation were it not for the [CFA]. Similarly 
the cost of disbursements would have been crippling, and likely impossible if the matter 
extended through a trial. The social objective of providing access to justice was enhanced here 
by counsel's willingness to do the case on a contingency fee basis with its inherent risks […]  
the claim for fees as modified during the hearing before me is fair and reasonable” (para 40, 
41)  
Followed:  Aywas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Kirwan (2010 ONSC 2278);  Lau (Litigation 
Guardian of) v. Bloomfield (2007) (Ont SCJ) 
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Zhau (Litigation guardian of) v. 2100950 Ontario Inc. – additional reasons 
to judgement in (2015 ONSC 785) 
2015 CarswellOnt 2331, 2015 ONSC 1093, 249 A.C.W.S. (3d) 703 
 
  
Date Judgment: February 18, 2015 
Parties Brian Zhau, a minor by his litigation guardian, Anthony Ngai, and Wendy Tan, Plaintiffs 
2100950 Ontario Inc., operating as Congee Queen, Cho Design Inc., Lonna Wai-Fong Cho, 
Joe Cho, Tran Dieu and Associates Inc., ISI Contracting Limited, Defendants 
Counsel P. Michael Rotondo, for Plaintiffs 
Ramon V. Andal, for Defendant, Congee Queen 
Judge/s Spies J. 
Quick Facts Minor plaintiff suffered injury to wrist and hand at restaurant operated by defendant when he 
pushed open door that led to washroom and window in frame of door fell onto him. 
Defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs $225,000, all-inclusive and plaintiffs brought motion for 
court approval of settlement. Motion was granted. Structured settlement was ordered in 
amount of $110,000. Minor plaintiff was to be provided with annual payments of $15,000 
once he turned 18, payable for four years and lump sum of remaining amount was to be paid 
out at age 25. CFA was not provided at that time, and court determined it was not in position 
to determine what amount should be approved for legal fees and disbursements of law firm. 
Lawyer provided supplementary affidavit. This was an application to deal with outstanding 






CFA signed by Mr. Ngai and dated March 26, 2010. Allegedly the same as the CFA signed by 
Wendy Tan at the start of the action, but that agreement could not be found. CFA provides: 
30% of any settlement or recovery for its fees 
 + GST 
 + costs and expenses (disbursements) 
The CFA was not relied upon to support the firm’s claim for fees. Fees claimed based on 
hourly rates provided in the CFA, which states that if services of firm are terminated, they are 
to be paid $250/hour for lawyers and $85/hour for law clerks. This provision in CFA does not 
formally apply but goes to the expectations of the clients. In total,  the firm has asked for 
$58,268.83 in fees plus HST. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement NA 
Outcome Held: Settlement approved. 
“I am satisfied that the time spent by Mr. Rotondo and his law clerks and paralegals was 
reasonable and that it is justified. Assuming his hourly rate of $250 and $85 for his law clerks, 
which rates I find to be reasonable, the time spent justifies the fees claimed and does not 
include a premium. Accordingly, I approve of the fees plus HST as requested.” (para 10)  
 100 
Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP v. Chen (2015 ONSC 2501) 
2015 CarswellOnt 5700, 2015 ONSC 2501, 253 A.C.W.S. (3d) 94 
 
  
Date Heard: April 18, 2015 
Judgment: April 21, 2015 
Parties Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP and Singer Kwinter, Applicants 
Wei Chen, Respondent 
Counsel David Levy, for Applicant, Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP 
Alfred Kwinter, Veronica Marson, for Applicant, Singer Kwinter 
No one for Wei Chen 
Judge/s G. Dow J. 
Quick Facts Applicant law firm Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP (H) represented respondent in claim for 
accident benefits following motor vehicle accident. In 2007, action was settled on 
respondent's instructions. In 2012, respondent filed unsuccessful complaint against H with 
provincial law society about quality of service he received. Respondent also commenced 
action against H to assess accounts for tort claim. That matter was adjourned and respondent 
appealed adjournment. Respondent switched counsel again and retained applicant law firm 
Singer Kwinter to represent him in tort action arising out of motor vehicle accident pursuant 
to CFA. Tort action was settled on respondent's instructions in November 2011 at pre-trial 
conference. Despite fact that Alfred Kwinter had reduced amount of fees owing under CFA, 
respondent sought assessment of their account. Assessment officer allowed entirety of 
Kwinter account. Respondent opposed confirmation of certificate of assessment and brought 
motion. Motion was dismissed as was respondent's attempts to appeal. Respondent also 
brought two actions against Kwinter for solicitor's negligence in relation to tort action. Both 
actions were dismissed although respondent had filed for leave to appeal dismissal of one 
action. Applicants requested order declaring respondent to be vexatious litigant. 
Statute/Rules 




 As part of achieving a settlement satisfactory to Wei Chen, Alfred Kwinter agreed to reduce 
his fees from that available through the CFA (which would have been about $141,000) to 
$70,000 + $40,000 for disbursements (of which $25,534.53 was being paid to the previous 
firm that had acted for Wei Chen, McLeish Orlando LLP – that firm had agreed to waive any 
claim for legal fees).  
Issue/s with 
Agreement NA – decision focussed on respondent’s vexatious behaviour and not the CFAs at play.  
Outcome Held: Application granted. Chen ordered to pay costs in the amount of $1,500 to Applicants. 
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Russo (Litigation guardian of) v. Seligman (2015 ONSC 3019) 
2015 CarswellOnt 7770, 2015 ONSC 3019, 254 A.C.W.S. (3d) 552 
 
  
Date Judgment: May 12, 2015 
Parties Benito Russo, by his Litigation Guardian, Frank Russo, Plaintiff/Moving Party 
Dr. James Seligman, Defendant 
Counsel Joel McCoy, for Plaintiff 
Judge/s Molloy J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiff retained counsel in relation to malpractice claim arising from surgery on his shoulder 
in 2004, when he was 74 years old. Statement of claim was issued in 2008. Plaintiff's son was 
appointed as litigation guardian in 2012, as plaintiff then suffered from dementia. Matter was 
settled for $52,500 all inclusive, of which $1,800 was to go to Ministry of Health for its 
subrogated claim. Plaintiff had entered into CFA with solicitors, Bermanis Preya, at the time 
he first retained the firm, and was later billed $22,950 for legal services. After payment of 
OHIP claim, plaintiff was to receive $27,500. Litigation guardian approved counsel fees and 
brought motion for approval of settlement 
Statute/Rules 




The retainer CFA is dated on the 15th day of “an illegible month” in 2007. It provides that the 
fee will include: 
 the amount of party and party costs contributed by the defendant 
 disbursements 
 and that fees which will not exceed 30% of the gross amount received for damages 
and interest, over and above party and party costs. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Including $7,000 toward party costs (which the judge is sceptical of) the amount of the fees 
charged exceeds 30% of the gross settlement proceeds, thereby violating the retainer CFA, 
that is unless the $7000 figure is deducted from the settlement amount. 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
“I have serious concerns that the contingency fee agreement in this case is not compliant with 
the legislation, and may be invalid.” (para 13) 
Further, the proposed settlement involved payment of money to plaintiff who was said to be 
mentally incapable, with no provision for how money was to be used and who would have 
control over it. Settlement was approved and defence counsel could obtain order dismissing 
action after payment of settlement funds into court to credit of action, less $1,800 to be paid 
directly to OHIP for its subrogated claim, for total of $50,700. Given concern that best 
interests of incapable plaintiff might not be protected, copy of endorsement was directed to be 
sent to Public Guardian and Trustee and to Law Society of Upper Canada. Counsel for 
plaintiff was directed to obtain appointment for motion for directions on notice to Public 
Guardian and Trustee. 
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Romero v. Turnbull (2015 ONSC 3638) 
2015 CarswellOnt 12707, 2015 ONSC 3638, 257 A.C.W.S. (3d) 470, 74 C.P.C. (7th) 389 
Date Heard: May 26, 2015 
Judgment: June 4, 2015 
Parties Custodio Moreno Romero, Plaintiff 
 Max Turnbull, Defendant 
Counsel K. Arvai, for Plaintiff / Moving Party 
S. Li, for Responding Party, Patey Law Group 
Judge/s B.W. Miller J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiff retained defendant solicitor (Patey Law Group) to represent him in action for 
damages arising from motor vehicle accident (on August 29, 2010) and signed CFA. 
Following breakdown in solicitor-client relationship, defendant requested Mr. Romeo to 
obtain new counsel and dismissed Romero as a client in January 2015. Plaintiff agreed to pay 
defendant's fees and disbursements, subject to assessment, out of any settlement or litigation 
proceeds from action. Defendant asserted solicitor's lien for payment of fees and 
disbursements incurred on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff brought motion for order requiring 
defendant, his former solicitor, to deliver his files to his new solicitor (Karl Arvai Professional 
Corporation). 
Patey is content with Arvai's undertaking with respect to fees, but takes the position that either 
Mr. Romero or Arvai should pay the disbursements incurred by Patey to date, in the amount 
of $4,358.56, as well as a $300 file duplication charge. 
Statute/Rules 




CFA executed on February 18, 2011, which includes provisions that state the following: 
 in the event of termination of services, “ I agree to your hourly fees for all work 
conducted on my matter, plus disbursements, plus H.S.T. on all services performed up 
to the date of termination of your services” 
 Patey reserves the right to charge full hourly rate in the event that client wishes to 
continue litigation against their recommendation, and/or where the client has 
misrepresented their claim, and/or where the client withdraws their claim at any point 
prior to settlement, and/or the client becomes noncompliant with reasonable requests 
 “I agree to pay to you your proper processing fees and disbursement plus H.S.T. on 
all services performed and to pay an interest penalty of 2% per month/ 24% per 
annum on all overdue accounts.” 
 “I acknowledge having read and received a copy of this retainer and that I am liable 
for payment of your fees and disbursements incurred in this matter.” 
“Arvai has advised that although it is willing to fund Mr. Romero's disbursements going 
forward, it is not prepared to pay the disbursements incurred to date, and will not take on Mr. 
Romero as a client if it is required to do so.” (para 9) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Does the former solicitor (Patey) have the right to withhold sending their former client’s files to 




Outcome Held: Motion granted with costs payable to the plaintiff in the amount of $1,000 inclusive of 
disbursements and HST. Patey must deliver files to Arvai within 30 days and Arvai is to pay 
reasonable copying fees to Patey in the amount of $300. 
As regards the CFA, there is nothing in the agreement that requires payment of disbursements 
on an on-going basis, or on demand. Further, CFA does not address termination by Patey, 
only by the client, and does not speak at all to when payment is due in the event of client’s 
termination. “On reading the Retainer Agreement it would be reasonable for Mr. Romero to 
believe, as he evidently did, that changing lawyers (at the instance of either party) would not 
generate an account that would be immediately payable.” (para 20) 
Additional 
Reasons given in 
(2015 ONSC 
5159) 
Romero v. Turnbull (2015 ONSC 5159) – additional reasons to the above 
Subsequent to earlier reasons, Arvai wrote to Miller J bringing to his attention – “quite 
rightly” - that Miller J had not had the benefit of his submissions on costs and had not taken 
into account an offer to settle that the plaintiff had made. 
Held: “Taking the plaintiff's offer into account, in conjunction with the factors enumerated in 
Rule 57.01, particularly the amount of costs that a party could reasonably be expected to pay, 
the complexity of the issues, and the quantum involved, I fix the costs of this motion at $1,500 
plus $378.59 in disbursements plus HST.” (para 9) 
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Gnys v. Narbutt (2015 ONSC 4407) 
2015 CarswellOnt 11214, 2015 ONSC 4407, 257 A.C.W.S. (3d) 120 
 
  
Date Heard: June 26, 2015 
Judgment: July 22, 2015 
Parties Valerie Gnys carrying on business as Health Services Recovery Network, Plaintiff 
Marta Narbutt, Defendant 
Counsel Shawn Knights, for Plaintiff 
Margaret Hoy, for Defendant 
Judge/s R.J. Nightingale J. 
Quick Facts Debtor retained solicitor in 2004 to pursue claim for damages arising from motor vehicle 
accident. Debtor sought litigation loan in 2008, and solicitor's law firm arranged one from 
creditor. Principal amount was $10,000, with interest at 18% compounded monthly. Interest 
rate was somewhat less than what other litigation loan providers charged. Debtor was not 
informed that creditor was owned by solicitor's spouse. Second loan for $2,500 was arranged 
on same terms to cover cost of medical report. Third loan for $1,000 was arranged on same 
terms about two months later. Debtor changed solicitors in late 2009 and received about 
$306,000 in 2011. Debtor paid solicitor's account but never repaid loans. Plaintiff loan 







Defendant, Marta Narbutt had no money for a retainer and her litigation guardian signed 
a CFA with the law firm, providing for: 
 1/3 of recovery, with the Defendant receiving credit for costs paid by the respondible 
party 




NA – no issues with CFA, decision focused on issues around the outstanding payment of loans. 
Outcome Held: Action allowed. 
“…the Plaintiff shall have judgment against the Defendant for the principal amount of the 
loans of $10,000 and $1000 respectively and lender fees thereon together with interest at the 
annual rate of 18% calculated monthly with an effective annual rate of interest of 19.5% 
calculated from the date of those loan advances. The Plaintiff shall also have judgment against 
the Defendant in the principal amount of the loan of $2500.” (paras 105-106) 
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John Doe v. MacDonald (2015 ONSC 4850) 
2015 CarswellOnt 12134, 2015 ONSC 4850, 257 A.C.W.S. (3d) 724 
 
  
Date Heard: July 21, 2015 
Judgement: August 10, 2015 
Parties John Doe, Applicant (name kept confidential per the terms of the settlement) 
Andrea Macdonald and the Barrister Group, Respondents 
Counsel Greg M. Frenette, Jessica Lam, for Applicant 
Andrew J. MacDonald, for Respondents 
Judge/s M.D. Faieta J. 
Quick Facts In summer of 2006, J (applicant) orally retained lawyer, A (respondent), to represent him in 
veterinary malpractice action following death of his dog. J is on a public disability pension 
and does not have the ability to pay for legal services. J thought that A was providing his 
services on a pro bono basis. Action was settled in February 2014 for undisclosed amount. In 
April 2014, A issued final invoice to J in amount of $34,000 on contingency fee basis. J 
brought application under s. 23 of Solicitors Act for declaration that A's services were 
rendered on pro bono basis and for related relief. 
Statute/Rules 




A (respondent) stated: “There was never a discussion of a percentage of proceeds as a basis 
that I was requiring to be paid and it was not a contingency agreement in that typical sense.” 
(para 26) – decision provides further back and forth correspondence between A and J 
Agreement was never put in writing per requirement of Solicitors Act. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Central question to application: Whether or not Andrew's services were provided on a pro 
bono or contingency basis. 
A (respondent) provided evidence of correspondence with J and J’s mother, as well as 
payment of $7,939.80 in trust by J’s mother on March 10, 2011 as evidence that they were 
engaged in a fee agreement.  
Outcome Held: Application granted. Relief granted. A ordered to pay costs to J in the amount of 
$1,684.57. 
There is presumption in Ontario that oral retainer is made on terms advanced by client. A 
(respondent) had not discharged heavy onus on him to satisfy court that his version of terms 
of retainer should be accepted over that of his client.  
Payment of $7,939.80 in March 2011 to A in trust by J's mother was not evidence that this 
was payment for fees. J's explanation was that this payment was for anticipated 
disbursements, and if A was retained on contingency basis, it did not make sense that this 
was payment for work to date. 
Followed: Griffiths v. Evans (1953 – Eng CA); Rye & Partners v. 1041977 Ontario Inc. 
(2004 – Ont CA)  
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Sawah v. Warren (2015 ONSC 5373) 
2015 CarswellOnt 13173, 2015 ONSC 5373, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 644 
 
  
Date Heard: August 17, 2015 
Judgment: August 26, 2015 
Parties John Sawah, Plaintiff  
Tyler David Warren (lawyer) and Sheetal Jhuti (paralegal) c.o.b. as SBJ Consulting Services, 
Defendants 
Counsel Ben Hahn, Ethan M. Rogers, for Plaintiff 
Brian A. Pickard, for Tyler David Warren 
David S. Lipkus, for Sheetal Jhuti 
Judge/s Gray J. 
Quick Facts Client suffered injuries in motor vehicle collision, and signed retainer agreement with 
paralegal authorizing her to represent his interests on claim for statutory accident 
benefits. Agreement was for contingency fee of 25 percent on any award or settlement. 
Statement of claim in connection with tort claim was filed by lawyer. Paralegal advised client 
of offer to settle tort claim in all-inclusive amount of $18,000, and client signed full and final 
release. Settlement funds in amount of $22,500 were advanced to lawyer and paralegal shortly 
thereafter. Client alleged that paralegal advised him of settlement of statutory accident 
benefits in amount of $6,000, but client refused to sign release. Client contacted insurer who 
provided documentation showing offer to settle was for $15,000. Client brought action for 
actual and punitive damages against lawyer and paralegal for fraud and breach of fiduciary 







CFA retainer signed January 7, 2009 between plaintiff and defendant provided for: 
 25% on any award or settlement (lower than counsel’s usual rate of 30%) 
 + disbursements 
No copy of CFA retainer could be produced by either party. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
NA – see issues re: fraud and breach of fiduciary duty set-out in ‘Quick Facts’ 
Outcome Held: Motion for summary judgement dismissed. Matter must proceed to trial. 
Releases regarding tort claim were suspicious, however evidence did not show that lawyer 
was responsible for or aware of such, and trial would be required to determine this. Evidence 
against paralegal was compelling, and it was clear that she falsely represented settlement 
amounts. Since matter was to proceed to trial anyway, no finding of fraud was made against 
paralegal. 
Followed: C. (R.) v. McDougall (2008 SCC 53); Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. 
Flesch (2014 SCC 8) 
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Mishan v. York Central Hospital (2015 ONSC 6369) 
2015 CarswellOnt 16276, 2015 ONSC 6369, 259 A.C.W.S. (3d) 578 
 
  
Date Judgment: October 19, 2015 
Parties Peter Mishan, Kathy Mishan, David J. Mishan, Adam M. Mishan, Sarah L. Mishan, and 
Naomi B. Mishan by her litigation guardian Peter Mishan, Plaintiffs 
York Central Hospital, Nurse Candy Wong, Nurse Nana Vadachkoriya, Nurse Michelle Van 
Der Valk, Nurse Janese Langley, Dr. Darryl J. Gebien and Dr. John A. Hayami, Defendants 
Counsel Miles Obradovich, for Plaintiffs 
Kate Crawford, for Defendants 
Judge/s Darla A. Wilson J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiff patient and family brought action against nurses, physicians and hospital for damages 
arising from negligent treatment. Patient no longer wished to pursue claim because he was not 
prepared to fund expert neurological opinion. Lawsuit had been at standstill for more than five 











Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
“In my view, if lawyers are not prepared to take these difficult professional negligence cases 
on a CFA basis, recognizing they may have to absorb the legal fees and disbursements if no 
supportive expert opinion can be secured, the Plaintiff ought to be referred out to counsel who 
will take the case on such a basis.” (para 11) 
However, given passage of time (5 years) and circumstances in which patient could not fund 
necessary expert opinion, action was dismissed. It was not possible on evidence to make 
finding about merits of claim or to determine whether it was in best interests of minor child to 
dismiss action. 
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Livent Inc. (Receiver of) v. Deloitte & Touche (2016 ONCA 11) 
2016 CarswellOnt 122, 2016 ONCA 11, 128 O.R. (3d) 225, 24 C.C.L.T. (4th) 177, 262 A.C.W.S. (3d) 542, 31 
C.B.R. (6th) 205, 342 O.A.C. 201, 393 D.L.R. (4th) 1 
 
  
Date Heard: March 23-26, 2015 
Judgment: January 8, 2016 
Parties Livent Inc., Through its Special Receiver and Manager Roman Doroniuk, Plaintiff 
(Respondent/Appellant by Cross-Appeal) 
Deloitte & Touche and Deloitte & Touche LLP, Defendants (Appellant/Respondent by Cross-
Appeal) 
Counsel John Mpampas for Appellant / Respondent by way of Cross-Appeal, for himself 
Eric Freedman for Respondent / Appellant by way of Cross-Appeal, Joel Freedman 
Judge/s G.R. Strathy C.J.O., R.A. Blair, P. Lauwers JJ.A. 
Quick Facts Client retained lawyer as legal counsel on three personal injury matters. Parties entered into 
CFA. Some legal work was done and settlement offers were being discussed. Lawyer was 
removed from record on his own motion. Lawyer brought successful motion for charging 
order for his unpaid account under s. 34 of Solicitors Act. Charging order was granted for two 
of client's three actions. Motion judge found that preconditions were satisfied that fund or 
property was in existence at time order was granted, property was "recovered or preserved" 
through instrumentality of solicitor, and that there was some evidence client could or would 
not pay fees. Motion judge held that lawyer preserved client's right to sue, which was chose in 
action and therefore property. Motion judge concluded that client could not pay lawyer's fees 
other than out of judgments or settlements. Client appealed. Cross-appeal by lawyer from 
costs award (no costs awarded). 










Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal dismissed. Costs awarded to the respondent fixed at 
$3000 inclusive of disbursements and GST. 
“We see no error in the reasons of the motion judge. The charging orders over any settlement 
funds were properly issued. The respondent acknowledges that any claim that the solicitor get 
off the record without just cause can be taken into account by the assessment officer in 
determining what fees are reasonable.” (para 1) And, motion judge acted within his discretion 
in awarding no costs. 
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Livent Inc. (Receiver of) v. Deloitte & Touche (2016 ONCA 11) 
2016 CarswellOnt 122, 2016 ONCA 11, 128 O.R. (3d) 225, 24 C.C.L.T. (4th) 177, 262 A.C.W.S. (3d) 542, 31 
C.B.R. (6th) 205, 342 O.A.C. 201, 393 D.L.R. (4th) 1 
 
  
Date Heard: March 23-26, 2015 
Judgment: January 8, 2016 
Parties Livent Inc., Through its Special Receiver and Manager Roman Doroniuk, Plaintiff 
(Respondent/Appellant by Cross-Appeal) 
Deloitte & Touche and Deloitte & Touche LLP, Defendants (Appellant/Respondent by Cross-
Appeal) 
Counsel John Mpampas for Appellant / Respondent by way of Cross-Appeal, for himself 
Eric Freedman for Respondent / Appellant by way of Cross-Appeal, Joel Freedman 
Judge/s G.R. Strathy C.J.O., R.A. Blair, P. Lauwers JJ.A. 
Quick Facts Client retained lawyer as legal counsel on three personal injury matters. Parties entered into 
CFA. Some legal work was done and settlement offers were being discussed. Lawyer was 
removed from record on his own motion. Lawyer brought successful motion for charging 
order for his unpaid account under s. 34 of Solicitors Act. Charging order was granted for two 
of client's three actions. Motion judge found that preconditions were satisfied that fund or 
property was in existence at time order was granted, property was "recovered or preserved" 
through instrumentality of solicitor, and that there was some evidence client could or would 
not pay fees. Motion judge held that lawyer preserved client's right to sue, which was chose in 
action and therefore property. Motion judge concluded that client could not pay lawyer's fees 
other than out of judgments or settlements. Client appealed. Cross-appeal by lawyer from 
costs award (no costs awarded). 








Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal dismissed. Costs awarded to the respondent fixed at 
$3000 inclusive of disbursements and GST. 
“We see no error in the reasons of the motion judge. The charging orders over any settlement 
funds were properly issued. The respondent acknowledges that any claim that the solicitor get 
off the record without just cause can be taken into account by the assessment officer in 
determining what fees are reasonable.” (para 1) And, motion judge acted within his discretion 
in awarding no costs. 
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Edwards (Litigation guardian of) v. Camp Kennebec (Frontenac) (1979) 
Inc.  (2016 ONSC 2501) 
2016 Carswell Ont 5702, 2016 ONSC 2501 
Date Heard: January 20, 2016 
Judgment: April 13, 2016 
Parties Jared Edwards, by his Litigation Guardian Eve Ojasoo and Eve Ojasoo, Russell Topp, Leiki 
Candace Edwards and Ailie Anne Bikaunieks, Plaintiffs 
Camp Kennebec (Frontenac) (1979) Inc., Kennebec Holdings Limited, Courtney Rondeau 
and Cameron Wilson, Defendants 
Counsel David Burstein, for Plaintiffs 
Timothy P. Alexander, for Defendants 
Judge/s M.D. Faieta J. 
Quick Facts Plaintif, Jared Edwards suffered from an existing learning disability and seizure disorder 
when he fell while entering a sailboat at the defendant’s six-week summer camp for the 
disabled, causing him a spinal injury.  Eve (Jared’s mother and Litigation Guardian) and her 
partner Russell retained De Rose Professional Corporation pursuant to a CFA dated October 
4, 2012 to seek recovery of damages arising from the above accident on behalf of Jared, his 
parents and his sisters.  This action was commenced in April 2014. In October 2015 the 
parties agreed to settle this action for $2,750,000.00, inclusive of costs and taxes.   It is 
proposed that the net proceeds of Jared's settlement will be supplemented by Eve's settlement 
to pay $1,475,000.00 for an annuity that will pay Jared the sum of $5,825.00 per month, 
without indexation, for the rest of his life. Plaintiffs bring this motion for Judgment 
approving the settlement of Jared's claim.  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 24, 28(1) 





 33% of any settlement recovered + HST 
 However, if action goes to trial, then fee is 40% of amount recovered + HST, or the 
amount of costs awarded by the Court, whichever counsel chooses 
 Or, where claim is not settled or lost at trial, plaintiff still responsible to pay all 
disbursements and taxes 
CFA does not state that client has been advised to obtain independent legal advice before 
signing.  
This settlement proposes that Jared will receive $1,427,417.00 after the deduction of 
$606,311.30 for fees, disbursements and taxes. Disbursements amounted to $58,207.75. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. Is the CFA void for failure to comply with the Solicitors Act? 
B. Is the CFA “fair and reasonable”? 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. 
A. No. CFA is void because it does not state that "client has been advised that hourly rates 
may vary among solicitors and that the client can speak with other solicitors to compares 
rate" as required by s. 2.3(ii) of O. Reg. 195/04; and,  does not provide a simple example, or 




Batalla v. St. Michael's Hospital (2016 ONSC 1513) 
2016 CarswellOnt 3936, 2016 ONSC 1513, 264 A.C.W.S. (3d) 357, 81 C.P.C. (7th) 293 
 
  
B. No. This is evidenced by client’s (Eve) misunderstandings about the content of the CFA. 
“I order that De Rose's account for legal fees, disbursements and taxes in relation to Jared's 
claim be reduced by $381,311.30 to $225,000.00. I order that these funds ($381,311.30) be 
used to purchase a larger annuity for Jared's benefit, without changing the other terms of the 
annuity.” (para 55) 
Date Judgment: March 9, 2016 
Parties Mercelita Batalla, Rogelio Batalla and Aaron Jake Batalla, a minor by his Litigation 
Guardian, Mercelita Batalla, Primo Eroles, Calixta Eroles and Mercela Batalla, Plaintiffs 
St. Michael's Hospital and Dr. Filomena Mary Meffe, Defendants 
Counsel Joel P. Freedman, for Plaintiffs 
Judge/s Darla A. Wilson J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiffs alleged that attending physician and nurses were negligent during delivery of minor 
plaintiff and as result he had severe brain damage resulting in very limited cognitive 
functioning and impaired motor skills.  Mediation was held in April 2014, at which time the 
solicitors agreed to resolve the action for the all-inclusive sum of $6,625,000, subject to court 
approval. Plaintiff's counsel asserted that plaintiffs signed CFA and sought to have fee 
approved of $1,537,223, under the agreement. Counsel for the plaintiffs served motion for 
approval of settlement.  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 24. 




CFA executed on September 4, 2010 by Mr. and Mrs. Batalla. It provides for: 
 30% of all monies received less disbursements 
 client to pay interest on money borrowed by counsel to pay disbursements 
Counsel seeks to have a fee approved of $1,537,223, per the above provision. However, 
counsel willing to accept 25% of the damages and interest + HST + disbursements. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement Is the CFA “fair and reasonable”? 
Outcome Held: Settlement approved for all-inclusive sum of $6,625,000, including $1,000,000 to Mr. 
Freedman + $130,000 in HST + $69,900 in disbursements 
Yes, CFA was fair at the time it was signed. However, paragraph requiring plaintiffs to pay 
interest on disbursements incurred was not fair. “I do not think it is fair for counsel to look to 
the clients for payment of interest charged by the bank for money borrowed to pay the 
disbursements. In this case, that amount is $4,480, which is a very small amount in light of 
the fee proposed to be charged.” (para 54) 
Followed:  Raphael Partners v. Lam 
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Murillo v Turnbull (2016 ONSC 1906) 
2016 CarswellOnt 4178, 2016 ONSC 1906 
 
Date Heard: March 16, 2016 
Judgment: March 17, 2016 
Parties Luz Gomez Murillo and Christian Moreno Gomez, Plaintiffs 
Max Turnbull and Custodio Moreno Romero, Defendant 
Counsel T. McKinlay, for Karl Arvai Professional Corporation 
R. Mitri, for Grillo Barristers 
Judge/s T.A. Heeney R.S.J. 
Quick Facts The plaintiffs retained Grillo Barristers to act for them, in both a tort and accident benefits 
claim stemming from a motorcycle accident in 2010.  Grillo prosecuted the action through to 
the completion of discoveries and compliance with undertakings, and the assembly of 
evidence to support their claims. On August 28, 2015, they received a courtesy call from the 
plaintiffs, advising that they had retained new counsel, Arvai. Grillo indicated that they were 
prepared to forward the file upon payment of their disbursements (approx. $11 000), as well 
as an undertaking to protect their account for fees from any settlement or judgment. Arvai 
refused and demanded transfer of the file. Arvai served offer to settle agreeing to resolve all 
matters as proposed, but demanding costs of $11,195.66. Ultimately, consent orders were 
prepared to resolve matter as follows: file was transferred upon Arvai paying $4,000 
disbursements to Grillo, with balance to be carried by them pending completion of file and 
certificate of assessment was to be set aside. Parties made submissions regarding costs of 





“[W]hether the prior law firm can insist on payment of their disbursements from the client 
prior to releasing the file, when they have a written [contingency fee] retainer agreement 
signed by the clients that entitles the firm to payment of their fees and disbursements 




The contingency fee retainer was executed by the plaintiffs on September 25, 2013 with a 
term  that entitles the firm to payment of their fees and disbursements "forthwith" upon 
breakdown of the solicitor and client relationship 
Outcome Held: No costs awarded to either side. However, judge acknowledged that if costs were to be 
awarded they would be in Grillo’s favour. 
“If the case has sufficient apparent merit to warrant taking the file on, Arvai should be 
prepared to carry the disbursements, as they no doubt do with their many other personal 
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Smith Estate v. National Money Mart (2010 ONSC 1334) 
2010 CarswellOnt 1238, 2010 ONSC 1334, [2010] O.J. No. 873, 186 A.C.W.S. (3d) 335, 94 C.P.C. (6th) 126 
Date Heard: February, 2010 
Judgement: March, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Kenneth Smith, as an Estate Trustee of Margaret Smith, deceased; Oriet 
Defendant: National Money Mart; Dollar Financial Group 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C., Linda Rothstein 
For Defendant: F. Paul Morrison, John P. Brown for Defendant, National Money Mart 
Company 
Mahmud Jamal, Jean-Marc Leclerc, Jason MacLean for Defendant, Dollar Financial Group, 
Inc. 
Terrence J. O'Sullivan, James Renihan for Class Counsel  
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts Class proceeding between creditors and debtors, on payday loans, where the debtors alleged 
that the creditor charged a criminal rate of interest. Motion by parties in class proceeding for 
order approving settlement (and class counsel fees).  
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Rules of Civil Procedure: R. 7.04(1), R.7.08(4); Class Proceedings Act ss. 17(3)-17(6), 





“All of the law firms agreed to act on the same contingency fee basis as had been agreed 
between the representative plaintiffs and Sutts, Strosberg LLP” (para 5) 
CFA: provides for 30% of the value of the settlement. Class counsel “submit that if they were 
paid in accordance with the [CFA], described above, they would be entitled to a $40 million 
counsel fee [($10 million fee + $130,000 disbursements) times four]. They are seeking only 
$27.5 million.” (para 114) 
Settlement: $120M = (27.5 cash payment made by D.) + (56.4 debt forgiveness) + (30 credits 
for new loans made by D.) + (3 payment to Class Proceedings fund) 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Are the settlement and legal fees fair and reasonable?  
Outcome Held: Motion granted in part. 11.25% [or $13.5 million] of the total $120M settlement 
amount. 
“A better version of the settlement and the one that I am approving is that Class Counsel's fee 
does not take up all the cash portion of the settlement and there is some repayment to the 





Smith Estate v. National Money Mart Co. (2011 ONCA 233) – reversing in 
part (2010 ONSC 1334)   
– see above 
2011 CarswellOnt 1920, 2011 ONCA 233, [2011] O.J. No. 1321, 106 O.R. (3d) 37, 199 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1077, 276 
O.A.C. 237, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 208, 3 C.P.C. (7th) 223 
Date Heard: October 25, 2010 
Judgment: March 28, 2011 
Parties Kenneth Smith, as Estate Trustee of the Last Will and Testament of Margaret Smith, 
deceased, and Ronald Oriet (plaintiffs), Appellant 
Sutts, Strosberg LLP, Heenan Blaikie LLP, Paliare Roland Rothstein Rosenberg LLP and 
Koskie Minsky LLP, Appellants and National Money Mart Company and Dollar Financial 
Group, Inc. (defendants), Respondent 
Counsel Terrence J. O’Sullivan, James Renihan, for Appellants 
Chris Hubbard, for Money Mart (not participating in appeal) 
Mahmud Jamal, Jason MacLean, for Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (not participating in 
appeal) 
Judge/s M.J. Moldaver, R.P. Armstrong, R.G. Juriansz JJ.A. 
Quick Facts Debtors brought class action against creditors with respect to allegedly criminal rate of 
interest charged on "payday" loans. During trial, parties reached settlement with forgiving 
of outstanding loans, credits for new loans, payment of $27.5 million cash for class counsel 
fees and representative plaintiff's $3,000 fee, and establishment of class fund. Settlement 
was approved with class counsel fees reduced to $14.5 million. Class counsel appealed, 
seeking a fee of $20 million. 
Statute & Rules 




Perell J. of ONSC fixed class counsel fees in the amount of $14.5 million ($12,806,074.94 
for fees, $640,303.75 for GST and $1,053,621.31 for disbursements including GST). The 
disbursements included the fees of certain consultants and other counsel retained by class 
counsel that the appellants had requested be treated as contingency fees.  
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. Class counsel sought to have fees, disbursements and taxes of other counsel—who had 
provided their services on a contingency basis—treated as a component of the class counsel 
base fee rather than as disbursements. 
B. Class counsel also sought to have the fees of consultants—who also provided services 
on a contingency fee basis—increased by the multiplier the court awarded to class counsel, 
and to have the compensation paid to the representative plaintiff paid out of the class fund 
rather than out of class counsel fees. 
Outcome Held: Appeal allowed in part by providing that the compensation for the representative 
plaintiff be paid out of the settlement fund. Appeal dismissed on all other respects. 
“…the representative plaintiff's fee should be paid out of the settlement fund and not out of 
class counsel fees. Class counsel fees are predicated on the work that class counsel have 
done for the class. Allocating a part of that fee to a layperson, especially a representative 
plaintiff, raises the spectre of fee splitting […] $3,000 compensation for the representative 
plaintiff should be paid out of the settlement fund. I would vary the motion judge's order 
accordingly.” (paras 135-, 136) 
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Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (2010 ONSC 2752) 
2010 CarswellOnt 3350, 2010 ONSC 2752, [2010] O.J. No. 2093, 189 A.C.W.S. (3d) 33, 97 C.P.C. (6th) 169 
Further reasons in Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (2012 ONSC 3837) – see below 
Date Heard: April, 2010 
Judgement: May, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Osmun; Metro Enterprises 
Defendant: Cadbury Adams; The Hershey Company; Nestle Canada; Mars Canada; Itwal 
Limited 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C., Charles M. Wright 
For Defendant: Not Listed on QL (Motion) 
Judge/s Then: G.R. Strathy J. 
Quick Facts Partial settlements were reached in class action. Settlements were approved in Ontario. 
Settlement included payment of $5,795,695.60 for benefit of settlement class members. 
Motion was brought for approval of fees and disbursements of class counsel. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 





CFA retainer entered into on December 1, 2007 provided for either: 
(a) the base fee increased by a multiplier of 4, less any fees already recovered as costs, plus 
applicable taxes; or 
(b) if a settlement is reached before examinations for discovery, 30% of the settlement, less 
any fees already paid, plus applicable taxes. 
And, whether a or b: 
+ disbursements (not already recovered by the defendants as costs) 
+ taxes and interest 
Class counsel in Ontario and BC request a 25% contingency fee on this motion 
($1,487,195.76 including disbursements and GST). 
Settlement: "The details of these proceedings are set out in my reasons on the settlement 
approval: Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc., 2010 ONSC 2643… (a) Cadbury has paid 
[$5.8M]… for the benefit of settlement class members. Cadbury is also obligated to pay the 
costs of notice that exceed [$250k] (b) Cadbury has agreed to cooperate with the plaintiffs in 
pursuing their claims against the non-settling defendants;… (c)... (d)..." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Are class counsel’s requested fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 25% + disbursements 
“It is appropriate to use other methods of measurement, such as time multiplied by hourly 
rate, or a multiplier, or the result, as a check against the reasonableness of the fees claimed; 
but, in my respectful view, courts should not be too quick to disallow a fee based on a 
percentage simply because it is a multiple - sometimes even a large multiple - of the 
mathematical calculation of hours docketed times the hourly rate... As I have noted, on a 
straight "time and hourly rate" basis, class counsel's charges would be [$633k], excluding 
disbursements. The effective multiplier being requested, therefore, is about two, which is not 
out of the reasonable range. That range has been expressed as being from slightly greater 
than one (at the low end) to four or higher in the most deserving cases" (para 31) 
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O'Neil v. SunOpta Inc. (2010 ONSC 2735) 
2010 CarswellOnt 9129, 2010 ONSC 2735, [2010] O.J. No. 5251, 6 C.P.C. (7th) 438 
Date Heard: May, 2010 
Judgement: May, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: O'Neil 
Defendant: Sunopta; Bromley; Dietrech 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Michael G. Robb, Monique L. Radlein 
For Defendant: Steve Tenai, C. Kilby, for Defendant, SunOpta Inc. 
Craig Lockwood, for Defendants, Steven R. Bromley and John H. Dietrich 
Judge/s Then: W.U. Tausendfreund J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiff brought cross-border securities class action against defendants for alleged 
misrepresentation leading to artificial inflation of value of defendant company's shares. 
Parties settled action and brought motion for approval of settlement terms and class counsel 
fees, 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 





CFA between Canadian class counsel and representative plaintiff provided for: 
 25% contingency fee 
 + disbursements 
 + taxes 




Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
"I am satisfied that this Settlement represents a fair and reasonable compromise." and, "In 
view of the cross-border nature of this Settlement, counsel in both actions have agreed that 
their combined fees will not exceed 25% of the gross settlement funds of USD$11.25M. 
This amounts to [USD$2.8M] plus disbursements and taxes [the present Motion granted the 
fee payment of USD$843K]." "Mr. O'Neil, the representative plaintiff, does not object to 





Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada (2010 ONSC 3113) 
2010 CarswellOnt 3675, 2010 ONSC 3113, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 967, 86 C.C.L.I. (4th) 239 
Summary Only one mention of CFA related to the cost indemnity scale: "In calculating that counsel 
fee, I did not include charges for fees associated with the dispute between REO and KO to be 
lawyer of record. In paras. 87 of my Reasons for Decision, I stated: I agree with 
Transamerica's submission that REO's counsel fee should not include charges for fees 
associated with its carriage fight with KO. It seems to me that this expenditure of effort, 
which did little to advance the litigation for the Representative Plaintiff or the Class is part of 
the risk assumed by Class Council when it takes the retainer. This expenditure is part of what 
may justify the contingency fee or the multiplier of a base fee, but it is not reasonable to 
charge a client for what it costs the lawyer to safeguard a retainer from a competitor. These 
costs are a risk that the lawyer assumes when he or she takes on the retainer. Viewed in the 
context of the public's interest, it strikes me as a bad idea to encourage and intensify carriage 
fights by the prospect that the winner will not only get the file but be paid something by his 




Pichette v. Toronto Hydro (2010 ONSC 4060) 
2010 CarswellOnt 5399, 2010 ONSC 4060, [2010] O.J. No. 3185, 191 A.C.W.S. (3d) 47, 98 C.P.C. (6th) 96 
Date Heard: July, 2010 
Judgement: July, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Pichette 
Defendant: Toronto Hydro 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Michael McGowan, Dorothy Fong, Barbara Grossman 
For Defendant: Alan H. Mark, Kelly Friedman, Jennifer Teskey 
Judge/s Then: Cumming J. 
Quick Facts Defendant municipal electric utilities historically charged customers so-called ‘late payment 
penalties’ (LPPs) of 7 or 5 per cent when utility bills were not paid by time required. Two 
class actions were brought alleging that LPPs were contrary to Criminal Code, which 
prohibits charging a rate over 60% per annum. Putative representative plaintiffs in two class 
actions brought motion under Class Proceedings Act, 1992 for consolidation of class actions. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 





CFA provided for: 
 25% contingency fee  
 + partial indemnity costs  
"The requested fees are about 28.5% of the total settlement amount (The inclusion of the 
partial indemnity costs result in the overall 28.5% figure)." (The requested fees are 
equivalent to a multiplier of about 4.42.) Class counsel also requests a portion of the 
settlement to cover disbursements and tax. 
Proposed settlement was $17.5 million. 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
25% contingency fee approved, plus partial indemnity costs, so effectively 28.5% + 




McLaren v. LG Electronics Canada Inc. (2010 ONSC 4710) 
2010 CarswellOnt 6881, 2010 ONSC 4710, 192 A.C.W.S. (3d) 385 
Date Heard: August, 2010 
Judgement: August, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: McLaren 
Defendant: LG Electronics 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Megan B. McPhee, Khalid Janmohamed 
For Defendant: Kris Borg-Oliver 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts Between June 2004 and April 2005, defendants, LG Inc., manufactured and sold refrigerators 
in Canada. These refrigerators contained faulty capacitors that were prone to malfunction, 
which could cause refrigerators to overheat and catch fire. Plaintiff's refrigerator caught fire 
and severely damaged his home. Plaintiff brought motion to certify action as class proceeding, 
to amend pleading to add representative plaintiff, and to have proposed settlement approved. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 





No % disclosed. Plaintiff signed a CFA with Kim Orr (current class counsel) providing that 
“if a settlement benefits one or more class members, class counsel is entitled to fees by a lump 
sum, by payment out of the proceeds, or otherwise as may be directed by the court."  
Note: plaintiff changed class counsel once and had a CFA with former counsel (no issues with 
switching solicitors) 
Proposed settlement includes the following provisions: 
 LG will be responsible for payment of the legal fees of Class Counsel. It shall, subject 
to approval by the court, pay the legal fees, disbursements and taxes thereon of Class 
Counsel in the amount of $250,000.00 on an all-inclusive basis. 
 Class Counsel shall not request payment of any legal fees, disbursements, or taxes 
from Class Members. 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Are class counsel’s fees appropriate as “a matter of interpretation of the settlement 
agreement”? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
“The proposed settlement promotes the three policy objectives of the CPA: access to justice, 




Waterston v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (2010 ONSC 4319) 
2010 CarswellOnt 8028, 2010 ONSC 4319, 194 A.C.W.S. (3d) 771, 85 C.C.P.B. 1, 98 C.P.C. (6th) 364 
Date Heard: February, June, July, 2010 
Judgement: October, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Waterston 
Defendant: CBC 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Anthony Guindon, Ari Kaplan 
For Defendant: David Stamp for Defendant 
Andre Claudé, Anne Sheppard, Mario Évangelisté for Moving Parties, SCRC and Messrs. 
Hebert and Bernard 
Judge/s Then: Pollak J. 
Quick Facts Association of pensioners with defendant corporation CBC brought action against CBC for 
breach of alleged collateral agreement relating to use of surplus pension funds. Action was 
certified as class proceeding. Union for some active employees with corporation SCRC did 
not intervene in certification proceeding. Class proceeding action was settled. SCRC was not 
party to settlement. During class proceeding action, another union filed grievance against 
CBC regarding collective agreement and surplus pension funds. Arbitrator allowed grievance. 
Parties to settlement ("parties") brought motion to approve settlement. SCRC brought cross-
motion for leave to intervene and stay of proceedings. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 






No details of CFA or counsel’s fee agreement provided. The decision only once mentions that 
there was a CFA and does not provide and further information. 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 




West Coast Soft Wear Ltd. v. 1000128 Alberta Ltd. (2010 ONSC 6388) 
2010 CarswellOnt 9127, 2010 ONSC 6388, 7 C.P.C. (7th) 323 
Date Heard: October, 2010 
Judgement: November, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: West Coast Soft Wear 
Defendant: CNPC International; China National Oil & Gas Exploration; CNPC International; 
China National Petroleum 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Charles M. Wright; Anthony O'Brien 
For Defendant: Christopher Naudie; Ed Morgan 
Judge/s Then: W.U. Tausendfreund J. 
Quick Facts "In this action, … the plaintiffs seek damages for alleged insider trading by the defendants in 
respect of shares of PetroKazakhstan Inc. ("PKZ")." 







CFA provided for: 
 25% contingency fee 
 + disbursements 
 + taxes 
 provision stating that the above subject to court approval 
Class counsel requests fees in the amount of $2,486,156.48 plus disbursements and applicable 
taxes. This amount was calculated at 25% of the net settlement funds. 
Settlement: "Under the terms of [the settlement] agreement, the defendants provided 
settlement funds of [$10M] " 
Contingency 
Fee Issue/s 
Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
“The fees are approved in the amount of $2,486,156.48 plus taxes and disbursements in the 




Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (2011 ONSC 128) 
2011 CarswellOnt 40, 2011 ONSC 128, 195 A.C.W.S. (3d) 932, 79 C.C.L.T. (3d) 272, 8 C.P.C. (7th) 73 
Date Heard: December, 2010 
Judgement: January, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff: Ahmad Serhan, deceased by His Trustee without a will Zein Ahmad Serhan; 
Beverley Gagnon, deceased, By Her Trustee without a will, Bruce Allen Gagnon 
Defendant: Johnson & Johnson; Lifescan Canada  
Counsel For Plaintiff: Paul Pape; Kirk Baert 
For Defendant: Caroline Zayid; Darryl Ferguson 
Judge/s Then: C. Horkins J. 
Quick Facts Proceeding was certified as class action in 2004, with cause of action being waiver of tort. 
Defendant was manufacturer of blood glucose monitoring products for diabetics, and class 
was all individuals in Canada, except British Columbia and Quebec, who acquired one of 
defendant's self-monitoring devices that had two design flaws. Problem resulting from flaws 
in defendant's product was rare, and there was no evidence of injury arising from flaws. 
Parties engaged in settlement discussions and eventually reached resolution. Settlement 
totalled $4 million, all of which was to be cy près distribution, as direct compensation to class 
was not practical. Settlement involved defendant providing devices to Canadian Diabetes 
Association for those unable to afford costs of self-monitoring, as well as providing funds for 
public awareness program to raise awareness of dangers of undiagnosed and untreated 
diabetes. Class brought motion for approval of settlement. 







CFA provided for: 
(a) to the extent that any disbursements are not received and recovered as party and party 
costs, an amount equivalent to the cost of the unrecovered disbursements plus applicable 
taxes; and 
(b) the greater of: 
(1) 25% of the settlement funds or monetary award, plus applicable taxes; or 
(2) the base fee, being the number of hours times the usual hourly rates, increased by a 
multiplier of 3.0, plus applicable taxes. 
Class Counsel requests a fixed fee of $1.5M inclusive of disbursements, taxes and repayment 
of $24.7k owed for disbursements advanced by the Class Proceedings Fund. 
Settlement: "The settlement has a cash value of [$2.75M] and a product value of [$1.25M], 
totalling [$4M], all of which will be a cy près distribution because direct compensation to the 
Settlement Class is not practical." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Are counsel’s legal fees fair and reasonable? 
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Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
[JB thinks it's unusual to include disbursements in the calculation, and s.6 of Reg 195/04 
(enabled by SA) prohibits the inclusion of disbursements in the CF % -- HO thinks that 
ultimately class counsel was not requesting a contingency fee per the CFA, but a fixed fee so 
not sure if there is still a problem there] 
"There were no objections to the amount sought and the representative plaintiffs support Class 
Counsel's fee request." 
 
Abdulrahim v. Air France (2011 ONSC 512) 
2011 CarswellOnt 403, 2011 ONSC 512, 16 C.P.C. (7th) 289, 197 A.C.W.S. (3d) 583 
Date Heard: January, 2011 
Judgement: January, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff: Abdulrahim; Abedrabbo 
Defendant: Greater Toronto Airports Authority; NAV Canada et al. 
Counsel For Plaintiff: J.J. Camp, Q.C. 
For Defendant: Robert Fenn, for NAV Canada 
Timothy Trembley, for Air France 
Judge/s Then: G.R. Strathy J. 
Quick Facts "The details of the action, and of the settlement, are set out in my endorsement approving the 
settlement, which is being released this day: Abdulrahim ...” 







CFA only mentioned to the following extent: "The retainer agreement between class counsel 
and the representative plaintiff provides for a fee of 33%." 
However, "Class counsel is requesting a fee of $6,225,000, plus disbursements and taxes. This 
is based on 30% of the settlement amount." 
Settlement: “the settlement was for the total sum of $20.75M, inclusive of costs." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?  
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  




Rowlands v. Durham Region Health (2011 ONSC 719) 
2011 CarswellOnt 3228, 2011 ONSC 719, [2011] O.J. No. 1864, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 895, 20 C.P.C. (7th) 253 
See further reasons in Rowlands v. Durham Region Health (2011 ONSC 719) – see below 
Date Heard: December, 2010 
Judgement: February, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff: Rowlands; Durham Region health; 
Defendant: Regional Municipality of Durham 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Todd J. McCarthy; Sean A. Brown 
For Defendant: Boghosian; Catherine Virgo 
Judge/s Then: P.D. Lauwers J. 
Quick Facts Prospective class plaintiff brought action on his own behalf and on behalf of class members 
for damages arising out of loss by nurse of USB key containing personal health information. 
Plaintiff brought motion for certification of class proceeding. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 





NA - see below 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
This case is more about the indemnity scale; only one mention of CFA: "The "funding of all 
disbursements necessary to properly prosecute this action to a successful completion have 
been and will continue to be paid by Class Counsel so there are no access to justice concerns 
in requiring the Plaintiff to bear the costs of the Notice and Opt-out program"; this is how, Mr. 
Boghosian submits, Class Counsel's 25% contingency fee is justified."" 




Mortillaro v. Unicash Franchising Inc. (2011 ONSC 923) 
2011 CarswellOnt 802, 2011 ONSC 923, [2011] O.J. No. 595, 16 C.P.C. (7th) 352, 197 A.C.W.S. (3d) 850 
Date Heard: February, 2011 
Judgement: February, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff: Mortillaro 
Defendant: Unicash 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Susan S. Brown; Jody Brown 
For Defendant: Meagan J. Swan 
Judge/s Then: G.R. Strathy J. 
Quick Facts "This is a "payday loans" case against the defendant Planinvest Consulting Limited 
("Unicash"). Unicash operated primarily in the Greater Toronto Area … [it] offered low 
principal, high cost consumer loans, which were designed to provide financing between 
paydays. The plaintiff alleges … that the total interest charged exceeded an effective annual 
rate of 60%, contrary to s. 347(1) of the Criminal Code." Motion to approve settlement and 
legal fees. 







CFA provided for: 
 25% contingency fee of the recovery 
 + disbursements 
 + taxes 
 with provision stating that the above is subject to the approval of the court 
"Class counsel asks that their fees be approved in the amount of [$55k] plus [taxes], and 
disbursements of [$23k] (being the actual amount expended), plus $500 for estimated ongoing 
disbursements (inclusive of applicable GST and HST), to be paid from the settlement fund in 
accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement." "The fee proposed is higher than the 
amount to which counsel would be entitled under that arrangement. Mr. Mortillaro agrees to 
the proposed fee. Class counsel's time spent in this matter has a face value of nearly [$250k]" 
Settlement: "Under the proposed settlement, which is subject to court approval, Unicash will 
forgive all unpaid payday loans owed by class members and will make a payment of [$155k], 




Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. (i.e. 35% + disbursements) 
"In my view, the proposed fee is fair and reasonable, having regard to the factors to be 
considered in determining a lawyer's fee as well as the goals of the C.P.A. The outcome of 
this litigation was dictated by circumstances beyond the control of counsel. It can be regarded 
as a victory in principle if not in dollars. Fee awards should be designed to encourage good 
lawyers to take on risky and difficult class proceedings. This was such a proceeding." 
 
 128 
Dugal v. Manulife Financial Corp. (2011 ONSC 1785) 
2011 CarswellOnt 1889, 2011 ONSC 1785, [2011] O.J. No. 1239, 105 O.R. (3d) 364, 18 C.P.C. (7th) 105, 200 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 35 
Date Heard: February, 2011 
Judgement: March, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff/Moving Party: Dugal; Ironworkers Pension Fund 
Defendant: Manulife Financial et al 
Counsel For Plaintiff/Moving Party: Charles M. Wright, Michael D. Wright, Daniel Bach, Stephanie 
Dickson 
For Defendant: Patricia D.S. Jackson, Andrew Gray, for Defendant / Respondent, Manulife 
Financial Corporation 
R. Paul Steep, E.S. Block, for Defendant, Peter Rubenovitch 
Linda L. Fuerst, for Defendant, Domenic D'Alessandro 
Alexa Abiscott, for Defendants, Gail Cook-Bennett, Arthur Sawchuk 
Judge/s Then: G.R. Strathy J. 
Quick Facts "The plaintiffs claim that the defendant Manulife Financial Corporation ("Manulife"), which 
is a public company, made misrepresentations concerning its risk management practices in its 
public disclosure documents, and that this had the effect of artificially inflating the value of its 
stock. ... This action has not yet been certified as a class proceeding under the Class 
Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 (the "C.P.A.")." Motion by P. for approval of funding 
agreement as between a P. and a third-party "on any settlement or judgment in this action" 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 





This case is unusual and involves a third-party indemnity agreement between the Ps and a 
third-party (third-party = CFI, "an Irish corporation, which will pay any adverse costs award 
made against the plaintiffs, in return for a "commission""): " 
 CFI is entitled to a commission of 7% of the amount of any settlement or judgment, 
after deduction of the fees and disbursements of class counsel and administration 
expenses. 
 The commission is subject to a "cap" of $5 million if the resolution occurs at any time 
prior to the filing of the plaintiffs' pre-trial conference brief and $10 million if the 
resolution occurs at any time thereafter. 
 CFI will pay $50,000 towards the plaintiffs' disbursements. 
 Class counsel are required to advise CFI of any significant issue in the proceeding, 
including prospects of success, strategy and quantum, and class counsel are required 
to respond to any reasonable request by CFI for information about the proceedings.... 
this agreement does not come into effect unless approved by the court." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is the funding agreement between the plaintiffs and CFI fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
"(a) The funding agreement helps to promote one of the important goals of the CPA — 
providing access to justice. That goal would be illusory if access to justice were deterred by 
the prospect of a crushing costs award to be borne by the representative plaintiff or counsel. In 
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this sense, the agreement is beneficial to the proper administration of justice […] Just as 
[CFAs] have been recognized as providing access to justice, so too third party indemnity 
agreements can avoid the unfortunate result that individuals with potentially meritorious 
claims cannot bring them because they are unable to withstand the risk of loss: see McIntyre 
Estate at para. 55. (b)...  (c) ... (j) "In McIntyre Estate ... the Court of Appeal held that a 
lawyer's contingent fee agreement was not per se prohibited by the Champerty Act and that it 
was necessary for the court to consider the reasonableness and fairness of the fee structure in 
the Contingency Fee Agreement. ... The court therefore concluded that it was premature to 
determine whether the agreement was reasonable and fair because the fee payable might 
prove to be unreasonable when considering the factors that courts historically take into 




Travassos v. Tattoo (2011 ONSC 2290) 
2011 CarswellOnt 3193, 2011 ONSC 2290, 19 C.P.C. (7th) 209, 200 A.C.W.S. (3d) 984 
Date Heard: April, 2011 
Judgement:April, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff: Travassos (Ruben and Ana) 
Defendant: Moonshin Tattoo; Mason; Smith; Regional Municipality of Peel; Peel Public 
Health 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Todd J. McCarthy; Sean A. Brown 
For Defendant: Linda Phillips-Smith, for Defendants, Regional Municipality of Peel, Peel 
Public Health 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts Defendants CM and ES operated defendant tattoo parlour. Defendant public health 
department was regulation and investigating authority governing activities of 
defendant tattoo parlour. In March 2009, defendant public health department warned that 
approximately 3,000 patrons who received tattoos or piercings at tattoo parlour may have 
been put at risk for blood-borne infection due to non-sterile instruments or equipment. In 
March 2009 plaintiffs commenced class action against defendants. After action commenced 
parties engaged in settlement discussions culminating in formal mediation. Information for 
purposes of settlement discussions was that no tattoo customers tested positive for for 
Hepatitis B or C or for HIV. Parties arrived at proposed settlement which included 
compensation for uninfected persons, infected persons and contingency fee includes of GST, 
HST and disbursements. Parties brought motion for certification of class for purposes of 
settlement. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 





30% CFA: "In March 2009, Mr. Travassos retained Flaherty Dow Elliott & McCarthy to 
commence a class action. He signed a contingency fee retainer agreement that stipulates a fee 
of 30% of the value of any settlement." 
Settlement Agreement included the following: 
 Class Counsel shall seek, with the consent of Peel, court approval of a contingency 
fee of $275,000.00, inclusive of GST, HST, and disbursements. 
 The contingency fee, if approved, shall be paid from the Uninfected Fund, thereby 
reducing the fund from $900,000.00 to $625,000.00. 
Settlement is $1.1M: (including: "Peel Region and Peel Public Health shall establish a fund of 




Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Application granted. 
“I approve the counsel fee [as set-out in the Settlement Agreement]. I believe that the Class 
Counsel have earned their fee. The fee is fair and reasonable compensation in all the 
circumstances.” (para 34) 
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Robertson v. ProQuest Information & Learning Co. (2011 ONSC 2629) 
2011 CarswellOnt 2923, 2011 ONSC 2629, [2011] O.J. No. 2013, 18 C.P.C. (7th) 406, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 345 
Date Heard: April, 2011 
Judgement: May, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff: Robertson 
Defendant: Proquest; Cedrom; Toronto Star; Rogers Publishing; Canwest Publishing 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Kirk Baert; Celeste Poltak 
For Defendant: Donald A. Cameron, Christina Capone-Settimi, for Defendant, ProQuest 
Information and Learning LLC 
Wendy Matheson, Andrew Bernstein, for Defendant, Rogers Publishing Limited 
Ernest M. Chan, for Defendant, Cedrom-SNI Inc. 
Ryder Gilliland, for Defendant, Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd 
Judge/s Then: C. Horkins J. 
Quick Facts "The statement of claim alleges that the defendants breached class members' rights to their 
articles and literary works under the Copyright Act, … By the defendants' reproduction, 
distribution and communication of these works to the public in electronic media, such as 
online databases, without the permission of authors or the copyright holders, the plaintiff 
claimed the defendants had infringed the class members' copyrights." Motion to approve 
settlement and legal fees. 







CFA: "The retainer agreement provides that payment of legal fees and disbursements would 
be contingent upon success at trial or settlement of this matter. The retainer agreement 
provides that legal fees are based upon the multiplication of a base fee by a multiplier to be 
determined by the court [value of Class Counsel's total docketed time is $1.2M]."  
Class counsel requests fees in the amount of $1.9 million (exclusive of taxes disbursements), 
equivalent to 24% or 1.7 multiplier of settlement. 
Settlement of $7.9M: "Under the terms of the settlement agreements, Toronto Star... have 
agreed to pay [$3.475M] and ProQuest has agreed to pay [$2M]. In addition, there will be the 
proceeds from the sale of the Postmedia shares [$2.4M] for a total of [$7.9M]." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 




Baker Estate v. Sony BMG Music (Canada) Inc. (2011 ONSC 7105) 
2011 CarswellOnt 15453, 2011 ONSC 7105, [2011] O.J. No. 5781, 210 A.C.W.S. (3d) 586, 31 C.P.C. (7th) 320, 98 
C.P.R. (4th) 244 
Date Heard: November, 2011 
Judgement: November, 2011 
Parties Plaintiffs/Moving Parties: Estate of "Chet" Baker et al. 
Defendant/Respondents: Sony et al. 
Counsel For Plaintiffs/Moving Parties: 
For Defendant: Danielle Royal, for Defendant / Respondent, Universal Music Canada Inc. 
Timothy Pinos, Casey M. Chisick, for Defendants / Respondents, CMRRA, SODRAC 
Judge/s Then: G.R. Strathy J. 
Quick Facts "Unfortunately… Chet Baker, an American trumpeter and jazz singer, and his heirs, ... did not 
receive full compensation for the use of his works by others. This was the result of a royalty 
and licensing system in Canada that permitted third parties, such as the defendants, Sony 
BMG Music (Canada) Inc. ("Sony"), EMI Music Canada Inc. ("EMI"), Universal Music 
Canada Inc. ("Universal") and Warner Music Canada Co. ("Warner") (collectively, the 
"Record Labels"), to reproduce and distribute copyrighted musical works owned or controlled 
by musicians or their rights holders, without having a licence to do so or without paying the 
royalties due to the rights holders.... This class action was brought in 2008 on behalf of artists 
and rights holders who had not received full compensation for the use of their works" 







30% CFA: "Both representative plaintiffs executed contingent fee agreements that stipulated a 
maximum counsel fee of 30% of the amount recovered." 
"The fee request made by Class Counsel is approximately 15% of the gross settlement value 
[$7.6 million total, $6.95 million for legal fees and $87 k for taxes and disbursements] and 
therefore represents a significant discount of the fee to which Class Counsel is contractually 
entitled. The fee request is supported by both Mrs. Baker and Mr. Northey." 
"The fee request is opposed by the Collectives, by Universal and by [WCMC]. "WCMC takes 
the position that the fee is excessive in light of the services rendered by Class Counsel, when 
balanced against the complexity of the matter, the importance of the matter to the Class, the 
expectations of the Class and the effect that the fee will have on the recovery achieved by the 
Class." 
Settlement: "Under the terms of the settlement, as ultimately implemented, a total of [$46.7M] 
is to be paid into a settlement trust for the benefit of Class members." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
 Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
“If class proceedings are to realize the goal of access to justice, Class Counsel must be 
liberally compensated to ensure that they take on challenging but difficult briefs such as this 
one." "If first-class lawyers cannot be assured that the Courts will support their reasonable fee 
requests, how can the Courts and the public expect them to take on risky and expensive 
litigation that can go for years before there is a resolution?"  
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Voutour v. Pfizer Canada Inc. (2011 ONSC 7118) 
2011 CarswellOnt 14961, 2011 ONSC 7118, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 307, 38 C.P.C. (7th) 360 
Date Heard: November, 2011 
Judgement: November, 2011 
Parties Plaintiffs: Jesse Voutour ("JV"); Eiko Voutour ("EV"); Waheed; Perotta 
Defendants: Pfizer 
Counsel For Plaintiffs: B.C. McPhadden, J. Rochon, I. Erez, A. Thorsen 
For Defendants: G. Zakaib, E. Larose 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts "Pfizer … manufactured and marketed the drugs Bextra and Celebrex ["Pfizer drugs"], which 
are prescription, non-steroidal, anti-inflammatory drugs ("NSAIDs"), a class of drugs used for 
the treatment of inflammation and associated pain…  In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs allege 
that the drugs caused serious and life-threatening adverse reactions and that the Defendants 
knew or ought to have known of these risks and failed to warn Canadian consumers 
sufficiently or at all and failed to take appropriate steps related to the risks." Motion for 
approval of settlement and counsel fees. 







The Representative Plaintiffs signed retainer agreements that all involve CFAs, but the 
agreements differ: 
A. 604-682-3377The retainer with PW: 30% of the amounts recovered or on the 
basis of a 3 times multiplier, whichever is higher. 
B. with PP, 25% of the amounts recovered or on the basis of a 3 times multiplier, 
whichever is higher. 
C. The retainers with JV and EV: 25% of the amounts recovered"  
As a term of the proposed Settlement Agreement  Class Counsels seeks $4 million in legal 
fees plus disbursements of $212,068.87 plus applicable taxes. 
Settlement: $12 million 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is counsels’ fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
“Class Counsel have earned their fees including what amounts to a quite modest premium 
above their hours and hourly rates for what was difficult and high-risk products liability 




Banerjee v. Shire Biochem Inc. (2011 ONSC 7616) 
2011 CarswellOnt 14798, 2011 ONSC 7616, 210 A.C.W.S. (3d) 616 
Date Heard: December, 2011 
Judgement: December, 2011 
Parties Plaintiff/Moving Party: Banerjee 
Defendants/Respondents: Shire Biochem 
Counsel For Plaintiff/Moving Party: Darcy R. Merkur, Stephen Birman 
Sylvie Rodrigue, for Defendants, Eli Lilly Canada Inc., Eli Lilly and Company 
Malcolm N. Ruby, for Defendant, Shire Biochem Inc. 
Christopher Hubbard, Keegan Boyd, for Defendant, Draxis Health Inc. 
Judge/s Then: G.R. Strathy J. 
Quick Facts "on behalf of residents of Canada who were prescribed a drug called "Permax"… Permax was 
approved for sale in Canada... and was successfully used to treat thousands of Canadians with 
Parkinson's disease.... The plaintiff alleged that a very small percentage of users of Permax 
experienced behavioural changes, broadly described as "impulse control disorders" ("ICDs"). 
These included compulsive gambling, hyper-sexuality, compulsive shopping and compulsive 
eating." This is a motion by the plaintiff, on consent of the defendants, for approval of the 
settlement and legal fees. 







"the retainer agreement signed between the representative plaintiff and Class Counsel 
stipulates a contingency fee of 15% over and above partial indemnity costs... In addition, the 
retainer agreement permits Class Counsel to seek an order for a multiplier of up to four times, 
being applied to the fees charged, where the outcome of the litigation warrants such a 
multiplier."  
Counsel requests $762k on this motion ($812k [inclusive fees and disbursements] - $50k 
(disbursements) = $762k). 
Settlement: "the defendants will pay [$2.4M] in settlement of the claims of the Class together 
with a contribution of [$300k] towards costs." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 32%  
“The proposed settlement applies a litigation risk discount of approximately 50% to the claim 
of each Class member, as quantified by Class Counsel. This discount reflects the fact that the 




Simmonds v. Armtec Infrastructure Inc. (2012 ONSC 5228) and (2012 
ONSC 44) 
Summary not really a case about CFA and the case is more about what happens when two competing 
firms are trying to sue the same P.  
Minor CFA Issue Does a difference in page length (in this case, between a five-page CFA and one-page CFA) 
make one agreement ‘stronger’ than the other? 
From (2012 ONSC 5228): “As noted earlier [in (2012 ONSC 44)], Thomas J. concluded 
that fact was of little consequence because the fee charged by class counsel is subject to 
court approval.” (para 70) 
 
Kidd v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (2012 ONSC 740) 
2012 CarswellOnt 1064, 2012 ONSC 740, [2012] O.J. No. 506, 19 C.P.C. (7th) 378, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 787, 95 
C.C.P.B. 73 
Date Heard: January, 2012 
Judgement: February, 2012 
Parties Plaintiffs: Kidd; Harvey; Marentette; Yip; Henderson; Yeomans 
Defendants: Canada Life Assurance Company; Symons; Loney; Grant 
Counsel For Plaintiffs: M. Zigler, C. Godkewitsch, D.B. Williams; D. Brown, L. Sokolov;  
For Defendants: J. Galway, for Defendant, Canada Life Assurance Company 
J. Field, for Defendants, A.P. Symons, D. Allen Loney, James R. Grant 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts In 2005, David Kidd, Alexander Harvey, and Jean Paul Marentette brought a proposed 
class action against Canada Life Assurance Company and the other defendants. The 
Plaintiffs make three major claims. One claim concerns the ownership of the surplus assets 
of the Pension Plan. The Plaintiffs plead that amendments to the Pension Plan concerning 
the reversion of surplus assets to Canada Life on Plan and Fund termination are unlawful 
and are of no force or effect. The second claim concerns the payment out of surplus funds 
to certain groups of employees whose participation in the Pension Plan was terminated and 
who have a claim for a partial winding-up of the Pension Plan. The third claim concerns 
negating Canada Life's alleged entitlement to be reimbursed for expenses on behalf of the 
Pension Plan. The Plaintiffs plead that Canada Life should restore monies, estimated to be 
in excess of $41 million. Motion for approval of retainer agreement and fees 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 




Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
Mr. Marentette retained Harrison Pensa LLP and Koskie Minksy LLP on a contingency fee 
basis to represent him and other class members. He signed a Retainer Agreement. 
Messrs. Kidd, Harvey, Mr. Yeomans and Ms. Henderson, signed identical retainer 
agreements. The agreements provide that: 
 in the event of success, Class Counsel may apply to the court for approval of a 
multiplier of 3.0; 
 commencing one year after the execution of the retainer, an additional multiplier of 
0.01 would be applied for each month until judgment or settlement up to a 
maximum multiplier of 3.5; and  
 under no circumstances can legal fees exceed 25% of the total amount recovered 
Settlement: "the total financial benefit to Class members is estimated at [$54M], plus 
payment of all of their legal fees and expenses estimated at [$5M]." 
[Note: "After many years of negotiating, the parties reached a settlement... Untypically and 
perhaps without precedent, the proposed Class Members have voted for or against the 
settlement... There are 5,228 persons in the classes. As of ... 4,293 Class Members (82%) 
voted in favour of settling their claims in accordance with the Surplus Settlement 
Agreement."] 
A. “With the support of the class representatives, Class Counsel [Class Counsel 
Koskie Minsky LLP and Harrison Pensa LLP] seek court approval of a fee request 
in the amount of [$4.7M] plus applicable taxes and disbursements of [$61k] (less 
than 10% of the value of the settlement on a net basis after payment of all 
expenses). 
B. In another motion, Class Counsel Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP requests an Order: 
(a) approving the payment of Class Counsel's fees, taxes and disbursements in the 
amount of [$120k] for legal services to the Adason Representative Plaintiffs.  
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Are counsels’ requested fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motions granted. 
"In my opinion, considering the facts described above and the factors relevant to assessing 
the reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee request, there is no doubt that the retainer entered 
into by the representative plaintiffs should be approved and that Class Counsel's fee request 




Robinson v. Rochester Financial Ltd. (2012 ONSC 911) 
2012 CarswellOnt 1368, 2012 ONSC 911, [2012] 5 C.T.C. 24, [2012] O.J. No. 534, 212 A.C.W.S. (3d) 20, 27 
C.P.C. (7th) 351 
Date Heard: January, 2012 
Judgement: February, 2012 
Parties Plaintiff: Kathryn Robinson; Rick Robinson 
Defendant: Rochester Financial Limited et al 
Counsel For Plaintiffs/Moving Parties: David Thompson, Matthew G. Moloci 
For Defendants/Respondents: Glenn Smith, Sean O'Donnell 
Judge/s Then: G.R. Strathy J. 
Quick Facts "The action relates to a tax shelter called the Banyan Tree Foundation Gift Program, which 
operated in 2003-2007. It has been referred to as a "leveraged" charitable donation program 
because, in return for a proportionately small out-of-pocket payment, a taxpayer was 
purportedly entitled to ratchet-up his or her donation and to receive a charitable tax receipt 
equivalent to 3 1/2 times the amount of his or her cash outlay." Motion for approval of 
settlement and legal fees. 





Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
25% CFA: "Class counsel entered into a [CFA] with the representative plaintiffs that 
provided for a contingent fee of 25% of the total value of any settlement."  
"Class Counsel request approval of the payment of [$3.3M] for their fees, disbursements 
[of $200k] and taxes." 
Settlement: "… mediation… total sum of [$11M]. Approximately $7.75 million of this 
amount will be paid to class members in proportion to the charitable contributions they 
made, under a distribution plan that will be administered by class counsel. The balance will 
be used to pay the fees and disbursements of class counsel and the costs of administration 
of the settlement"  
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is counsel’s requested legal fee fair and reasonable? 




Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (2012 ONSC 3837) 
2012 CarswellOnt 8440, 2012 ONSC 3837, 41 C.P.C. (7th) 333 
Further reasons to the partial settlement reached in Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (2012 ONSC 3837) – see 
above 
Parties Plaintiff: Osmun; Metro (Windsor) Enterprises 
Defendant: Cadbury Adams Canada; Hershey Company; Nestle Canada; Mars; Itwal 
Limited 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Charles M. Wright 
For Defendant: Scott Maidment, Lisa Parliament, for Defendants, Hershey Company, 
Hershey Canada Inc. 
Christopher P. Naudie, for Defendant, Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (now Kraft Canada 
Inc.) 
Catherine Beagan Flood, for Defendant, Nestlé Canada Inc. 
Donald Houston, for Defendant, ITWAL Limited 
Matthew Milne-Smith, for Defendants, Mars Incorporated and Mars Canada Inc. 
Judge/s Then: G.R. Strathy J. 
Quick Facts Partial settlements were reached in class action. Settlements were approved in Ontario. 
Settlement included payment of $5,795,695.60 for benefit of settlement class members. 
Motion was brought for approval of fees and disbursements of class counsel. (The 
settlements are conditional upon approval of the courts in each of Ontario, British 
Columbia and Québec.) 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 32, 33. 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
“The retainer agreement entered into with the plaintiffs in this action as of December 1, 
2007, provides that in the event of success in the action, Ontario class counsel will be paid 
any disbursements (not already recovered from the defendants as costs), plus applicable 
taxes and interest in accordance with s. 33(7)(c) of theClass Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 
1992, c. 6 ("C.P.A."), plus the greater of: 
a. the base fee increased by a multiplier of 4, less any fees already 
recovered as costs, plus applicable taxes; or 
b. if a settlement is reached before examinations for discovery, 30% of the 
settlement, less any fees already paid, plus applicable taxes.” 
“Class counsel in Ontario and B.C. request fees of $1,335,235.12 with respect to the 
settlement, plus disbursements of $81,231.04 and G.S.T. in the amount of $70,729.60, for a 
total of $1,487,195.76. The fee represents 25% of the portion of the settlement amount 
allocated to the Ontario and B.C. settlement classes ($5,340,940.48) and is less than the 
30% permitted by the retainer agreements entered into with the plaintiffs in this action and 
the B.C. action.” 
Settlement: " Hershey Canada will pay [$5.3M] for the benefit of the settlement class 
members and the claims against Hershey will be dismissed." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
Class counsel's fee approved in amount of $1,487,195.76. 
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Rowlands v. Durham Region Health (2012 ONSC 3948) 
2012 CarswellOnt 8668, 2012 ONSC 3948, 217 A.C.W.S. (3d) 779 
Date Heard: July, 2012 
Judgement: July, 2012 
Parties Plaintiffs: Rowlands 
Defendants: Durham Healh Region; Regional Municipality of Durham; Durham Health 
Department 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Todd J. McCarthy; Sean A. Brown; Matthew J. Stepura 
For Defendant: David B. Boghosian; Ward Branch; Laura Day 
Judge/s Then: P.D. Lauwers J. 
Quick Facts "... a nurse employed by the Durham Regional Health Department lost a digital memory 
USB key. It held the unencrypted personal and confidential information of 83,524 
individuals who...  received an H1N1 immunization shot at a clinic in Durham Region. The 
plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of the Class Members for damages arising 
out of the loss of the USB key, and especially in light of the prospect that the confidential 
information about the Class Members contained in the USB key might be used to facilitate 
identity theft." MOTION for approval of settlement and class counsel fees [$500k]. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, s.29(2)  
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA "The Representative Plaintiff entered into [CFA] with Class Counsel. Since the 
inception of this claim, the retainer agreement stipulated a counsel fee of 25% of the value 
of any claim awarded to a Class Member. ...The promise of 25% of the value of any claim 
awarded to a Class Member is a motivating factor to ensure that Class Counsel remains 
interested and involved in the Claims Process, which will benefit claiming Class 
Members." 
Settlement Agreement provides for the payment of costs to class counsel in the additional 
amount of $500,000.00 inclusive of taxes and disbursements, plus 25 per cent of actual 
claims paid by the defendant in the future. 
Settlement: "Durham Region and its insurer ... not prepared to pay compensation to a Class 
Member in the absence of an actual financial loss." "Class Members who believe they have 
suffered economic harm as a result of the loss of the USB key can submit a Claim by 
completing the Claim Form. The Class Member must provide sufficient information to 




Is counsel’s requested legal fee fair and reasonable? 




Krajewski v. TNOW Entertainment Group Inc. (2012 ONSC 3908) 
2012 CarswellOnt 8567, 2012 ONSC 3908, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 757 
Date Heard: June, 2012 
Judgement: July, 2012 
Parties Plaintiff: Krajewski; Brandsma; Dunbrack 
Defendant: Tnow Entertainment Group; Ticketmaster; Premium Inventory 
Counsel For Plaintiffs: Ward Branch, Jay Strosberg; Luciana Brasil 
For Defendants: Wendy Matheson; Stuart Svonkin 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts "Messrs. Krajewski, Brandsma, and Dunbrack's action concern [actions in different 
Canadian provinces]: (a) the primary market sale; and (b) the secondary market resale of 
tickets for music, sports, theatre and other events at prices that the plaintiffs allege 
contravene the provisions of the Ticket Speculation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 17...  While each 
of the actions is based on a different [provincial] statute, the theory of the plaintiffs is the 
same; namely, the sale of primary and secondary market tickets to the plaintiffs and to the 
members of the proposed classes was contrary to the various statutes. The plaintiffs seek a 
number of remedies, including an injunction restraining the defendants and others from 
selling primary and secondary tickets at prices which contravene the statutes and damages 
based upon unjust enrichment and conspiracy." Motion to approve settlement and legal 
fees. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, ss.5(1), 29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: "[P.] signed a [CFA]. He (and each of the plaintiffs in the companion actions) agreed 
to a fee of 25% of the settlement amount, plus disbursements and applicable taxes. He also 
agreed that regardless of whether success was achieved in the Ontario Action, Class 
Counsel would be paid all costs recovered in the action, which as noted above is [$850k]"  
"Class Counsel seek an immediate payment of [$850k], plus 25 percent of each cheque that 
is cashed by a Settlement Class Member." 
Note: "Before preparing for the consent certification and settlement approval hearing, Class 
Counsel docketed time valued at [$1.14M]. Assuming that all of the Settlement Class 
Members cash their refund cheques, the projected fee would provide a multiplier of 1.1." 
AND "Mr. Krajewski supports the fee request, and there are no objections to the amount 
sought." 
Settlement: "Assuming that all of the Settlement Class Members cash their refund cheques 
(of $36 per ticket purchased), the projected recovery is [$5.03M]." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable?   




Lundy v. VIA Rail Canada Inc. (2012 ONSC 4152) 
2012 CarswellOnt 9152, 2012 ONSC 4152, 111 O.R. (3d) 628, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 21, 41 C.P.C. (7th) 347 
Summary Only mention of CFA: " In the case at bar, the proposed representative plaintiffs are Sandra 
Lundy, Allison Kaczmarek and Marc Couroux. The proposed representative plaintiff will 
have a conventional lawyer and client relationship with the lawyer of record, usually 
formalized by a written Contingency Fee Agreement. There may be some unconventional 
elements to their relationship with class counsel, such as an indemnity agreement or 
funding from the Law Foundation or third party funder, but the lawyer and client 
relationship will be governed by the traditional common law and equity that governs the 




Markson v. MBNA Canada Bank (2012 ONSC 5891) 
2012 CarswellOnt 17304, 2012 ONSC 5891, [2012] O.J. No. 4967, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 335, 42 C.P.C. (7th) 202 
Date Heard: October, 2012 
Judgement: October, 2012 
Parties Plaintiff: Markson 
Defendant: MBNA Canada Bank 
Counsel For Plaintiff/Moving Party: Margaret L. Waddell, Kirk Baert 
For Defendant/Respondent: Jill Lawrie, David Noseworthy 
Judge/s Then: C. Horkins J.: 
Quick Facts "The action [originally started in 2004] relates to cash advance transaction fees and related 
compound interest that MBNA charged and received. The fees and interest occurred when 
MBNA customers took a cash advance using the credit facilities accessed through their 
MBNA credit cards ("Cash Advances")... The plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (i) 
breach of contract, (ii) unjust enrichment and for restitution of criminal interest paid to 
MBNA Canada Bank ("MBNA"), and (iii) a declaration that MBNA has violated s. 347 of 
the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46." MOTION by plaintiff for approval of [A] 
settlement and [B] class counsel fees. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
30% CFA: "agreement provided that fees were to be fixed at 30% of any settlement or 
award, subject to court approval"  
"Class Counsel seek approval of their fees in accordance with this agreement, in the amount 
of [$2.4M] (30% of [$8M]), plus applicable taxes and disbursements." 
Note: Under the terms of the contingency fee retainer agreement, they will receive a 
premium of about $500,000, or less than a multiple of 1.3 on their docketed fees. No one in 
the class has complained about the amount of fees." 
Settlement: "... MBNA will pay [$8M] into an interest bearing account, which will 
comprise the Settlement Fund to be paid out as follows: 
1. Class Counsel's fees and disbursements, inclusive of taxes, as approved by the court, will 
be deducted from the Settlement Fund. 
[...] 
4. The balance of the Settlement Fund will be divided by the number of open MBNA 
accounts as of November 30, 2011 where at least one Cash Advance has been taken (the 
"Distribution Class Members"..." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 30%  
"In summary, I conclude that this settlement is fair and reasonable and in the best interests 




Toronto Community Housing Corp. v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator (Canada) 
Ltd. (2012 ONSC 6626) 
2012 CarswellOnt 14602, 2012 ONSC 6626, 44 C.P.C. (7th) 361 
Date Heard: November, 2012 
Judgement: November, 2012 
Parties Plaintiff: Toronto Community Housing; Housing Services Incorporated 
Defendant: Thyssenkrupp Elevator 
Counsel For Plaintiffs: Linda R. Rothstein; Odette Soriano 
For Defendants: John P. Brown 
Judge/s Then: C. Horkins J. 
Quick Facts "The plaintiffs allege that the defendants ["TKE"] negligently designed and manufactured 
the sheave jammer, and then knowingly sold and installed the negligently designed sheave 
jammers. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, not the elevator owners, are liable for 
the costs associated with removing the sheave jammers and replacing them with an 
alternate emergency braking device.... The available evidence shows that class members 
replaced approximately 2,100 sheave jammers in elevating devices in Ontario as a result of 
[a] TSSA Order. The average replacement cost was $10,000 per sheave jammer [P. allege 
that TKE charged the owners for the preventative maintenance and should not have]" 
MOTION for approval of the settlement of this class action and class counsel fees. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: 30% "Class counsel entered into a [CFA] retainer with the representative plaintiffs 
whereby fees were to be fixed at 30% of any settlement or award, subject to court 
approval."  
Counsel sets their fee in accordance with the CFA, in the amount of $3.5M plus applicable 
taxes, and $5k for future disbursements. 
Note: The representative plaintiffs agreed that these fees are reasonable 
Settlement: "The defendants have paid [$12M] into an interest bearing account, which will 
comprise the Settlement Fund" 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 




Sugar v. Kim Orr Barristers Professional Corp. (2012 ONSC 6668) 
2012 CarswellOnt 14968, 2012 ONSC 6668, 222 A.C.W.S. (3d) 806 
Quick Facts This case involves a lawyer trying to claim money for work done with a law firm, but that 
is the extent of the CFA discussion. The most telling quote: "The Defendant understood 
that no one works for free, especially given Mr. Kim's view that there was no reasonable 
expectation that the Plaintiff would actually be joining the firm. The Plaintiff understood 
that class counsel do not get paid unless they are ultimately successful in winning or 
settling the case so that their fees can be deducted from the proceeds paid to their clients. 
He had himself negotiated a contingency fee retainer agreement with the Defendant for the 
Precious Metal case, and he was certainly aware of the basis on which the Defendant would 




Woods v. Redeemer Foundation (2012 ONSC 7254) 
2012 CarswellOnt 16446, 2012 ONSC 7254, 224 A.C.W.S. (3d) 266, 43 C.P.C. (7th) 211 
Date Heard: December, 2012 
Judgement: December, 2012 
Parties Plaintiff: Woods 
Defendant: Redeemer Foundation; Redeemer University College 
Counsel For Plaintiff: David Thomson 
For Defendant: John Downing 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts "In 1989, [Redeemer University College established a "Foregiveable loan" program where 
students would pay for tuition and Redeemer would issue charitable donation tax receipts in 
return]. By way of example, a $10,000.00 education cost per year would generate a 
charitable donation tax credit of approximately 29% of the "donation" amount, being 
$2,900.00 ... [after factoring in education tax credits, etcetera, the] net cash outlay for a 
$10,000.00 education cost per year was $4,250.00 [which is $3,350 less than without the 
Program]”. The CRA then became involved, disallowing] the charitable donation tax 
credits for 2001 and 2002. Donors became liable for interest charges on income tax 
reassessments..." "Proceedings in the tax courts followed and eventually a settlement with 
the CRA. Mr. Wood retained Scarfone Hawkins LLP as proposed Class Counsel in an 
action against the Defendants." MOTION for approval of the settlement,  for approval of 
payment of class counsel fees. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: "... Class Counsel receive a legal fee of 30% of the value of settlement benefits 
available to the Class."  
Class Counsel requests legal fees, disbursements, and taxes in the amount of $65k all 
inclusive. 
Note: "Mr. Wood recommends the approval of the settlement. There were no objectors to 
the settlement." AND "It represents significantly less than Class Counsel is entitled to 
under the [CFA], and less than the value of time spent. There is no premium or multiplier." 
Settlement: "Class Counsel estimates that the value of the settlement is approximately 
$400,000.00, based on their being approximately 200 Class Members, with an average of 
$1,000.00 per year of participation in the Forgiveable Loan Program." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
"In my opinion, Class Counsel should be commended for taking on this small class action. 
It provided access to justice for the Class Members and a fair and reasonable settlement. 




Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG (2013 ONSC 853) 
2013 CarswellOnt 1303, 2013 ONSC 853, 226 A.C.W.S. (3d) 26 
Date Heard: January, 2013 
Judgement: February, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Eidoo; Cygnus Electronics Corporation 
Defendant: Infineon; Hynix Semiconductor; Samsung Electronics; Samsung 
Semiconductor; Micron; Elpida Memory 
Counsel For Plaintiffs: Jonathan J. Foreman, Robert L. Gain 
For Defendant: Adam D.H. Chisholm, for Micron Technology, Inc. and Micron 
Semiconductor Products, Inc. O/A Crucial Technologies 
Eric Hoaken, Emrys Davis, for NEC Corporation, NEC Corporation of America, NEC 
Canada, Renesas Electronics Corporation, and Renesas Electronics America, Inc. 
Christine Kilby, for Nanya Technology Corporation and Nanya Technology Corporation 
USA 
Eliot Kolers, for Infineon Technologies AG, Infineon Technologies Corporation and 
Infineon Technologies North American Corporation 
John P. Brown, for Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Hynix Semiconductor America Inc. and 
Hynix Semiconductor Manufacturing America, Inc. 
Christopher Naudie, for Elpida Memory Inc. 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts In the first class action Khalid Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics Corporation sue: Infineon 
Technologies [and about twelve others, including Samsung]... In the second class action, 
Mr. Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics sue: Hitachi Ltd. [and 23 others, including Mitsubishi 
and Toshiba] 
All the actions concern allegations that the Defendants conspired to fix prices in DRAM 
(dynamic random access memory) devices. The second action in Ontario is in effect a 
device to add defendants as co-conspirators to the conspiracy alleged in the first class 
action. The claims in the various actions are for: (a) breach of Part IV of the Competition 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34; (b) civil conspiracy; and (c) tortious interference with economic 
interests." 
MOTION for approval of four partial settlements, for ancillary relief, and approval of class 
counsel’s fees. 





Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: "The Ontario Fee Agreements, which were previously approved by this Court, 
provide for a fee payable of up to 30% of the value of any settlement plus disbursements 
and applicable taxes." 
Class Counsels' fee at $6.99M and disbursements of $134k. "Since commencing the 
Proceedings, Class Counsel have docketed $4.53M worth of legal services at their regular 
hourly rates. They have incurred disbursements of $637k since commencing the various 
class actions." 
Settlement: "Together, the Settlement Agreements total $23.33M. This brings the total 
recovery to over $29M"... Plaintiffs in British Columbia, Ontario, and Québec actions 
entered into a settlement agreement with Elpida... Under the terms of the agreement, Elpida 
agreed to pay $5.75M plus interest in exchange for a full release of claims. The Elpida 
Settlement contained what is known as a Most Favoured Nation or MFN clause. Pursuant 
to its MFN clause, Elpida is entitled to a refund of portions of its settlement fund payment 
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if its settlement is greater than specified settlement sums paid by certain specified co-
defendants. In other words, if the Plaintiffs settle for less than the confidential thresholds, 
the Plaintiffs must refund the difference." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. at lower rate of 20% [absent distribution plan, 30% is not "fair and 
reasonable".]  
"it would not be in the best interests of the class members to reject these settlements 
because of the absence of a distribution plan.” BUT “notwithstanding the absence of a 
distribution plan, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class as a 
whole."  
“I also approve Class Counsel's fee, but not as requested... I am awarding $4.18M, all 
inclusive.” "A fee calculated on the basis of 30% percent of the recovery may ultimately be 
fair in this litigation; however, in my opinion, at this juncture of the litigation without Class 
Counsel having completed the work of a distribution plan, a 30% fee is not fair and 
reasonable. Thus, 20% of $29M [.20*29 = $5.8M] plus disbursements to date equals 




Morgan v. Sara Lee of Canada NS ULC (2013 ONSC 859) 
2013 CarswellOnt 1304, 2013 ONSC 859, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 29 
Date Heard: February, 2013 
Judgement: February, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Morgan 
Defendants: Sara Lee Corporation; Tana Canada Inc.; Hanesbrands Canada 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Geoffrey D.E. Adair, Q.C.; Ian W.M. Angus 
For Defendant: J.A. Prestage 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts "... Christopher Prichard, the son of a pensioner with a pension plan from the Defendants, 
approached Adair Morse LLP to investigate whether there was a claim against the 
Defendants with respect its administration of its employee pension plans." the other issue is 
that Adair LLP was dropped by the representative plaintiff in one of the actions (there were 
two class actions), but this issue was ignored. MOTIONS for, among other things: (a) the 
approval of a settlement in two actions under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992... (b) the 
approval of several fee agreements; and (c) the approval of Class Counsels' fees in the two 
class actions. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
20% CFA: “In May 2011, thirty-two pensioners signed a contingent retainer agreement 
with Adair Morse LLP. The fees if the contingency was satisfied was 20% of any amount 
recovered over 50% of the surplus plus unrecovered disbursements and all applicable 
taxes.”  
Settlement: "Under the Settlement Agreement, all of the surplus in both pension plans, 
estimated to be $3.5M will be paid to the plan beneficiaries. In addition, $350k will be paid 
in respect of all other claims including costs... in my opinion, all of the $350k can be used 
to pay legal fees before encroaching on the surplus to be paid to the Class Members." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 12%  
"The aggregate legal accounts that have been approved by the Court total $415,000, all 
inclusive"  
"In all the circumstances of this case, I award Adair Morse LLP $340,000, all inclusive. I 
approve the retainer agreement with Mr. Morgan. As noted above, Mr. Angus claims an all 
inclusive fee of $109,593.05. This fee includes a multiplier of 1.5 of the base fee. In the 
circumstances of this case, there is no basis for any multiplier. From a risk perspective, Mr. 
Angus's retainer did not begin until after the settlement had been achieved. Although Mr. 
Angus was unofficially involved and present at the mediation session, practically speaking, 
he was retained by Mr. Scime for a second opinion... In all the circumstances of this case, I 




Sa'd v. Remington Group Inc. (2013 ONSC 1404) 
2013 CarswellOnt 2453, 2013 ONSC 1404, 115 O.R. (3d) 627, 49 C.P.C. (7th) 206 
Date Heard: March, 2013 
Judgement: March, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Samir Sa'd 
Defendant: Remington Group Inc.; Rouge Residences I Inc.; Rouge Residences II Inc., 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Sean M. Grayson 
For Defendant: Michael F. Cooper 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts "Mr. Sa'd and other members of the proposed class purchased condominium units from 
Rouge I and Rouge II in a development in Markham, Ontario that included the Rouge Bijou 
Condominium Residences. Mr. Sa'd alleges that they were overcharged for development 
charges. There are approximately 400 class members." MOTION (a) to certify the action … 
(b) for approval of the Settlement Agreement ... and (c) for approval of Class Counsel's fee. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, ss.5, 5(1), 29(2)  
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA "25% of the total settlement fund"  
 
Settlement: "The Defendants have agreed to pay $578k to a settlement fund..."  
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
 Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. Contingency fee of 25% approved.  
 
"In my opinion, considering the facts described above and the factors relevant to assessing 
the reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee request, I am satisfied that Class Counsel's fee 





Goodridge v. Pfizer Canada Inc. (2013 ONSC 2686) 
2013 CarswellOnt 5615, 2013 ONSC 2686, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 941, 49 C.P.C. (7th) 342 
Date Heard: May, 2013 
Judgement: May, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Goodridge; Davidson; Lauricella 
Defendant: Pfizer Inc. 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Michael J. Peerless, Matthew D. Baer 
For Defendant: Patricia D.S. Jackson; Nicole Martini 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts "Pfizer Canada Inc. and Pfizer Inc. manufacture Neurontin, which is a prescription 
anticonvulsant medication, approved by Health Canada in May 1994, for use as a 
therapeutic antiepileptic agent, specifically as an adjunctive therapy for seizures. In this 
class action on behalf of consumers of Neurontin, it was alleged that the majority of 
Neurontin sales were for off-label use and that Neurontin was ineffective and/or defective 
for these various off-label uses. It was further alleged that Neurontin can cause an increased 
risk of suicidal behaviour and that consumers did not receive adequate warning of this 
dangerous propensity of the drug. Pfizer vigorously denied that Neurontin can cause 
increased risk of suicidal behaviour and, in general, that the issue of whether or not 
antiepileptic drugs, including Neurontin, can increase the risk of suicide ideation and 
suicidal behaviour is controversial." MOTION for approval of the settlement and for 
approval of Class Counsel's fees. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2)  
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFAs 30% and 25%: Ms. Goodridge and Mr. Davidson executed retainer agreements.  
A. Ms. Goodridge's retainer with Dunn & Company provides for a legal fee of 30% of 
any settlement achieved, plus disbursements and applicable taxes.  
B. Mr. Davidson's retainer agreement with Siskinds provides for a legal fee of 25% of 
any settlement achieved, plus disbursements and applicable taxes."  
"Class Counsel is seeking to enforce the terms of the CFA entered into by Mr. Davidson 
[25%], the lesser of the two percentage rates.... a legal fee of $1.04M plus disbursements of 
$322k plus applicable taxes of ... for a total of $1.5M." 
Note: “Class Counsel have not received any objections to the Settlement." 
Settlement: Under the Settlement Agreement, the Defendants agree to pay $4.8M allocated 
as follows: (a) $2.6M for Eligible Claims; ... (c) $400k for Administration Expenses, 
including publication of notices and claims administration; and (d) $1.5M for Class 
Counsel Fees including legal fees, disbursements, and applicable taxes. 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 




Sorenson v. Easyhome Ltd. (2013 ONSC 4017) 
2013 CarswellOnt 7898, 2013 ONSC 4017, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 934, 49 C.P.C. (7th) 305 
Date Heard: June, 2013 
Judgement: June, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Sorenson 
Defendant: Easyhome Ltd.; Ingram; Goertz; Fregren 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Daniel E.H. Bach 
For Defendant: Ronald Slaght, Q.C. 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts "Mr. Sorenson... purchased 800 common shares of easyhome at a price of $11.90 per 
share... [He] alleges that ... easyhome's public disclosures contained material 
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts due to a significant employee fraud at 
one of its kiosks, with the result that its share price was artificially inflated to the detriment 
of the Class." MOTION for approval of a settlement and approval of Class Counsel's fee. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: 25% "Mr. Sorenson... signed a [CFA] that provided that Class Counsel's 
compensation should be 25% of the total recovery available to Class Members obtained in 
the Action, plus disbursements and taxes." 
"Siskinds seeks approval of legal fees plus disbursements and applicable taxes in the 
amount of $662k, broken down as follows: (a) legal fees, $563k; (b) H.S.T. ...; and (c) 
disbursements (incl. taxes as applicable), $26k.  
Note: Siskinds LLP docketed time is in excess of $183k and disbursements are in excess of 
$23k, plus taxes. And, there have been no objections to the proposed settlement. 
Settlement: easyhome agreed to cause its insurers to pay $2,250,000.00, into the Escrow 
Account for the benefit of the Class...  
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 




Blair v. Toronto Community Housing Corp. (2013 ONSC 4237) 
2013 CarswellOnt 9409, 2013 ONSC 4237, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 686, 52 C.P.C. (7th) 399 
Date Heard: June, 2013 
Judgement: June, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Blair 
Defendant: Toronto Community Housing Corporation; Greenwin Property Management 
Counsel For Plaintiff: M. Teplitsky, Q.C.; S. Sagle 
For Defendant: Peter Lukesiwicz, Deborah Templer, for Defendant, Toronto Community 
Housing Corporation 
Sarah Pottle, for Defendant, Greenwin Property Management Incorporated 
Rivka Birkan, for Third Party, Forensic Investigations Canada 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts "The apartment building was owned by the Defendant, Toronto Community Housing 
Corporation ("TCHC") and operated by the Defendant Greenwin Property Management 
Incorporated. After [a fire at 200 Wellesley Street East], the Defendant, TCHC, without 
admitting that it had been at fault offered a Compensation Plan to the tenants and after 
receiving independent legal advice about half of the tenants accepted the compensation 
offered by TCHC, which I understand to have an average value of approximately $4,000 
per dwelling unit tenant. These tenants released their claims against TCHC, and they 
assigned to TCHC their claims against Greenwin. Ms. Blair, however, was not satisfied 
with the Compensation Plan. She retained the law firms of Shell Lawyers and Teplitsky, 
Colson LLP to commence a class action." MOTION for approval of a settlement and 
approval of Class Counsel's fee. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
Ms. Blair signed a CFA but no details of the agreement are provided in the decision. 
“Class Counsel asks that the Court approve a total of $1,150,000 as payment of all Class 
Counsel legal fees. Of this amount, Class Counsel proposes that $500,000 will come from 
the Legal Fees and Disbursements Amount ($1.4 million) and $650,000 will come from the 
Claims Amount ($5.4 million).” (para 41)  
Settlement: provides for, "$1.4M as the full and final contribution of the Defendants to the 
legal fees and disbursements, including HST, including for all expenses related to the 
distribution of settlement funds to individual Class Members... The balance of the Claims 
Amount, namely $4.85M, will be distributed by Class Counsel to Class Members." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 




Musicians' Pension Fund of Canada (Trustee of) v. Kinross Gold Corp. 
(2013 ONSC 4974) 
2013 CarswellOnt 11197, 2013 ONSC 4974, 117 O.R. (3d) 150, 230 A.C.W.S. (3d) 970, 55 C.P.C. (7th) 437, 6 
C.C.P.B. (2nd) 82 
Summary interesting case about using third-parties to indemnify plaintiffs, but not really about CFAs.  
Only real discussion of CFAs:"At the outset of the proposed class action, the Pension Fund 
retained Koskie Minsky LLP as its lawyers, and the law firm agreed to take on the retainer 
pursuant to a Contingency Fee Agreement, which has been disclosed to the court in the 
material filed for this motion. The Contingency Fee Agreement is subject to court approval, 
and ultimately the court supervises and determines Class Counsel's legal fees under the 
provisions of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c.6. 
12      Although Koskie Minsky was prepared to take on the risk of a contingency fee 
retainer, it was not prepared to agree to indemnify the Pension Fund from any adverse costs 
award, and thus, from the outset of the action, Koskie Minsky sought to secure funding for 
any adverse costs awards made against its client, the Pension Fund." 
 
Zaniewicz v. Zungui Haixi Corp. (2013 ONSC 5490) 
2013 CarswellOnt 11949, 2013 ONSC 5490, 232 A.C.W.S. (3d) 319, 44 C.P.C. (7th) 178 
Date Heard: August, 2013 
Judgement: August, 2013 
Parties Plaintiffs: Zaniewicz; Clarke 
Defendants: Haixi Corporation; E&Y (auditors); Fengyi Cai; Manley; Ryan; Wahle; CIBC 
World Markets; Canaccord Genuity; GMP Securities; Mackie Research Capital 
Counsel For Plaintiffs: Charles M. Wright, Douglas M. Worndl 
For Defendant: Deborah Berlach, for Defendant, Zungui Haizi Corporation 
Margaret L. Waddell, for Defendant, Michelle Gobin 
Michael A. Eizenga, for Defendant, Michael W. Manley 
James S.F. Wilson, for Defendants, Patrick A. Ryan, Elliott Wahle, and Margaret Cornish 
Linda L. Fuerst, for Defendant, Ernst &Young LLP 
Kent Thomson, Derek Ricci, for Defendants, CIBC World Markets Inc., Canaccord 
Genuity Corp. (f.k.a. Canaccord Financial Ltd.) and Mackie Research Capital Corporation 
(f.k.a. Research Capital Corporation) and GMP Securities LP 
Judge/s Then: Perell J. 
Quick Facts "securities class action under the Class Proceedings Act... The Plaintiffs Jerzy Robert 
Zaniewicz and Edward C. Clarke advance common law tort claims and also statutory 
claims with respect to the sale of the shares of Zungui Haizi Corporation in the primary and 
secondary markets... The Plaintiffs are residents of Ontario. Each purchased common 
shares of Zungui in the primary market. Mr. Clarke also purchased common shares of 
Zungui in the secondary market. On August 22, 2011, Zungui issued a press release 
announcing that its auditor, Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y"), had suspended its audit of 
Zungui's ... With that announcement, Zungui's shares immediately lost 77% of their value. 
Subsequently, Zungui's shares became the subject of various temporary and permanent 
cease trade orders, and they are now worthless." MOTION for certification for settlement 
purposes and approval of three settlements, in addition to other approvals around the 
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settlement process. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, ss.26, 26(1), 29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: "The Retainer Agreements with the Plaintiffs provide that Class Counsel may seek a 
fee of up to 30% of the recovery."  
"Class Counsel seeks $2.25M, plus disbursements, interest on disbursements, and 
applicable taxes. The total request is for $2.81M." 
Note: "...Class Counsel had docketed time of $648,386.00, excluding applicable taxes, 
disbursements of $226,670.44, exclusive of applicable taxes." AND "Class Counsel is not 
seeking to recover, and will not return to request payment of the time and disbursements 
required to complete the administration of the settlement, which is estimated to be at least 
$50k." 
Settlement: "The Plaintiffs have concluded three settlements: (1) the Auditor Settlement; 
(2) the Zungui Settlement; and (3) Underwriter Settlement. The Auditor Settlement is for 
$2M. The Zungui Settlement is for $8M, and the Underwriter Settlement is for $750k... 
Thus, if all the settlements are approved, the settlement funds will total $10.85M plus 
interest before deductions for counsel fee and administrative expenses." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 




Glube v. Pella Corp. (2013 ONSC 6164) 
2013 CarswellOnt 13746, 2013 ONSC 6164, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 16 
Date Heard: October, 2013 
Judgement: October, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Glube; Terpstra 
Defendant: Pella Corp. 
Counsel For Plaintiffs: Joel Rochon, John Archibald 
For Defendants: Scott Maidment, Lindsay Lorimer, Calie Adamson 
Judge/s Then: Conway J. 
Quick Facts "This is a product liability case. In the proposed class action, the plaintiffs allege that 
design and manufacturing defects in Pella windows and doors allowed water to penetrate 
the aluminum cladding and failed to protect the surrounding wood from rot. They allege 
that class members suffered damage, including the cost of repairing or replacing the Pella 
products.... A parallel U.S. proceeding [is] underway. From the outset class counsel in the 
Ontario action had a relationship with the lead counsel in the U.S. proceeding, as well as 
with their U.S. fenestration (window and door) expert." MOTIONS approving the 
settlement pursuant to s. 29(2) of the Class Proceedings Act, and approving class counsel 
fees. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: "Pella will pay class counsel, subject to court approval, legal fees in the all-inclusive 
amount of $650k. [disbursements = $10k]". Nature of agreement not provided beyond the 
$650k all-inclusive figure.  
"Class counsel submits that it has spent over 450 hours on the case as of September 22, 
2013, representing over $250k in unbilled time, exclusive of taxes. It anticipates spending 
another $40k to $60k on the hearing and subsequent administration of the settlement. 
Disbursements are approximately $10k. That works out to a multiplier of 2.2 times 
counsel's base fee ... and a multiplier of less than 2 when the additional fees are included." 
Settlement: The Settlement Agreement contains the following principal terms: 
a. Eligible claimants may receive cash benefits under the settlement either through a 
claims process or an expedited and streamlined arbitration process. Under the 
former, they may receive a maximum amount of $750 per structure; under the 
latter, they may receive up to $6000 per structure. 
b. Pella will offer discounts, at various rates, to class members who repaired or 
replaced their windows. 
c. Pella will pay each of the two plaintiffs an honorarium of $5000 based on their 
important assistance in the investigation of the case and their roles in shepherding it 
forward. 
d. Pella will pay class counsel a class counsel fee of $650,000, which amount is 
inclusive of all disbursements and taxes, subject to court approval. 
e. Pella will pay all notice costs and the costs of settlement administration. 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. $650k paid by Pella approved. 
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Patel v. Groupon Inc. (2013 ONSC 6679) 
2013 CarswellOnt 15030, 2013 ONSC 6679, 234 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847 
Date Heard: September, 2013 
Judgement: October 20143 
Parties Plaintiff: Patel 
Defendant: Groupon Inc. 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Louis Sokolov, Christine Davies, Nadine Blum 
For Defendant: Laura K. Fric, Robert Carso 
Judge/s Then: Edward Belobaba J. 
Quick Facts "The plaintiff alleges that Groupon engaged in "unfair practices" contrary to provincial 
consumer protection legislation by selling Groupon vouchers with illegal expiration dates. 
The plaintiff further alleges that Groupon illegally required consumers to use the entire 
"groupon" in a single transaction, or lose any remaining balance. The proposed class action 
is framed in breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of consumer protection 
legislation and unjust enrichment. There are about one million potential class members in 
Canada. Shortly after the commencement of this action, Groupon changed its terms of 
service to clarify that the purchase value of the Groupon vouchers would not expire. 
However, despite these changes, Groupon did not take any steps to refund the purchase 
price of class members' expired groupons and continued to publish deal pages that, on their 
face, included an expiry date and, in the plaintiff's view, did not make clear that the expiry 
date only referred to the promotional value and not to the purchase value. The lawsuit, 
therefore, continued." MOTION for approval of the settlement agreement and approval of 
class counsel fees, payable by Groupon, in the amount of $235k. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, ss.5, 5(1), 29(2) 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement, 
Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: 20% contingency fee ("If class counsel had based their legal fees request on a 20 
percent contingency, they would have arguably been entitled to $457k in legal fees.")  
Counsel requests approval for the lower amount of $235,000. 
Settlement: "The value of the overall settlement, on the most conservative measure, would 
thus be $2.285M ($535k plus $1.75 million in "non-monetary value.")" 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
“the legal fees are approved but only because they are less than what would have been 
awarded on a contingent fee basis. […] As part of the settlement, the defendant has agreed 




Roveredo v. Bard Canada Inc. (2013 ONSC 6979) 
2013 CarswellOnt 15486, 2013 ONSC 6979, 234 A.C.W.S. (3d) 845 
Date Heard: November, 2013 
Judgement: November, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Roveredo; Premsukh 
Defendant: Bard Canada Inc.; Davol Inc. 
Counsel For Plaintiffs: Harvin Pitch; Colin Stevenson 
For Defendants: Michael Eizenga; Christiaan Jordaan 
Judge/s Then: Edward Belobaba J. 
Quick Facts "This medical-devices class action was commenced on behalf of individuals who had been 
implanted with certain surgical mesh products ("the Covered Products") used to repair 
ventral or abdominal hernias. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to warn 
Canadian patients of the Covered Products' risk of failure which allegedly could result in 
serious injuries and even death...  In addition to this action, three other proposed class 
proceedings were launched - in B.C., Alberta and Quebec." MOTION 30% for approval of 
the settlement agreement and for approval of class counsel fees. 





Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA 30% "Class counsel's retainer agreement provided for counsel fees of 30% on the first 
$20 million (subject to court approval) and the payment of all disbursements."  
Counsel requests approval for a 30% contingency fee per the CFA. 
Settlement "A national settlement has now been achieved and is conditional on this court's 
approval. Under the settlement agreement, the defendants will pay $1.38M into a settlement 
fund. After deducting legal fees, notice and administration costs ..., the balance will be paid 
out to class members." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. (30% contingency fee approved) 
“Most judges, myself included, are prepared to approve contingency fees in the range of 
20% to 25%. If more is being sought, such as the 30% herein, class counselare typically 
required to make further submissions justifying these additional five percentage points. 
Here, however, I am satisfied that the full 30%, as requested, should be approved." "It 
would therefore be unfair in the extreme to deny class counsel a CFA award that, by any 
measure, is a fraction of the legal costs that were actually and legitimately incurred." 
"30% contingency fee amount of $413k is therefore approved. The $184k in disbursements 




Snelgrove v. Cathay Forest Products Corp. (2013 ONSC 7282) 
2013 CarswellOnt 17592, 2013 ONSC 7282, 236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 25 
Date Heard: November, 2013 
Judgement: November, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff: Snelgrove 
Defendant: Cathay Forest Products Corp.; Ng; Perron; Wong 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Charles M. Wright; Nicholas C. Baker 
For Defendant: Jeremy Devereux, Jennifer Teskey, for Cathay Forest Products Corp., Luc 
Perron, John Duncanson and John Housser 
D. Gallo, for Defendants, Raymond Lo & Paul Wong 
Judge/s Then: H.A. Rady J. 
Quick Facts "This action is a class proceeding brought by and on behalf of current and former 
shareholders of Cathay Forest Products Corporation. Cathay is a junior forestry company 
incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44. It was 
involved in the development of tree plantations, sub-concession of harvesting rights and log 
trading in the People's Republic of China and forest harvesting operations in the Russian 
Federation... The plaintiff's allegations in the action include the following: Cathay's ... 
prospectus and the financial statements that were the subject of the February 4, 2011 
restatement contained materially misleading statements about Cathay's financial statements 
not in accordance with Canadian generally accepted accounting principles; [...] Cathay's 
share price during the class period was artificially inflated.  The claim pleads common law 
causes of action in negligence and negligent misrepresentation as well as statutory causes 
of action for prospectus misrepresentation, secondary market misrepresentation and 
oppression pursuant to the Securities Act and the Canada Business Corporations Act." 
Application to approve settlement agreement and for approval of class counsel fees. 





Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: 25% "There was a Contingency Fee Agreement by the terms of which the firm was 
entitled to recovery of 25% of any settlement or judgment."  
 
Settlement: "global settlement amount of $1.9M CAD" 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Application granted. 
 
"the firm has agreed to reduce its percentage to approximately 21% to recognize the fact 
that it did not achieve precisely the level of success that it had wished. In addition, it is 




Cannon v. Funds for Canada Foundation (2013 ONSC 7686) 
2013 CarswellOnt 17784, 2013 ONSC 7686, [2013] O.J. No. 5825, 236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 24 
Date Heard: October, 2013 
Judgement: December, 2013 
Parties Plaintiff/Moving Party: Cannon 
Defendant/Responding Party: Funds for Canada Foundation; Donations Canada Financial 
Trust; Appleby Services (Bermuda) Ltd.; et al 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Margaret Waddell; Samuel Marr; Andrew Lewis 
For Defendant: Not disclosed on Westlaw 
Judge/s Then: Edward Belobaba J. 
Quick Facts Class action settlement was approved and class members received $28.2 million. Court 
previously approved 25 per cent of settlement for class counsel based on precedent, but 
invited supplementary submissions. Application by class counsel to vary order to allow full 
one-third contingency fee, which amounted to $9.4 million. 





Requested Fees & 
Settlement 
CFA: 1/3 or 33% ($9.4M) – counsel requests an increased fee per the 1/3 allowance in their 
CFA 
Settlement: "The class members will receive about $28.2 million." 
Contingency Fee 
Issue/s 
Is counsel’s request fee fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
"The one-third contingency is not excessive because it is in line with the percentages that 
are charged in the personal injury area. And there is no suggestion that the $9.4M amount 
that class counsel will receive is unseemly or inherently unreasonable. In short, no reasons 
have been advanced to rebut the presumption of validity" 
"I reviewed several of the decisions, expecting to find persuasive reasons for capping the 
legal fees at say, 20 to 25 per cent and not allowing the 30 per cent or one-third that had 
been agreed to in the retainer agreement. What I found, instead, were well-intentioned 
judicial efforts to rationalize legal fee approvals by discussing arguably irrelevant or 
immeasurable metrics such as docketed time (irrelevant) or risks incurred (immeasurable.) 
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 By using these metrics, judges felt comfortable building up a reasonable legal fees award 
that was capped at the 20 to 25 per cent level, sometimes 30 per cent but rarely, if ever, 
approved at the one-third level." "What I suggest is this: contingency fee arrangements that 
are fully understood and accepted by the representative plaintiffs should be presumptively 
valid and enforceable, whatever the amounts involved. Judicial approval will, of course, be 
required but the presumption of validity should only be rebutted in clear cases based on 
principled reasons. Examples of clear cases where the presumption of validity could be 
rebutted include the following: (i) Where there is a lack of full understanding or true 
acceptance on the part of the representative plaintiff... 
(ii) Where the agreed-to contingency amount is excessive. I, for one, am prepared to accept 
that a one-third contingency is presumptively reasonable and acceptable in the class actions 
area because that amount that has been found to be reasonable and acceptable (and 
successful) in the personal injury area... 
(iii) Where the application of the presumptively valid one-third contingency fee results in a 
legal fees award that is so large as to be unseemly or otherwise unreasonable..." "But to the 
extent that the retainer agreement provides for a percentage-based fee approach rather than 
the multiplier approach, I will be one judge that will accept a fully understood one-third 




Urlin Rent-A-Car Ltd. v. Champion Laboratories Inc. (2014 ONSC 577) 
2014 CarswellOnt 1085, 2014 ONSC 577, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 73 
 
  
Date Heard: January 8, 2014 
Judgment: January 24, 2014 
Parties Urlin Rent-A-Car Ltd., Plaintiff 
Champion Laboratories Inc., Honeywell International Inc, Wix Filtration Products, Affina 
Group Inc., Cummins Filtration Inc., Cummins Filtration International Corp., Cummins 
Inc., The Donaldson Company, Baldwin Filters Inc., ArvinMeriotr Inc., ArvinMeritor 
Filters Operating Company LLC (f/k/a Purolator Products NA LLC, ArvinMeritor Holding 
Company (f/k/a Purolator Products Company LLC) and ArvinMeritor Canada, Defendants 
Counsel C. Wright, K. McGladdery Dent, for Plaintiff 
R. Kwinter, for Defendant, Champion Laboratories Inc. 
S. Forbes, for Defendant, Honeywell International, Inc. 
D. Kent, for Defendants, Wix Filtration Products and Affina Group Inc. 
P. Martin, for Defendants, Cummins Filtration Inc., Cummins Filtration International Corp 
and Cummins Inc. 
C. Chow, for Defendant, Baldwin Filters Inc. 
D. Houston, for Defendants, ArvinMeritor Inc., ArvinMeritor Filters Operating Company 
LLC (f/k/a Purolator Products NA LLC, ArvinMeritor Holding Company (f/k/a Purolator 
Products Company LLC) and ArvinMeritor Canada 
Judge/s H.A. Rady J. 
Quick Facts The claim alleges a price fixing conspiracy for aftermarket filters in Canada. Aftermarket 
filters are oil, air, fuel and transmission filters sold as replacement filters for automobiles, 
trucks and other vehicles. The claim was narrowed to include oil and air filters only, which 
account for the majority of the filters market. A parallel action is proceeding in Quebec and 
related claims have been made in the United States. The plaintiff seeks approval of a 
settlement it has reached with the defendants which resolves the litigation in its entirety, as 







CFA provides for: 
 25% contingency fee 
Counsel has reduced their fee request to 19% so that when added to disbursements, the 
25% level is not surpassed. Settlement reached is for $350,000 CDN. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Are the proposed legal fees under the CFA fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Both settlement and legal fees requests approved.  
Fees and disbursements are fair and reasonable, and the settlement recovery is “modest and 
undoubtedly disappointing to the plaintiff,” but this comes with the nature of class action. 
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Waldman v. Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. (2014 ONSC 1288)  
– appealed in Waldman v Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. (2015 ONCS 53) – see last row of this chart 
2014 CarswellOnt 2674, 2014 ONSC 1288, 120 C.P.R. (4th) 127, 238 A.C.W.S. (3d) 303, 56 C.P.C. (7th) 81 
Date Heard: February 19, 2014 
Judgment: March 4, 2014 
Parties Lorne Waldman, Plaintiff 
Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, Defendant 
Counsel Jordan Goldblatt, M. Edwardh, for Plaintiff 
Andrew Bernstein, for Defendant 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Class action alleged defendant infringed copyright of class members by making available 
without permission and for fee copies of court documents authored by class members and 
their law firms on Litigator. Parties signed settlement subject to court approval. Defendant 
agreed to make changes to copyright notices on Litigator and to terms of its contract with 
subscribers. Settlement agreement provided for cy-pres trust fund. Individual class 
members, who might opt-out, received no monetary award under settlement agreement, 
and signed release and granted non-exclusive license of their copyrights in court 
documents to defendant. Seven class members opposed settlement agreement. Class 
counsel brought motion for approval of CFA and for court approval of counsel fees of 








Class counsel (Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP, with assistance of Deeth Williams Wall 
LLP) moved for approval of the CFA with the plaintiff, Mr. Waldman for counsel fees of 
$825,000, all inclusive.  
In proposed settlement agreement Thomson settles a $350,000 cy-près trust fund to 
support public interest litigation. Thomson also agrees to make changes to the copyright 
notices on Litigator and to the terms of its contract with subscribers. The individual Class 
Members, who may opt-out, receive no monetary award under the Settlement Agreement, 
and they sign a release and grant a non-exclusive license of their copyrights in the court 
documents to Thomson. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Class counsel contingency fee was contingent on success of settlement approval, as it was 
a term therein. If settlement approved then question is, is class counsel’s fee “fair and 
reasonable”? 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. Settlement and agreement and thus class counsel fee not 
approved. No order as to costs. 
“It is wrong to make the payment of Class Counsel's Fee, in effect, a pre-condition to 
approval of the settlement agreement.” (para 115) “…the court should have been afforded 
the option of reducing the Counsel Fee as it thought appropriate and then approving the 
Settlement 
Agreement. For settlement approval purposes, better still is the situation where the court 
has the option of reallocating a portion of class counsel's fee to enhance the benefits of 




Appealed in (2015 
ONCA 53) 
Waldman v. Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. (2015 ONCA 53) – appeal by plaintiff from 
judgement reported in (2014 ONSC 1288) – see above 
“The appellant, supported by the respondent, argues that, in any event, an appeal lies to 
this court under s. 6(1)(b) of the CJA because the order refusing to approve the settlement 
agreement is a final order of a judge of the Superior Court. He argues that this is a final 
order because, although the litigation could continue, the settlement agreement has been 
finally dismissed. The appellant submits that, where the approval of a settlement has been 
determined, substantive rights are affected. He argues that this situation is therefore 
different from the dismissal of a motion for summary judgment, which typically neither 
finally determines an issue in the litigation nor affects substantive rights.” (para 18) 
Held: Appeal quashed. No costs ordered because both appellant and respondent allied in 
favour of ONCA’s jurisdiction. 
“Here, although the settlement agreement was not approved, the litigation continues, and 
the parties cannot be said to have lost a substantive right relating to the merits of the 
litigation. The order is interlocutory and any appeal lies to the Divisional Court with 
leave.” (para 23) 
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Slark (Litigation guardian of) v. Ontario (2014 ONSC 1283) 
2014 CarswellOnt 2725, 2014 ONSC 1283, 238 A.C.W.S. (3d) 302 
 
  
Date Heard: February 25, 2014 
Judgment: March 4, 2014 
Parties Marilyn Dolmage as Litigation Guardian of Marie Slark and Jim Dolmage as Litigation 
Guardian of Patricia Seth, Plaintiffs 
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, Defendant 
Counsel Kirk M. Baert, Celeste Poltak, David Rosenfeld, for Plaintiffs 
Robert Ratcliffe, John Kelly, Jonathan Sydor, for Defendant 
Judge/s Conway J. 
Quick Facts Actions related to three provincially operated residential facilities for individuals with 
developmental disabilities were commenced. In each action, plaintiffs alleged that 
defendant Crown was negligent and breached its fiduciary duties in funding, operation, 
management, administration, supervision and control of facility. All three actions were 
settled and settlements approved by court. Total cash payment by Crown in settlement 
was $70.7 million. Class counsel sought global fee for actions in amount of $14 million, 
plus disbursements of approximately $1.6 million and taxes of $1.78 million. Class 
counsel brought motion for approval of its fees pursuant to ss. 32 and 33 of Class 
Proceedings Act. 
Statute/Rules 




CFA in Huronia action: 
 at least the sum of 3.0 and 0.01 for every month between the date of the 
agreement and date of settlement approval – in this case multiplied is 3.5, making 
class counsel entitled to fees of $15,556,016 
CFAs in Rideau and Southwestern actions 
 4.0 multiplier or 30% of any settlement – in this case class counsel entitled to 
fees of $6,185,700 for Rideau and $3,624,300 for Southwestern 
However, class counsel seeks only 20.68% or 19.8% (when notice and administration costs 
are added in) of settlement fund. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Are the fees sought by class counsel fair and reasonable? (Note: they seek a lesser 
amount that provided for under their retainer agreements, see ‘CFA Breakdown’ above) 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
“The fees sought are well below what class counsel is entitled to recover under its 
retainer agreements entered into at the start of this litigation. The amount of 
these fees has further been approved by the litigation guardians in all three actions 
recently, in January 2014, after the settlement figures were known. The fees are certainly 
within the expectations of the class.” (para 14) 
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Ducharme v. Solarium De Paris Inc. (2014 ONSC 1684) 
2014 CarswellOnt 3383, 2014 ONSC 1684, 238 A.C.W.S. (3d) 304 
 
  
Date Heard: March 7, 2014 
Judgment: March 20, 2014 
Parties Doris Ducharme, Plaintiff 
Solarium de Paris Inc., Defendant 
Counsel William J. Sammon, for Plaintiff 
Brian C. Elkin, for Defendant 
Judge/s Robert J. Smith J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiff brought class action alleging negligence by defendant in design and manufacture 
of solariums. Plaintiff brought motion to settle certification order and notice to class to 
obtain orders with respect to costs. Defendant brought cross-motion to amend class 







NA – no details of the CFA were given 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Defendant expressed concern that the notice does not sufficiently inform class members 
of the financial arrangement. In particular, the notice sets-out that legal fees are to paid 
on a contingency basis, i.e. under a CFA. 
Outcome Held: Plaintiff’s motion granted. Defendant’s cross-motion dismissed 
On CFA issue: “The legal fees charged will have to be approved by the Court in any 
event, which will ensure that the fees charged are fair and reasonable to class members. 
To ensure that class members are fully informed the following sentence should be added: 
"Any member of the class will be provided with a copy of the retainer agreement with the 
representation plaintiff on request".” (para 22)  
 166 
Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v. Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP 
(2014 ONSC 4118) 
2014 CarswellOnt 9299, 2014 ONSC 4118, 242 A.C.W.S. (3d) 776, 31 B.L.R. (5th) 46 
 
  
Date Heard: June 26-27, 2014 
Judgment: July 8, 2014 
Parties Excalibur Special Opportunities LP, Plaintiff 
Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP, Defendant 
Counsel Margaret L. Waddell, Nasha Nijhawan, for Plaintiff 
Tim Farrell, Jordan Page, for Defendant 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiff was Canadian investor, who was among 57 accredited investors under Unites 
States legislation for transaction refinancing American-owned hog producer in China. 
Accredited investors were provided with memorandum that included clean audit report 
prepared by defendant accounting firm. Accredited investors invested some $7.5 million 
before learning that producer lacked financial controls over its all-cash-business. 
Producer went out of business. Plaintiff brought class action against defendant for 
negligence and negligent misrepresentation in production of clean audit report. Plaintiffs 
brought motion for certification. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




NA – no CFA at play but Perell J does talk a bit about CFAs in the context of his reasons 
denying certification, see ‘Outcome’ 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
NA – see ‘Outcome’ 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. 
As part of his reasoning, Perell J commented that “… there are no significant economic 
barriers to litigating that would need to be overcome by a class action procedure.” (para 
207) and neither Excalibur nor class members in this case need a class action in order to 
obtain access to justice. In saying so, he states that: “There is ample her[e] for 
a contingency fee, and Class Counsel would not be confronted with the risks associated 
with obtaining certification.” (para 206) 
Followed:  Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch (2014 SCC 7);  Hunt v. T & 
N plc ([1999] SCR 959);  Lipson v. Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP (2011 – Ont SCJ);  
Parsons v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd. (2005 – Ont CA);  Silver v. Imax 
Corp. (2009 – Ont SCJ) 
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Hodge v. Neinstein (2014 ONSC 4503)  
– see also (2015 ONSC 7345) below 
2014 CarswellOnt 10316, 2014 ONSC 4503, [2014] O.J. No. 3572, 243 A.C.W.S. (3d) 537, 58 C.P.C. (7th) 37 
Date Heard: July 23-24, 2014 
Judgment: July 29, 2014 
Parties Cassie Hodge, Applicant 
Gary Neinstein and Neinstein & Associates LLP, Respondents 
Counsel Peter I. Waldman, Andrew Stein, for Applicant 
Chris G. Paliare, Odette Soriano, Nasha Nijhawan, for Respondents 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Applicant had motor vehicle accident personal injury claim and hired respondent lawyer 
and law firm to prosecute her statutory benefits and tort claims. Applicant signed CFA. 
Litigation ended and applicant paid contingency fee. Applicant brought proposed class 
action proceeding on behalf of all contingency fee clients of respondents. Applicant 
asserted respondents fraudulently, in breach of contract and in breach of fiduciary duty 
contravened contingency fee provisions of Solicitors Act and its regulations. Applicant 
sought certification of application as class proceeding. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Alleged breach of Solicitors Act, ss. 28.1(8), 28.1(9), and 15 – considered ss 23-25, 
28.1(8)-(10). 
Also considered: Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 5(1)(a)-(e), 6; Rules of 
Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R 7.08; Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 
195/04, ss 5, 7. 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
Ms. Hodge signed a standard form stating: “In consideration for the professional services 
provided and the risks in funding all costs and disbursements by N&A, I/We do hereby 
understand and agree that N&A's legal fees arising from this Retainer agreement will be 
25% of the damages recovered on my/our behalf, plus partial indemnity costs (which will 
be no more than 40% of the total recovered) plus disbursements.” (para 66) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Major complaint:  alleged contravention of sections 28.1(8) and 28.1(9) of the Act, 
which prohibit, without court approval, a [CFA] that includes in the fee any amount of 
costs recovered by the client and that stipulates that a [CFA] subject to approval is not 
enforceable unless it is approved. Applicant submits that ss. 28.1(8) and 28.1(9) of 
the Act are a free-standing strict liability civil wrong. 
Also, alleged breach of s. 15 of Solicitors Act and its regulations: “Every conceivable 
contravention is alleged, including:(a) the Respondents not following the formalities for 
the formation of an enforceable [CFA]; (b) the Respondents not advising their clients 
about their rights and choices in retaining a lawyer; (c) the Respondents misrepresenting 
and deceiving the clients about their rights; and (d) the Respondents charging fees and 
disbursements that contravened the substantive provisions of the statutory regime that 
governs [CFA]. The Respondents are accused of contravening other provisions of the 
Solicitors Act or breaching their professional responsibilities by improperly charging 
disbursements and interest.” (para 4) 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. 
Application was not certifiable as class action. While identifiable group might have been 
victimized by respondents, clients would have been victimized as individuals, common 





obtain access to justice for group of individual claimants without commonality other than 
possibility of having been victimized by same entity. Attempt to find commonality by 
asserting that ss. 28.1(8) and 28.1(9) of Solicitors Act was strict liability offence failed. 
Application satisfied cause of action criterion and breach of fiduciary duty and breach of 
contract claims could be certified because it was not plain and obvious that they were 
precluded by s. 23 of Solicitors Act and they had some evidentiary footprint.  
Followed: Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch (2014 SCC 7); Fischer v. IG 
Investment Management Ltd. (2013 SCC 69); Hunt v. T & N plc   
Additional Reasons 
given in Hodge v 
Neinstein (2014 
ONSC 6366) 
Concerning costs to judgement earlier reported: 
“In my opinion, I agree with Ms. Hodge that $390,000 is too high and beyond what an 
unsuccessful party, even one that provoked the other side with the type of allegations 
found in the immediate case, could fairly expect to pay. However, I think that $185,000 is 
too low.” and, 
“…having regard to the factors that influence the exercise of the court's discretion as to 
costs, the Respondents should receive costs on a partial indemnity scale of $300,000 plus 
HST, plus disbursements of $28,758.45.” (paras 97 and 98) 
See also… (2014 
ONSC 706) 
In an earlier judgement in the same year, Hodge v Neinstein (2014 ONSC 706), class 
action plaintiffs brought a motion to amend litigation plan, amend notice of application, 
for leave to file further affidavits, and for costs and cross-examination. Hodge was 
largely unsuccessful on the omnibus motion and costs were ordered against her. 
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Hodge v. Neinstein (2015 ONSC 7345) – appeal of (2014 ONSC 4503) 
2015 CarswellOnt 18937, 2015 ONSC 7345, 261 A.C.W.S. (3d) 272, 342 O.A.C. 306 
Date Heard: May 21, 2015 
Judgment: December 9, 2015 
Parties Cassie Hodge, Appellant 
Gary Neinstein and Neinstein & Associates LLP, Respondents 
Law Foundation of Ontario, Intervenor 
Counsel Peter I. Waldman, Andrew Stein, for Appellant 
Chris G. Paliare, Odette Soriano, Denise Cooney, for Respondents 
Scott C. Hutchinson, Sherif Foda, for Intervenor, Law Foundation of Ontario 
Judge/s Then J., Molloy J., Lederer J. 
Quick Facts At trial court, plaintiff (Cassie Hodge) brought proposed class proceeding alleging that 
defendant lawyer and firm used improper contingency fee agreements and took 
unauthorized fees, failed to obtain court approval when required by law, and charged 
illegal interest rates on disbursements. Plaintiff brought application to certify action as 
class proceeding.  
Trial judge found that plaintiff pleaded tenable cause of action for breach of fiduciary 
duty and breach of contract, as well as for application under s. 23 of Solicitors Act to 
determine whether the contingency fee agreement was fair and reasonable. Trial judge 
found that plaintiff failed to establish free-standing cause of action for a strict liability 
claim under s. 28.1. Trial judge also ruled that there was an identifiable class capable of 
definition and that the plaintiff was an acceptable representative, but that the claim failed 
on the common issue requirement (claim would be too individualistic for class 
proceeding). Application was dismissed and plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of 
$328,758.45 to defendants. Plaintiff appealed. 
(See Hodge v Neinstein 2014 ONSC 4503)  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 5. 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s. 347. (no allegation of criminal conduct in this 
case) 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, ss. 15, 16(1), 16(2), 23-25, 28.1(1)-(11), 33(2) 





A. Standard form retainer agreement (see full description at para 27, 28) 
 included clause stipulating that appellant pay 25% of damages recovered + any 
recovery for partial indemnity costs (more than 40% of amount recovered) 
 also included that appellant liable to pay disbursements 
 agreement did not include provision, as required under the Regulations, advising 
her that she was entitled to any costs recovered unless a judge ordered otherwise 
B. No application was made to a judge for approval of the agreement, as required under s. 
281(8) of the Solicitors Act 
C. Ms. Hodge settled for an “all-in-settlement’ of $150,000 in her tort claim. Ms. Hodge 
charged $60,326.49 in legal fees (+GST) + $48,942.37 for disbursements, leaving her 
with a total recovered sum of $41,906.41. 




Agreement failed to obtain court approval when required by law, and charged illegal interest rates on 
disbursements 
Costs plus Fees:  The appellants seek a declaration that any contingency 
agreement entered into by Neinstein & Associates with a client in which the firm has an 
entitlement to take any portion of costs in addition to a fee is unenforceable. (para 78) 
Interest Recovery Charges: including  charge related to interest on disbursements 
incurred by the firm during the course of the litigation (average amount per client is 
$2000 x 6000 members of class = $12 million) (para 84-87) 
Other Improper Charges: charging clients for disbursements (para 88-90) 
Referral Fees: Ms. Hodge alleges that Neinstein & Associates improperly paid finder's 
fees to other firms and charged these fees to their clients. (para 91) 
Outcome Held: Appeal allowed. Trial judge’s costs order set-aside. 
Per Molloy J., Then J.: Trial judge erred in law in interpreting the Act, all criteria for 
certification had been met and the action should have been certified as a class proceeding.  
Trial judge failed to consider that ss. 23 - 25 of the Act might not apply 
to contingency fee agreements that did not comply with s. 28.1, which was an arguable 
issue. It was also arguable that: 1) clients had right to seek declaration 
that contingency fee agreements were unenforceable; 2) the appropriate remedy would be 
disgorgement of money received by law firm in respect of invalid 
contingency fee agreements. Legal issues would be common to all clients within the 
class, and quantification of claims would be straightforward. Law firm would have to 
establish whether there was a valid claim to be paid fees on quantum meruit basis. While 
those counterclaims would be individual, that would not bar using class procedure to 
determine common claims. Class procedure would be the preferable proceeding 
Per Lederer J. (dissenting in part): The appeal should be allowed, but for different 
reasons. The trial judge erred in principle. It was not plain and obvious that an action 
which depends solely on s. 28.1 of the Solicitors Act cannot succeed. The cause of action 
should have been certified. The trial judge's interpretation of the applicable sections of 
the Solicitors Act was not necessarily wrong and the majority opinion is not necessarily 
correct. It is not plain and obvious that an action relying solely on s. 28.1 will inevitably 
fail. 
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Fulawka v. Bank of Nova Scotia (2014 ONSC 4743) 
2014 CarswellOnt 11626, 2014 ONSC 4743, 243 A.C.W.S. (3d) 804, 69 C.P.C. (7th) 134 
Date Heard: August 12, 2014 
Judgment: August 27, 2014 
Parties Cindy Fulawka, Plaintiff  
The Bank of Nova Scotia, Defendant 
Counsel David F. O'Connor, Louis Sokolov, J. Adam Dewar, Jordan Goldblatt, for Plaintiff / Class 
Martin Sclisizzi, Markus Kremer, for Defendant / Bank 
Judge/s Edward P. Belobaba J. 
Quick Facts Class action alleged employer's compensation system unlawfully deprived class members 
of overtime pay. Action was settled. Settlement “not only reflects well on the Bank of Nova 
Scotia ("Scotiabank") but is also reasonable and in the best interests of the class” (para 1). 







CFA retainer provided that class counsel was entitled to either 30% recovery or a 4.0 
multiplier, in the event of a successful outcome. 
However, instead of following the CFA, the parties negotiated a settlement template that 
provided class members with a claims-made compensation process just described and a 
separate legal fees component to be paid by Scotiabank. There was some disagreement over 
legal fees so parties hired Stephen Goudge (retired judge of ONCA) to mediate, and if need 
be, to arbitrate as well. The issue did indeed go to arbitration and Goudge determined the 
base legal fees to be $3.8 million and then applied a 2.75 multiplier for a total 




Whether or not class counsel’s fee is fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Settlement approved. 
“…the legal fees represent less than half of what class counsel would arguably have been 
entitled to under the 30 percent contingency agreement. I am therefore satisfied that the 
$10.45 million amount is fair and reasonable.” (para 23) Additionally, a $15,000 
honorarium was granted for the representative plaintiff.  
Approval for 
revised settlement 
brought in (2016 
ONSC 1576) 
Fulawka v. Bank of Nova Scotia (2016 ONSC 1576) – request for approval of revised 
settlement and class counsel’s legal fees 
“Unfortunately, as things turned out, the claims process did not go smoothly…” Following 
months of negotiation and a two day mediation in December 2015 before the Hon. George 
Adams, the parties agreed to a new and more streamlined payment approach and the terms 
of the Settlement were revised. 
Bank proposed to pay class counsel $2.3 million in legal fees, separate and apart from the 
revised settlement. 
Held: Revised settlement and class counsel’s legal fees approved.  
Class counsel could have requested a 30% contingency recovery per the CFA retainer OR 
class counsel could also have insisted on the 2.75 multiplier that was applied by the 
arbitrator in setting the legal fees for the original settlement. Instead, they settled at $2.3 
million which, for the fees portion, reflects only a 1.99 multiplier. (para 19)  
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Horgan v. Lakeridge Health Corp. (2014 ONSC 5209) 




Date Heard: September 9, 2014 
Judgment: September 9, 2014 
Parties Michael David Horgan, Plaintiff 
Lakeridge Health Corporation, David J. Ross and Hak Ming Chiu, Defendants 
Counsel Jonathan Ptak, Jody Brown, for Plaintiff 
Barry Glaspell, for Defendant, Lakeridge Health Corporation 
Mary Thomson, Belinda Bain, for Defendants, David J. Ross and Hak Ming Chiu 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiffs tested positive for tuberculosis after being exposed to index patients at hospital. 
Plaintiffs alleged their infections were caused by defendants' negligence. Plaintiffs 
commenced two class actions ten years ago. Plaintiffs signed retainer CFAs that provided 
that full reimbursement of disbursements and fees were to be product of base fee and 
multiplier of four or contingency of 30 percent if action settled after commencement of 
discoveries. Parties reached settlements. Class counsel brought motion: 1) for approval 
of contingency fee of 30 percent on settlement (which was $510,000); 2) honorarium of 
$10,000 for each of representative plaintiffs; and 3) class counsel agreed to perform and 
assume all further costs of administration of settlement  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




CFA provided for full reimbursement of fees and disbursement : 
 either as the product of a base fee + 4.0 multiplier OR 30% of settlement   
Counsel seeks approval for the 30% option. The contingency fee ($510,000) amounted to 
less than 25% of the value of time invested by Class Counsel, which is approximately 




Whether or not class counsel’s requested fee is fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held:  Motions granted. Settlement approved and Class Counsel’s fee approved. 
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Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG (2014 ONSC 6082) 
2014 CarswellOnt 14546, 2014 ONSC 6082, 246 A.C.W.S. (3d) 730 
Date Heard: September 19, 2014 
Judgment: October 20, 2014 
Parties Khalid Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics Corporation, Plaintiffs 
Infineon Technologies Ag, Infineon Technologies Corporation, Infineon Technologies 
North America Corporation, Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Hynix Semiconductor America 
Inc., Hynix Semiconductor Manufacturing America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 
Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., Samsung Electronics America, Inc. Samsung Electronics 
Canada Inc., Micron Technology, Inc. Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. o/a Crucial 
Technologies, Mosel Vitelic Corp., Mosel Vitelic Inc. and Elpida Memory, Inc., 
Defendants 
Counsel Jonathan J. Foreman, Rob Gain, for Plaintiffs 
Eliot Kolers, for Defendants, Infineon Technologies AG, Infineon Technologies 
Corporation and Infineon Technologies North America Corporation 
Linda Plumpton, Jonathan Roth, for Defendants, Mitsubishi Electronic Corporation, 
Mitsubishi Electric Sales Canada, Inc., and Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc. 
Laura F. Cooper, Zohaib Maladwala, for Defendants, Toshiba Corporation, Toshiba 
America Electronics Components Inc. and Toshiba of Canada Limited 
Anna Tombs, for Defendants, Winbond Electronics Corporation and Winbond Electronics 
Corporation America 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Representative plaintiffs commenced two class actions in Ontario alleging defendants 
conspired to fix prices of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) devices. Other 
plaintiffs commenced companion actions in British Columbia and Quebec. Class counsel in 
three jurisdictions worked together, focusing attention on BC action which proceeded 
through discovery and preparation for trial. Settlements were reached with most defendants. 
Plaintiffs brought motion for: 1) approval of final four settlement agreements, which would 
bring aggregate recovery to $79.5 million; 2) leave to discontinue against remaining two 
defendants, who were impecunious; 3) approval of distribution protocol and administration 
protocol; 4) appointment of claims administrator and arbitrator; 5) approval of class 
counsel fees of $16,851,367.64 plus taxes; 6) approval of disbursements of $178,245.64 
and US$2,218.93; and 7) directions concerning budget for notice to class members. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




Harrison Pensa LLP and Sutts Strosberg LLP each entered into a CFA with their respective 
Ontario Representative Plaintiff client, which was court approved on July 27, 2012. It 
provided for: 
 a fee payable up to 30% of the value of any settlement 
 + disbursements and applicable taxes 
Camp Fiorante Matthews Mogerman entered into a CFA with the B.C. Representative 
Plaintiff , which was court approved on July 26, 2012. It provided for: 
 a fee up to 33.33% on any settlement or compensation pertaining to the case 
 + disbursements and applicable taxes 




sought is less than that permitted under the B.C. Fee Agreement and consistent with the 
terms of the Ontario and Québec Fee Agreements. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Are class counsels’ fees fair and reasonable? 
Outcome Held: Motions granted. 
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Boudreau v. Loba Ltd. (2015 ONSC 1648) – appealed in (2015 ONSC 4877)  
– see below 
2015 CarswellOnt 3680, 2015 ONSC 1648, [2015] O.J. No. 1288, 252 A.C.W.S. (3d) 601 
  
Date Heard: December 17, 2014 
Judgment: March 13, 2015 
Parties Joseph Andre Boudreau et. al., Plaintiffs 
Loba Limited, et. al., Defendants 
Counsel Paul K. Lepsoe, for Plaintiffs, Moving Parties 
Heather J. Williams, for Defendants, Responding Parties 
Judge/s Master C. MacLeod 
Quick Facts Federal public servants were led to believe they could transfer their accrued pension 
monies to private sector pension plan if they left public service. Defendant structured series 
of reciprocal transfer agreements with Treasury Board Secretariat. Minister revoked status 
of defendant pension plan. Minister threatened to revoke registration of CWI pension plan 
after plaintiff transferred her federal pension monies into plan. Lawyer was counsel for 
defendant at time. Lawyer provided legal advice to plaintiff at time on application for leave 
to appeal as well because there was commonality of interest. Lawyer was never on record 
and did not represent plaintiff before court. Defendant commenced action against federal 
government for compensation and retained plaintiff as lawyer. Parties entered into 
contingency agreement. Action was resolved by settlement. Plaintiff asserted entitlement to 
additional compensation because defendant wrongfully deducted expenses it was not 
entitled to deduct and plaintiff sued defendant for difference. Plaintiff claimed lawyer and 
law firm of record for defendant acted for her in connection with related matters, would 
have to be witness in proceeding, and was in conflict of interest. Plaintiff (Suzanne 
Boudreau) brought motion to remove lawyers (Michael Rankin and McMillan LLP) as 







Plaintiffs and defendants entered into a CFA on January 23, 2006, it provided for: 
 plaintiffs to provide legal services at a modest hourly rate 
 if litigation was successful then there would be further compensation, as a 
percentage of the net proceeds of the litigation 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Issue on the Motion: Whether or not Mr. Rankin's involvement on behalf of Ms. 
Boudreau in respect of her own appeal is such as to disqualify him from acting for the 
Loba defendants in this action over her fees. Is this a conflict of interest that requires the 
defendants to retain new counsel? 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. Defendants presumptively entitled to costs. 
“I am not persuaded by the evidence before the court that Michael Rankin will be a 
necessary witness. Mr. Parent will not be calling him. While some of his services and fees 
charged by his law firm are undoubtedly included in the amounts charged against the 
proceeds of settlement, it is far from clear that the only way to prove the legitimacy of the 
legal fees is to call Mr. Rankin.” (para 59) 
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Boudreau v. Loba Ltd. (2015 ONSC 4877) 
2015 CarswellOnt 11731, 2015 ONSC 4877, [2015] O.J. No. 4085, 256 A.C.W.S. (3d) 719 
 
  
Date Heard:  July 9, 2015 
Judgment: August 4, 2015 
Parties Joseph Andre Boudreau and Suzanne Boudreau, Plaintiffs/Appellants 
 Loba Limited, Welton Parent Inc. and Sylvain Parent, Defendants/ Respondents 
Counsel Paul K. Lepsoe, for Plaintiffs / Appellants 
Heather J. Williams, for Defendants / Respondents 
Judge/s Kershman J. 
Quick Facts Defendants retained lawyer R for complex and protracted multimillion dollar tort action 
against federal Crown dealing with tax and pension relating proceedings. Plaintiff B, as 
one of former public servants, represented herself in related class action against Crown, in 
which defendants were named as third parties. When B applied for leave to appeal decision 
in class action, dealing with enforceability of same pension transfer agreement at issue in 
defendants' action, R provided assistance with application due to commonality of interest. 
R's invoice for such assistance was paid by defendants. Plaintiffs brought action against 
defendants, alleging that they were owed for services rendered under contingency 
agreement. Defendants retained R and his firm as counsel. Plaintiffs' motion to remove law 







Appellants and respondents entered into CFA on January 23, 2006. The agreement 
provided that the plaintiffs would provide litigation support services and would be 
compensated at a modest hourly rate. The agreement also provided that there would be 
further compensation if Loba was successful in the litigation. This was expressed as a 
percentage of the value of the settlement after deducting out of pocket expenses.  
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
NA – issue did not engage with the CFA itself, but rather with privileges around the S-C 
relationship. 
Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed. 
There was ample evidence to find that invoice for R's work for B was directed to 
defendants such that it would be subject to shared privilege or that B had waived any 
privilege over it. B's claim for privilege was inconsistent with reliance on it to support 
contention that there was conflict of interest. Plaintiffs did not show that communication 
was intended to be confidential at time it was made. 
Followed: Heck v. Royal Bank (1993 – Ont Div Ct); Hryniak v. Mauldin (2013 SCC 7); 
Karas v. Ontario (2011 – Ont Master); Mazinani v. Bindoo (2013 ONSC 4744) 
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Kutlu v. Laboratorios Leon Farma, S.A. (2015 ONSC 5976) 
2015 CarswellOnt 14822, 2015 ONSC 5976, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 476 
Date Heard: September 25, 2015 
Judgment: September 28, 2015 
Parties Carleen Kutlu, Paige Towle and Rebekah Thomas, Plaintiffs 
Laboratorios Leon Farma, S.A., Chemo Iberica, S.A. and Apotex Inc., Defendants 
Counsel Won J. Kim, Megan B. McPhee, Alexander Zaitzeff, for Plaintiffs 
Christopher C. Watkins, for Watkins Law Professional Corporation 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts In fall 2013, lawyer CW planned to commence class action against three pharmaceutical 
companies alleging that negligently packaged contraceptive drugs had led to unexpected and 
unwanted pregnancies. He approached AZ, lawyer with whom he shared office space, to handle 
matter. AZ, in turn, came to arrangement with KO, class action firm in Toronto, to act as lead 
counsel. 73 potential class members signed retainer agreements with KO and with AZ as 
counsel for CW's firm. In November 2014, three representative plaintiffs commenced within 
proposed class action against three pharmaceutical companies including A Inc and L Co in 
Ontario. In September 2013, however, two other representative plaintiffs had commenced class 
action against A Inc and L Co in Alberta with respect to same cause of action. Even though KO 
attended certification hearing to object, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, found that Alberta 
appropriate venue for determination of proceeding and certified multi-jurisdictional class action 
with national class. In within action, professional relationship between AZ and CW ended. 
Plaintiffs delivered Notice of Change of Lawyers to change counsel from lawyers KO and CW 
to lawyers KO and AZ. CW contacted clients to suggest they join Alberta action which had 
already been certified and had settlement approval hearing scheduled. Plaintiffs brought motion 
for declaration that Notice of Change of full force and effect, for injunction restraining CW 
from contacting any putative class member who had retained KO and AZ, and for mandatory 
injunction requiring CW to direct any potential class member to KO and AZ. CW brought 
cross-motion for order removing him as lawyer of record, injunction restraining AZ from 
communicating with class members who had retained him, and order relieving him of 
undertaking not to speak to class members pending motions. CW also sought order requiring 
KO and AZ to disclose financial arrangements between themselves and with class members. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 








Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. Cross-motion dismissed on terms. Current retainer agreements and 
CFAs with respect to any Ontario action against Laboratories Leon Farma, SA, Chemo 
Iberica, SA, and Apotex are rescinded. 
It was not in best interests of putative class members to allow uncertified class action to 
continue when there was alternative with right to opt out and further advanced already 
existing. Single class action would best achieve goals of access to justice and judicial 
economy. Defendants should not have to face two class actions. 
“Without court approval, Mr. Zaitzeff and Mr. Watkins are not entitled to claim any fee, 
contingent or otherwise, for any services performed or disbursements incurred to date for the 
Plaintiffs or any Class Member…” (para 39) 
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Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada (Trustees of) v. 
Sino-Forest Corp. (2015 ONSC 6354) 
2015 CarswellOnt 15742, 2015 ONSC 6354, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 680 
Date Judgment: October 15, 2015 
Parties The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada, the Trustees 
of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating 
Engineers in Ontario, Sjunde AP-Fonden, David Grant, Robert Wong, Davis New York 
Venture Fund, Inc. and Davis Selected Advisers L.P., Plaintiffs 
Sino-Forest Corporation, Ernst & Young LLP, BDO Limited (formerly known as BDO 
McCabe Lo Limited), Allen T.Y. Chan, W. Judson Martin, Kai Kit Poon, David J. Horsley, 
William E. Ardell, James P. Bowland, James M.E. Hyde, Edmund Mak, Simon Murray, 
Peter Wang, Garry J. West, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited, Credit Suisse 
Securities (Canada), Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation, RBC 
Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch 
Canada Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd., Maison Placements Canada Inc., Credit Suisse 
Securities (USA) LLC and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (successor 
by merger to Banc of America Securities LLC), Defendants Proceeding under the Class 
Proceedings Act, 1992 
Counsel A. Dimitri Lascaris, Daniel E.H. Bach, S. Sajjad Nematollahi, Kirk M. Baert, Jonathan 
Ptak, for Plaintiffs 
Robert Staley, Derek J. Bell, Jonathan G. Bell, for Defendants, Sino-Forest Corporation, 
Simon Murray, Edmund Mak, W. Judson Martin, and Peter Wang 
Robert Rueter, Sara J. Erskine, Jason Beitchman, for Defendant, Allen T.Y. Chan 
Larry Lowenstein, Geoffrey Grove, for Defendants, William E. Ardell, James P. Bowland, 
James M.E. Hyde and Garry J. West 
Peter R. Greene, Kenneth A. Dekker, David Vaillancourt, for BDO Limited 
Susan E. Friedman, Brandon Barnes, for Defendant, Kai Kit Poon 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiffs purchased securities with allegedly inflated value. Plaintiffs brought action 
seeking in excess of $7 billion from defendants. Plaintiffs brought successful motion for 
certification and for leave to bring secondary market misrepresentation claim under 
Securities Act. Action was settled as against SDs (settling defendants) only, with SDs 
agreeing to pay plaintiffs over $1.7 million in disbursements and taxes. Hearing to 
determine costs conducted…  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s 31(1). 
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 131(1). 
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss 130.1, 138.5; Securities Act, 1933, 15 U.S.C. 2A, s 
12(a)(2) 




It is a term of the CFAs of all of the Plaintiffs (except Davis Selected Advisers, L.P. and 
Davis New York Venture Fund, Inc.) that Class Counsel receive any costs recovered from 








Outcome Held: Costs awarded (see para 152 for details) 
Earlier motion by 
trustees in (2014 
ONSC 62) 
Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v. Sino-Forest Corp. (2014 ONSC 
62): Motion by trustees for approval of claim and disbursement of funds. 
Canadian Class Counsel and Insolvency Counsel requested fees equal to 16.9% of 
settlement ($17,846,250.00 (exclusive of tax) for fees and $1,737,650.84 for 
disbursements). “…in the absence of any substantive criticism of the requested fees, I am 
satisfied that the requested fees and disbursements are consistent with the 
Retainer Agreement entered into with the plaintiffs and are fair and reasonable.” (para 47) – 
no issues with CFA retainer or fees requested. 
US Class Counsel fees and disbursements also approved (20% of 10% of E&Y settlement = 
Cdn $2,340,000) – there was no challenge to the fees requested.  
Held: Motion granted. (Decision by Morawetz R.S.J.) 
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Airia Brands Inc. v. Air Canada (2015 ONSC 6367) 




Date Heard: October 14, 2015 
Judgment: October 14, 2015 
Parties Airia Brands Inc., Startech.Com Ltd., and QCS-Quick Cargo Service GMBH, Plaintiffs 
Air Canada, AC Cargo Limited Partnership, Societe Air France, Koninklijke Luchtvaart 
Maatschappij N.V. dba KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines, Asiana Airlines Inc., British Airways 
PLC, Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Lufthansa Cargo AG, Japan 
Airlines International Co., Ltd., Scandinavian Airlines System, Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 
Cargolux Airline International, Lan Airlines S.A, LAN Cargo S.A., Atlas Air Worldwide 
Holdings Inc., Polar Air Cargo Inc., Singapore Airlines Ltd., Singapore Airlines Cargo PTE 
Ltd., Swiss International Air Lines Ltd., Quantas Airways Limited, and Martinair Holland 
N.V., Defendants 
Counsel Charles Wright, for Plaintiffs 
Judge/s L.C. Leitch J. 
Quick Facts Settlement agreements were entered into with defendants A Inc. and K Ltd.. Class counsel 
had undertaken litigation pursuant to retainer CFA, previously approved by court. Class 








CFA provided for 25% of amount recovered on behalf of class. 
Amount of fees sought by class counsel in Ontario and British Columbia is $1,299,200, 
representing 25% of settlement amounts notionally allocated to Ontario and British 
Columbia classes for the purposes of fee approval. Representative plaintiffs 
approved fees and disbursements and there had been no objections. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Whether or not counsel’s fee was fair and reasonable. 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. Order approving the fees sought has been signed.  
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Bancroft-Snell v. Visa Canada Corp. (2015 ONSC 7275) 
2015 CarswellOnt 17869, 2015 ONSC 7275, 260 A.C.W.S. (3d) 223, 80 C.P.C. (7th) 88 
Date Heard: November 19, 2015 
Judgment: November 23, 2015 
Parties Jonathon Bancroft-Snell and 1739793 Ontario Inc., Plaintiffs 
Visa Canada Corporation, Mastercard International Incorporated, Bank of America 
Corporation, Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce, Capital One Financial Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Federation des Caisses 
Desjardins du Québec, National Bank of Canada Toronto Inc., Royal Bank of Canada, and 
- Dominion Bank, Defendants 
Counsel Reidar Mogerman, Jen Winstanley, for Plaintiffs 
Michael Eizenga, Chris McKenna, for Defendant, Bank of America Corporation 
Mike Adlem, for Defendant, Citigroup Inc. 
Markus Kremer, for Defendant, Bank of Nova Scotia 
Rob Kwinter, for Defendant, Visa Canada Corporation 
James Musgrove, for Defendant, MasterCard International Incorporated 
Vincent de l'Etoile, for Defendant, Federation des caisses Desjardins du Québec 
David Rankin, for Defendant, Bank of Montreal 
Daniel G. Cohen, for Defendant, Capital One Corporation 
Katherine L. Kay, for Defendant, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
Paul J. Martin, for Defendant, Royal Bank of Canada 
Paul Morrison, Christine Lonsdale, for Defendant, Toronto-Dominion Bank 
William McNamara, for Defendant, National Bank of Canada Inc. 
Edward Babin, for Objector, Walmart 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiffs entered into CFA with class counsel. Plaintiffs brought class actions in multiple 
provinces against defendants with respect to fees charged to merchants accepting payment 
from consumers via credit cards. To resolve carriage dispute, class counsel entered into fee-
sharing agreement with law firm that brought carriage motions in two provinces Plaintiffs' 
class action was certified in British Columbia. Plaintiffs entered into settlement agreements 
 with three of defendants. Plaintiffs brought motion for approval of settlements, of 
fee agreement with class counsel, and of class counsel's fees and disbursements  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




On April 15, 2011, the initial plaintiff in the British Columbia action, Mary Watson signed 
a CFA with Branch MacMaster. (The agreement was updated on October 5, 2015 with the 
current representative plaintiff, Coburn and Watson's Metropolitan Home, dba 
"Metropolitan Home".) Also on April 15, 2011, the Plaintiffs in the Ontario action signed 
a CFA with Branch MacMaster and Camp Fiorante Matthews Mogerman. CFAs were also 
signed in the other proposed class actions. All agreements provided for: 
 legal fee of 30% or an amount equal to multiplying the total hours worked by 
counsel in accordance with their hourly rates, by a multiplier of 3.5 




1511419 Ontario Inc., Re (2015 ONSC 7518) 
2015 CarswellOnt 20331, 2015 ONSC 7518, 262 A.C.W.S. (3d) 588 
Class Counsel seeks approval of the CFAs, and approval of payment of a counsel fee of 
$3,407,500 and disbursements of $384,571.95. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Whether or not class counsel’s fee is fair and reasonable. 
Outcome Held: Motion granted in part. All three settlements approved, CFA approved, and class 
counsel fee of $3,384,571.95 approved. However, Fee Sharing Agreement is 
unenforceable. 
“The Contingency Fee Agreements between Class Counsel and the respective 
Representative Plaintiffs are typical or conventional agreements common to class actions. 
The agreements comply with the formal requirements of the Act, and I approve them.” 
(para 54) 
Followed: McIntyre Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2002) (Ont CA) 
Date Heard: November 19, 2015 
Judgment: December 23, 2015 
Parties NA 
Counsel Jonathan Foreman, Lindsay Merrifield, for Ontario Consumers Class Action 
James Harnum (Agent), for Harrison Pensa 
David Mann, Robert Kennedy, for DirectCash in CCAA Proceedings 
Eric R. Hoaken, for DirectCash in Class Action Proceedings 
Peter Griffin, Matthew Lerner, for Gordon Reykdal 
Jeff Galway, for N. Bland 
Mark Polley, Eric Brousseau, for National Money Mart Company 
Andrew Faith, Jeff Haylock, for 1573568 Alberta Ltd. 
Geoff R. Hall, Stephen Fulton, for Monitor (FTI Consulting Canada Inc.) 
Patrick Riesterer, for Chief Restructuring Officer of the Applicants 
Michael Byers, for Craig Warnock 
Serge Khallughlian, Charles Wright, for Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of Applicants' 
Securities, including the Plaintiff in the Ontario Securities Class Action 
Mary Margaret Fox, for ACE Insurance Company 
Doug McInnis, for Axis Reinsurance Company 
Brendan O'Neill, Carolyn Descours, for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders 
Rebecca Wise, for Albert Mondor, Michael Shaw, Ron Chicoyne, William Dunn and 
Robert Gibson 
Ilan Ishai, for McCann Entities 
David Hoffner, for Monitor in Chapter 14 Proceedings 
Judge/s G.B. Morawetz R.S.J. 
Quick Facts Ontario Consumer Class Action Counsel sought approval of contingent legal fee of 
approximately 25 per cent of recoveries achieved in action settlements plus disbursements 





request was for $707,387.66 inclusive. Unopposed motion was brought to 







CFA retainer entered into by representative plaintiff Timothy Yeoman and class counsel, 
which provided for: 
 max. 30% of the recoveries achieved 
 + disbursements 
 + applicable taxes 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Whether or not contingency fee is fair and reasonable. 
Outcome Held: Motion granted.  
Motion by 
securities 
plaintiffs in (2015 
ONSC 7535) 
1511419 Ontario Inc., Re (2015 ONSC 7535) – motion by securities plaintiffs for order 
approving fees and disbursements of class counsel in amount of $3,484,375.05 in fees plus 
applicable taxes and $106,177.64 in disbursements 
Requested fee represents 25.29% of settlement – less than CFA retainer between class 
counsel and plaintiffs would allow. 
Held: Motion granted. (judgement by Morawetz RSJ on same day as above) 
“I am satisfied that the fee requests fit within the range of reasonableness, based on 
comparison with other class proceedings. I accept that the fee award is both fair and 
reasonable.” (para 8) 
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Emms v. Christian Economic Assistance Foundation (2015 ONSC 7664) 
2015 CarswellOnt 18759, 2015 ONSC 7664, 261 A.C.W.S. (3d) 271 
 
  
Date Heard: December 8, 2015 
Judgment: December 8, 2015 
Parties Terry Emms, Plaintiff 
Christian Economic Assistance Foundation and Ontario Alliance of Christian School 
Societies, Defendants 
Counsel David Thompson, Matthew G. Moloci, for Plaintiff 
Ward Branch, for Defendant, Christian Economic Assistance Foundation 
William Chalmers, for Defendant, Ontario Alliance of Christian School Societies 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Defendant registered charity developed tax credit program in which taxpayer would 
receive charitable donation receipt for amount of tuition paid to enroll student at private 
Christian school. However, Canada Revenue Agency disallowed tax credits in 2010. 
Plaintiff had enrolled his son in private Christian school and was one of group of taxpayers 
that were denied amounts claimed as charitable donations, reassessed and penalized. 
Plaintiff commenced proposed class action against defendants. Parties negotiated 
settlement under which defendants consented to certification for settlement purposes, and 
under which, without admitting liability, defendants agreed to pay up to $1.5 million in 
exchange for release of claims against them. On consent, plaintiff brought motion for 
certification of class proceeding, approval of settlement and approval of class counsel fee 
and honorarium for representative plaintiff. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




Mr. Emms entered into a CFA retainer with Scarfone Hawkins LLP on August 23, 2013. It 
provides for: 
 30% contingency fee calculated after all expenses (including taxes and 
disbursements) deducted 
Class Counsel is asking for payment of fee $508,500 + $12,904.27 for disbursements, 
based on 30% of the Settlement Fund. Mr. Emms approves of the settlement and class 
counsel’s fee request. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Is class counsel’s fee request “fair and reasonable,” based on the factors relevant for 
assessing reasonableness of class counsel? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. All approved. 
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Silver v. Imax Corp. (2016 ONSC 403) 
2016 CarswellOnt 558, 2016 ONSC 403, 262 A.C.W.S. (3d) 856 
 
  
Date Heard: December 15, 2015 
Judgment: January 15, 2016 
Parties Marvin Neil Silver and Cliff Cohen, Plaintiffs 
Imax Corporation, Richard L. Gelfond, Bradley J. Wechsler, Francis T. Joyce, Neil S. 
Braun, Kenneth G. Copland, Garth M. Girvan, David W. Leebron and Kathryn A. Gamble, 
Defendants 
Counsel Jay Strosberg, Michael Robb, for Plaintiffs 
Dana Peebles, for Defendants 
Judge/s Baltman J. 
Quick Facts In class action, plaintiff claimed damages from defendant and some directors on basis it 
misrepresented revenue, resulting in decline in share price. Claims were brought under 
common-law tort of misrepresentation and statutory cause of action under Ontario 
Securities Act by residents who purchased shares in during class period. Nine years after 
action was commenced, parties reached proposed settlement for $3,750,000. Class counsel 
sought 33% of recovery plus taxes, for total of $1,398,375 plus unbilled disbursements of 
$224,330. Motion by plaintiff for approval of settlement and class counsel fees. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




CFA retainer for Siskinds LLP provided for: 
 33% of total recovery  
 + taxes 
 + disbursements 
CFA retainer for Sutts, Strosberg provided for: 
 sliding scale ranging from 25% to 33% 
Class counsel request fees at 33% of the recovery (i.e. $1,237,500) + taxes ($160,875) + 
unbilled disbursements ($224,330) 
Note: 1) “The request for fees at 33% plus disbursements and taxes was contained in the 
notice of certification, and, later, in the notice of settlement approval hearing. Both notices 
were widely distributed and no one objected to the fees sought. Only one class member 
opted out despite the public notice of the 33% contingency fee.” (para 44) and 2) “… two 
firms comprising class counsel have collectively docketed approximately $4,000,000 in 
time. That is more than the total recovery in the action. With the proposed fees class 
counsel will be recovering less than one third of their docketed time.” (para 46) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Whether or not class counsel’s legal fees were “fair and reasonable” and fairly reflected the 
factors listed at para 41 to determine fairness and reasonableness. 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. Proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of 
the class. Class counsel legal fees also approved. 
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AFA Livförsäkringsaktiebolag v. Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. (2016 ONSC 
532) 
2016 CarswellOnt 2169, 2016 ONSC 532, 263 A.C.W.S. (3d) 632 
 
  
Date Heard: January 20, 2016 
Judgment: February 12, 2016 
Parties AFA Livförsäkringsaktiebolag, AFA Sjukförsäkringsaktiebolag, AFA 
Trygghetsförsäkringsaktiebolag, Kollektivavtalsstiftelsen Trygghetsfonden TSL and 
William Leslie, Plaintiffs 
Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited, Sean Boyd, Eberhard Scherkus and Ammar Al-Jound, 
Defendants 
Counsel Michael G. Robb, Ronald Podolny, for Plaintiffs 
James Doris, Luis Sarabia, Chantelle Spagnola, for Defendants 
Judge/s Edward P. Belobaba J. 
Quick Facts Securities class action, certified on consent, was settled for $17 million. Plaintiffs brought 
application for judicial approval of settlement agreement and legal fees  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 5(1), 29(2). 




“Based on the retainer agreement, class counsel is seeking a 29.5 per 
cent contingency recovery which amounts to $4,094,000, plus disbursements and taxes.” 
(para 19)  
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Are the proposed legal fees fair and reasonable? Belobaba J notes, as he did in Canon, that 
the CFA is presumptively valid in the context. 
Outcome Held: Application granted with one revision: “I only ask that class counsel reduce the 
disbursements by $3828 for the "legal research" charge that, in my view, should not be 
billed as a disbursement.” 
Followed:  Cannon v. Funds for Canada Foundation (2013 – Ont SCJ) 
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Sheridan Chevrolet Cadillac Ltd. v. Furukawa Electric Co. (2016 ONSC 
729) 
2016 CarswellOnt 1571, 2016 ONSC 729, 263 A.C.W.S. (3d) 70 
 
  
Date Heard: January 28, 2016 
Judgment: February 3, 2016 
Parties Sheridan Chevrolet Cadillac Ltd., the Pickering Auto Mall Ltd., and Fady Samaha, 
Plaintiffs and Chiyoda MFG. Co., Ltd., Chiyoda USA Corporation, and Asti Corporation, 
Defendants 
Counsel Charles M. Wright, David Sterns, for Plaintiffs 
Robert Kwinter, for Yazaki Defendants 
David Kent, Laura Brazil, for Chiyoda Defendants 
Sandra Forbes, for Denso and Techma Defendants 
Paul Martin, for G.S. and G.S.W. Defendants 
Kelly Friedman, for Hitachi Defendants 
Susan Freedman, for Furakawa Defendants 
Linda Plumpton, for Mitsubishi Defendants 
Suzy Kaufman, for Fujikura Defendants 
Neil Campbell, Allison Worone, for Sumitomo Defendants 
James Gotowiec, for Leoni Defendants 
Mel Hogg, for SY Systems Defendants 
Judge/s Edward P. Belobaba J. 
Quick Facts Y Inc. and C Co. (defendants) were suppliers of auto parts including automotive wire 
harness systems (AWHS), instrument panel clusters (IPC), and fuel senders. Plaintiffs 
commenced class actions on behalf of persons in Canada who purchased or leased auto 
parts supplied by defendants. Actions alleged that defendants engaged in price-fixing. 
Parties reached settlements in four actions, including settlement in action against Y Inc. in 
relation to AWHS (Y Inc. AWHS settlement). Plaintiffs brought motions for approval of 







CFA retainers with class counsel provided for: 
 25% contingency fee 
 + disbursements 
 + taxes 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
NA – “As I made clear in Cannon, this contingency amount is presumptively valid and 
there is no good reason herein not to approve the legal fees” (para 16) 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
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Quenneville v. Volkswagen Group Canada Inc. (2016 ONSC 959) 
2016 CarswellOnt 2163, 2016 ONSC 959, 263 A.C.W.S. (3d) 610 
 
  
Date Heard: February 3, 2016 
Judgment: February 12, 2016 
Parties Matthew Robert Quenneville, Luciano Tauro, Michael Joseph Pare, Therese H. Gadoury, 
Amy Fitzgerald, Renee James, Al-Noor Wissanji, Jack Mastromattei and Jay MacDonald, 
Plaintiffs / Moving Parties 
Volkswagen Group Canada Inc., Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Volkswagen Group of 
America Inc., Audi Canada Inc., Audi Aktiengesellschaft, Audi of America Inc. and VW 
Credit Canada Inc., Defendants and Merchant Law Group LLP, Responding Party 
Counsel David F. O'Connor, J. Adam Dewar, for Plaintiffs / Moving Parties 
Anthony Tibbs, Chris Simoes, for Responding Party, Merchant Law Group 
Robert Bell, for Volkswagen Defendants 
Judge/s Edward P. Belobaba J. 
Quick Facts In breach of carriage agreement and court order of December 2015 granting carriage of 
Ontario Volkswagen class action to consortium of eight law firms, Merchant Law Group 
LLP (MLG) law firm sent misleading email in January to some 9500 recipients urging 
them, in essence, to join MLG class action. 150 Ontario residents acted on MLG's 
misstatements and signed MLG retainer agreement that was attached to email. It was 
beyond dispute that MLG agreed not to contest carriage in Ontario. MLG's carriage 
motion was dismissed as abandoned and its own Ontario action was stayed. MLG agreed 
to send out clarifying email and agreed not to execute retainer agreements received from 
Ontario residents. Counsel on both sides were unable to agree on several points to be 
included in clarifying email. Class counsel brought motion for costs of approximately 







Misleading e-mail sent by MLG included an attached CFA retainer and instructions. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Nothing contained in the CFA retainer was at issue in the case. It was the attachment of a 
retainer agreement to MLG’s e-mail (CFA or not) that was of concern in its breach of the 
court order.  
Outcome Held: Motion granted in part. Costs fixed at $40,000 payable by MLG to Class Counsel. 
“It is plain from the retainer agreement attached to the January 22 email that MLG 
intended to proceed either by way of class action or mass (individualized) litigation at its 
discretion.” (para 5) 
“MLG's breach of the Court Order is deserving of censure and condemnation and, 
therefore, by definition, is reprehensible. An elevated costs award is therefore justified…” 
(para 16) 
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Donohue v. Baja Mining Corp. (2016 ONSC 1569) 
2016 CarswellOnt 3317, 2016 ONSC 1569, 264 A.C.W.S. (3d) 79 
 
  
Date Heard: February 18, 2016; February 19, 2016 
Judgment: March 4, 2016 
Parties John Matthew Donohue, Plaintiff 
Baja Mining Corp., John Greenslade, Rowland L. Wallenius, Michael Shaw, Adam Wright, 
and PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, Defendant 
Counsel Jonathan J. Foreman, Stephanie Legdon, Paul Bates, for Plaintiff 
Laura Cooper, Sarah Armstrong for Defendants, Baja Mining Corp., Michael Shaw and 
Adam Wright 
Helen Daley, for Defendants, John Greenslade and Rowland Wallenius 
Michael Schafler, for Defendant, PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP 
Judge/s L.C. Leitch J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiffs in class proceeding who acquired securities in defendant mining corporation 
alleged that defendants misrepresented cost of development of its primary asset. Plaintiff 
and defendants entered into settlement agreement that provided that certain defendants 
would pay $11,000,000.00 for benefit of class members. Retainer agreement with class 
counsel provided that class counsel could seek legal fees of 30 per cent of amount of any 
recovery obtained on behalf of class plus disbursements and taxes. Plaintiff brought motion 
for approval of settlement and class counsel fees.  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 32, 33. 




Class counsel and representative plaintiff entered into a CFA, which provided for: 
 30% of the amount of any recovery obtained on behalf of the class 
 + disbursements 
 + taxes 
 CFA also states that all of the above is only payable upon a successful outcome, 
settlement or judgement 
Class counsel seeks an order approving legal fees in the amout of $2.75 million (at a 25% 
rate, lower than CFA provides for) + $77,696.06 in disbursements and taxes. Notice of the 
proposed fee was included in the notice given to class members and there has been no 
objections as previously noted. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Whether or not the fees requested by class counsel “fair and reasonable.” 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. Settlement and requested legal fees approved. 
Very favourable outcome achieved in settlement, and legal fee 5% lower than maximum of 
what class could have expected. Additionally, there had been no objections to the legal fees 
and the representative plaintiff endorsed them.  
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McIntyre (Litigation guardian of) v. Ontario (2016 ONSC 2662) 




Date Heard: April 25, 2016 
Judgment: April 28, 2016 
Parties Sharon Clegg as Litigation Guardian of Marlene McIntyre, Representative Plaintiff of 
Certified Class Action 
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, Defendant 
Counsel Kirk Baert, Celeste Poltak, David Rosenfeld, for Plaintiff 
Robert Ratcliffe, Sonal Gandhi, for Defendant 
Judge/s Edward P. Belobaba J. 
Quick Facts “This is the fourth in a series of class actions, dealing with abuses in provincial "Schedule 
1" facilities, that has settled before trial. In each of the other three cases, Huronia, 
Rideau and Southwestern, Conway J. found the settlements to be fair and reasonable and 







CFA provided for: 
 contingency fee of up to 30% of settlement value (including notice and 
administration) 
Counsel only requests 9.67% contingency fee (i.e. $3.7 million), “They have wisely 
reduced their request to about 10 per cent, no doubt because of the legal fee payments 
already received from the Huronia, Rideau and Southwestern settlements.” (para 40)  
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Whether or not the requested fee is “fair and reasonable.” 
Outcome Held: Both settlement and legal fees approved. 
“The proposed settlement before me implements the same structure and compensation 
template as in the other three. Given that this settlement, in essence, has already been 
judicially approved three times, this court could have simply approved this fourth iteration 
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I. Aboriginal Issues/Groups 
Missanabic Cree First Nation V. Ontario (2011 Onsc 5196) 
2011 CarswellOnt 15345, 2011 ONSC 5196, [2011] O.J. No. 6569, 215 A.C.W.S. (3d) 814, 38 C.P.C. (7th) 385 
Quick Facts This case only mentions a CFA once and states that a CFA can only be applied to situations 
where damages may be awarded (i.e. cannot apply if the only possible remedy is a reserve): 
"However, these efforts have been unsuccessful. I accept that a [CFA] ... is not a viable 
option in this case because of the possibility that the only remedy obtained could be a 
reserve with no award of damages." 
 
Fontaine V. Canada (Attorney General) (2012 ONCA 471)  
– see later ONSC decision below 
2012 CarswellOnt 8351, 2012 ONCA 471, [2012] O.J. No. 3019, 111 O.R. (3d) 461, 217 A.C.W.S. (3d) 780, 295 
O.A.C. 127 
Date Heard: January 31, 2012 
Judgment: July 4, 2012 
Parties Duboff Edwards Haight & Schachter (DEHS), Appellant 
Chief Adjudicator, Respondent 
Counsel Harley Schachter, for Appellant 
Charles Hofley, Leanne N. r, for Respondent 
E.F. Anthony Merchant, Q.C., for Intervener (Merchant Law Group LLP) 
Catherine Coughlan, Dalal Mouallem, for Intervener (Attorney General of Canada) 
Judge/s M. Rosenberg J.A., Paul Rouleau J.A., R.G. Juriansz J.A. 
Quick Facts Under national settlement agreement with respect to Crown's role in residential schools, class 
members could obtain compensation for serious physical or sexual abuse through independent 
assessment process (IAP). Law firm entered into contingency fee agreement with client for 
30% of compensation awarded in IAP, which was maximum percentage permitted under 
agreement. When client did not seek review of fairness and reasonableness of legal fees after 
obtaining IAP award, IAP adjudicator undertook legal fee review on own motion and adjusted 
fee down to 20 per cent of compensation awarded. Law firm's appeal to chief adjudicator was 
dismissed, but law firm and chief adjudicator brought request for direction from 
administrative judge under agreement prior to law firm commencing application for judicial 
review. Administrative judge ruled that there was no right of appeal or judicial review from 
fee review decision. Law firm appealed. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, s. 2(1) 




In July 2006, the appellant entered into a CFA with one of its IAP clients for 30% of any 
compensation awarded. The client's claim was heard in April 2009 and the Adjudicator 
awarded $103,000. Legal fees claimed at 30% of the award were $30,900, plus applicable 
taxes totalling $3,708. The reported time value of DEHS' fees and disbursements when the 
claim hearing took place was $15,685.88. 




motion.  On June 30, 2009, the Adjudicator issued a ruling adjusting DEHS' proposed fee 
down to $20,600, plus taxes totalling $2,472. The approved fees reduced the 
30% contingency fee to 20% (15% to be paid by Canada, 5% to be paid by the client). After a 
further hearing regarding whether GST and PST owed on a compensation award was to be 
paid by Canada on behalf of the claimant, the reported time value of DEHS' fees and 
disbursements had increased from $15,685.88 to $27,532.18. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. Are there any circumstances in which a Chief Adjudicator's decision in the fee review 
process is reviewable by a judge of the Superior Court? 
B. Did the Administrative Judge err in not granting the specific directions requested by the 
appellant? 
Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed. Parties agreed to no costs orders.  
 A fee review decision of the Chief Adjudicator in the IAP is not reviewable by way of an 
appeal to the Superior Court, or by way of an application for judicial review to the Superior 
Court. The Chief Adjudicator's decision is only reviewable by an Administrative Judge 
through a Request for Direction under the CAP, but such review is available only in very 
limited circumstances. The appellant did not establish that the Chief Adjudicator's decision 
reflects a failure to comply with the S.A. or the implementation orders. 
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Fontaine V. Canada (Attorney General) (2015 ONSC 7007) 
 see earlier ONCA decision above 
2015 CarswellOnt 17295, 2015 ONSC 7007, 260 A.C.W.S. (3d) 462, 80 C.P.C. (7th) 136 
Date Judgment: November 13, 2015 
Parties Larry Philip Fontaine in his personal capacity and in his capacity as the Executor of the estate 
of Agnes Mary Fontaine, deceased et al, Plaintiffs 
The Attorney General of Canada, The Presbyterian Church in Canada et al, Defendants 
Counsel E. Anthony Ross, Q.C., Katrina Marciniak, for Applicants 
Leona K. Tesar, for Attorney General of Canada 
Judge/s Perell J. 
Quick Facts Federal government resolved proceedings relating to Indian Residential Schools (IRS) by 
entering into Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA). IRSSA included 
common experience payments for all Aboriginal persons who attended IRS's and separate 
claims process for Aboriginal persons who had suffered abuse at IRS's. Claimant was 82-year-
old disabled, unemployed, and impoverished Aboriginal woman who had been student at 
institution that was not yet recognized as IRS. Claimant brought motion for directions under 
IRSSA seeking advance costs award so she could pursue claims under IRSSA. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 31. 




NA – no CFA, see ‘Issue/s with Agreement’ below 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Issue was that plaintiff could not secure CFA/s: “For the lawyers, 
a contingency fee arrangement was useless to ameliorate the risk of the expense of providing 
the unpaid legal services needed to complete the RFD. A successful Article 12 RFD would 
result in adding the Fort William Sanatorium School to the IRSSA's list of IRSs, but there is 
no money to be earned in obtaining a declaration other than the normal legal costs that goes 
with winning, which was far from a sure thing, because this RFD was obviously going to be 
strongly resisted by Canada.” (para 39) 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. Mrs. Henry awarded costs. 
“In my opinion, in the special circumstances of Mrs. Henry's particular circumstances and in 
the special circumstances of an Article 12 RFD, it is in the public interest that Mrs. Henry 
have access to justice through an advance costs award.” (para 96) 





Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General) – earlier in the same year, another request for 
directions was brought in (2015 ONSC 3611), which made no mention of contingency fee 
issues. However, in the additional reasons (2015 ONSC 5431), delivered two and a half 
months before the second request for directions (summarized above), i.e. (2015 ONSC 7007), 
CFAs were briefly dealt with in terms of their relation to the determination of costs. 
In short, Perell J found that concerns around counsel choosing or not choosing to take on risk 
by being retained on a CFA is “not a matter relevant to the assessment of costs” (para 40). 
Perell J went on to order Canada to pay costs in the amount of $50,000 to the Applicants. 
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Williams V. Whitefish River First Nation (2014 ONSC 1817) 
2014 CarswellOnt 3426, 2014 ONSC 1817, 119 O.R. (3d) 551, 238 A.C.W.S. (3d) 731 
 
  
Date Heard: March 17, 2014 
Judgment: March 20, 2014 
Parties Williams, Plaintiff 
Whitefish River First Nation, Defendant 
Counsel R. Aaron Detlor, for Plaintiff 
Stephanie Kearns, for Defendant 
Judge/s Master R.A. Muir 
Quick Facts Plaintiff was lawyer. Plaintiff provided legal services to defendant. For most part, work 
involved representing defendant in connection with certain land claims and claim relating to 
delineation of boundaries of reserve. Plaintiff alleged that he was owed $163,000.00, and 
defendant denied that it owed anything to plaintiff. Registrar dismissed action for delay. 
Action was dismissed by registrar due to failure on part of plaintiff to comply with 
requirements of R. 48.14 of Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff brought motion for order 
setting aside order of registrar. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




Defendant takes the position that a portion of the work undertaken for them by the plaintiff 
was done on a contingency fee basis, and that the Plaintiff’s fee was conditional upon a 
successful resolution of the claims. However, the Defendant also claims that the CFA was 
unenforceable. (There is no explanation in the decision for either of the Defendant’s claims.) 
In general, Defendant denies that it owes anything to the plaintiff. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
NA – the CFA was mentioned once to the extent described above in ‘CFA Breakdown’ 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
“The plaintiff has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay encountered with 
this action as a whole and in bringing this motion. However, I am satisfied that the failure to 
meet the Rule 48.14 deadline was a result of inadvertence on the part of his lawyer. 
Importantly, the plaintiff has also satisfied the key consideration of prejudice.”| 
Followed: 744142 Ontario Ltd. v. Ticknor Estate (2012 – Ont Master) 
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Ross V. Pinaymootang First Nation (2015 ONSC 3274) 
2015 CarswellOnt 7991, 2015 ONSC 3274, 255 A.C.W.S. (3d) 873 
Date Heard: May 17, 2015; May 18, 2015; May 19, 2015 
Judgment: June 1, 2015 
Parties E. Anthony Ross, Plaintiff 
Pinaymootang First Nation, also known as Fairford First Nation, also known as Fairford Band 
and Harris & Harris LLP, also known as Harris & Harris, Defendants 
Counsel Tanya Walker, Andrew Ostrom, for Plaintiff 
Darryl R. Buxton, for Defendant, Pinaymootang First Nation, also known as Fairford First 
Nation, also known as Fairford Band 
Douglas Christie, for Defendant, Harris & Harris LLP, also known as Harris & Harris 
Judge/s Diamond J. 
Quick Facts First nations band hired lawyer to commence proceedings against Federal Government for 
damages arising out of construction of water control structures – signing a CFA retainer. 
Lawyer joined new firm but continued to represent band. Action on behalf of band was 
unsuccessful, although court found Province of Manitoba was responsible for band's damages. 
Appeals were undertaken but settlement agreement was reached. New firm sent invoices to 
band, who did not pay on grounds that no relationship existed between band and new firm. 
Lawyer left new firm. New firm brought action against band. Band terminated original CFA 
retainer agreement. Band, lawyer and new firm signed memorandum of understanding. 
Amount of $950,000.00 was to be made payable from settlement funds forthcoming from 
Government of Canada, and payment of second and third tranches were essentially dependent 
upon further settlement funds to be obtained by band from Province of Manitoba. Band 
council ratified settlement for less than amount of agreement, which lawyer claimed ended 
settlement. Lawyer brought action against band and new firm. Two-way settlement was 
reached between new firm and lawyer, and three way settlement between lawyer, new firm, 
and band was reached regarding all proceedings for payment. Proceedings by lawyer against 
band were stayed under consent judgment. Band paid only first installment of settlement 








Pinaymootang First Nation (aka Fairford First Nation) retained Ross on or about August 23, 
1994, effective February 26, 1992, through a CFA retainer. Scope of retainer was to 
commence proceedings against Gov. of Canada and Prov. of Manitoba in Federal Court. The 
CFA provided for: 
 9% contingency fee of any future judgement or award 
 if retainer were terminated, terms of the agreement provided that Ross would be 
compensated for services rendered to the date of termination 
In December 1996 Ross moved to a new firm, but with the formal agreement that the new 
firm has no legal or financial interest in the files belonging to Ross, which were opened prior 
to the relationship commencing with the new law firm (i.e. Harris). After Fairfold was 
unsuccessful in their claim, Harris issued a Statement of Claim against Fairford seeking, inter 
alia, payment of its outstanding fees and disbursements totalling $1,729,846.92 in December 
2001. Ross commenced his own additional action, naming both Fairfold and Harris as 





order consolidating his action with the earlier Harris action [“Ross Action”]. In or around late 
January 2004, Fairford terminated Ross' CFA retainer agreement and retained Robert Roddick 
("Roddick") as its new counsel. By that time, Ross' docketed time had accumulated and 
totaled in excess of $3,500,000.00.  
Under the three-way settlement, Fairford was to pay the sum of $2,150,000.00 to Harris in 
three tranches: $950,000.00, $650,000.00 and $550,000.00. 
Under the two-way settlement, Ross and Harris further agreed that payment of the first 
$950,000.00 due under the three-way settlement, would be distributed as follows: (a) 
$445,594.50 to Ross; (b) $475,000.00 to Harris; (c) the balance of $29,405.50 paid in trust to 
the credit of the Harris Action. 
(see ‘Quick Facts’ for more) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
On August 11, 2005, Fairford (through Roddick) delivered trust cheques to both Ross and 
Harris of all three amounts contemplated under the two-way settlement agreement. The first 
$950,000 was fully paid on August 11, 2005. Fairford never paid the second $650,000 
installment due on January 1, 2006. Fairford never paid the third $550,000 installment due on 
or before January 1, 2007. Issues in decision dealt with this ‘fall-out’, and did not engage 
CFA issues directly, but instead focussed on how the earlier proceedings precluded, or did not 
preclude Ross from taking further action against Fairfold. 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed. 
“…there are not grounds to support an order varyig the consent judgement and.or lifting the 
stay of the Ross Action, Ross is therefore unable to take any further steps, other than 
enforcement steps, in the Ross Action.” (para 93) 
Followed: McCowan v. McCowan (1995 – Ont CA); Monarch Construction Ltd. v. Buildevco 
Ltd. (1988 – Ont CA) 
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II.  Corporate/Commercial 
 
Heydary Hamilton Professional Corp. V. Hanuka (2010 ONCA 881) 
2010 CarswellOnt 9782, 2010 ONCA 881, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 905, 272 O.A.C. 271 
 
  
Date Heard: November 24, 2010 
Judgment: December 21, 2010 
Parties Heydary Hamilton Professional Corporation (plaintiff), Appellant 
Thakar Baweja, Rajiv Baweja, also known as Roger Baweja, 6369162 Canada Inc., Ben 
Vladlen Hanuka and Davis Moldaver LLP (Defendants), Respondents 
Counsel Douglas Elliott, Ruzbeh Hosseini, for Appellant 
David Silver, for Respondents (Ben Vladlen Hanuka, Davis Moldaver LLP) 
Judge/s E.A. Cronk J.A., J. MacFarland J.A., Janet Simmons J.A. 
Quick Facts On October 19, 2007, initial lawyers (appellant) were retained on CFA in franchise dispute. 
Initial lawyers notified former clients that negotiating terms of lease was beyond scope of 
retainer agreement. Successor lawyers acted for former clients regarding lease. Successor 
lawyers served notice of change of solicitors on initial lawyers. Invoice from initial lawyers 
was unpaid. Initial lawyers claimed that successor lawyers were involved in scheme to assist 
former clients in avoiding compensation of initial lawyers. Initial lawyers brought action 
against former clients and against successor lawyers for conspiracy, inducing breach of 
contract and unlawful interference with economic interests. Successor lawyers' motion for 
summary judgment was granted. Initial lawyers appealed. 






CFA retainer between the appellant and the former clients required that the former clients 
pay the appellant $50,000 up front plus 27% of any future judgment or settlement proceeds. 
The retainer agreement also provided that it could be terminated within 15 days of the date of 
the agreement, and "[t]hereafter ... only by agreement between the parties or, if required, in 
accordance with the Law Society of Upper Canada Rules of Professional Conduct." 
During the period between October 2007 and November 2009 (when successor lawyers 
served a notice of change of solicitors), the appellant accrued approximately $63,998.70 in 




The main issue on appeal is whether the motion judge erred in striking out the appellant's 
claim against the successor lawyers for inducing breach of contract and intentional 
interference with economic interests for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action. 
Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed with costs to the successor lawyers on a substantial indemnity basis, 
fixed in the amount of $8,488.25, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes. 
“We see no basis for holding that the motion judge erred in failing to grant leave to amend. 
The allegations made by the appellant are serious allegations of professional misconduct. No 
facts were pleaded that are capable of supporting those allegations.” (para 16)  
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Chrusz V. Cheadle Johnson Shanks Macivor (2010 ONCA 553) 
2010 CarswellOnt 5896, 2010 ONCA 553, [2010] O.J. No. 3441, 191 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1106, 272 O.A.C. 1 
Date Heard: May 21, 2010 
Judgment: August 16, 2010 
Parties Daniel Chrusz and Poli-Fibreglass Industries (Thunder Bay) Ltd., Appellants 
Cheadle Johnson Shanks MacIvor aka Cheadles LLP, Robert D. Weiler Q.C. and Petrone 
Hornak Garofalo Mauro, Respondents 
Counsel Roderick W. Johansen for Appellants 
J. Douglas Crane, Q.C. for Respondent, Petrone Hornak Garofalo Mauro 
John W. Erickson, Q.C. for Respondents Cheadle Johnson Shanks MacIvor 
Judge/s J. McComb J. (ad hoc), K. Swinton J. (ad hoc), and Wilton-Siegel J. (ad hoc) 
Quick Facts Clients were involved in two actions. Firm Petrone replaced Firm Cheadle as counsel for 
clients. Clients and Firms reached mediated Settlement Agreement (SA) regarding payment to 
Firms. After actions were settled and settlement funds received, clients instructed Firm P not 
to pay Firm C. Clients brought application for determination of rights under SA and 
declaration of amount payable by clients to Firms or order referring issue to assessment 
officer. Firm C brought cross-application for determination of rights under SA and declaration 
confirming amount due to it under SA. Application judge found SA was fair and reasonable 
and determined $177,344.18 was payable to Firm C and $300,576.67 was payable to Firm P. 
Clients appealed. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 




Settlement Agreement provided, among other things that: 
1. the "recovery amount" in the actions would be split one-third with the lawyers and the 
balance to Chrusz; 
2. Cheadle and Petrone would divide the amount allocated to the lawyers on a 30/70 basis; 
3. costs in the action would be split on the basis of 50% to Chrusz and the balance 
apportioned 70/30 in favour of Petrone; and 
4. a consent charging order would be granted to Cheadle to secure a solicitor's lien in its 
favour over any proceeds of the litigation or costs and a consent order would be granted by 
Cheadle releasing the litigation files to Petrone. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
The Appellants raised the general issue of whether the Settlement Agreement was enforceable 
as a CFA given the provisions of the Act at the time of execution of the Agreement (i.e. pre-
2010 changes to the contingency fee legislation).  
Outcome Held: Appeal allowed in part. Appellants ordered to pay $15,000 in costs to the Respondent 
(Cheadle) 
The application judge did not err in concluding that the Agreement was reasonable in respect 
of Cheadle, notwithstanding the considerations raised by the Appellants, for two reasons. 
First, the current rules pertaining to contingency fee arrangements do not apply retrospectively 
[Section 28 of the Act as it existed in 2000 did not render contingency fee agreements void ab 
initio. (para 27)]. Second, while these provisions identify considerations that should be taken 
into account, they must be addressed as part of an evaluation of the totality of the arrangement 
between Cheadle and the Appellants. The particular elements of the arrangement identified by 
the Appellants are not such as to render the arrangement unreasonable on their own. (para 40) 
Appeal allowed in part with respect to the determination of the amount of the fees owing to 
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Morrison V. Morrison (2010 ONSC 6268) 
2010 CarswellOnt 8701, 2010 ONSC 6268, [2011] W.D.F.L. 385, [2011] W.D.F.L. 386, [2011] W.D.F.L. 392, 
[2011] W.D.F.L. 394, 194 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1213 
Date Heard: October, 2010 
Judgement: November, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Glen Everald Morrison 
Defendant: Theresa Calara Morrison 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Mr. G. E. Morrison for himself 
For Defendant: Mr. Michael H. Tweyman for Respondent 
Judge/s Then: MacKenzie J. 
Quick Facts CFA agreement discussed within the context of spousal support payments, and CFA not at 
issue: "The position of the applicant is quite simply that his only source of income is 
approximately $39,000.00 per annum from his pensions and that although he has been 
involved on a part-time or ad hoc basis with the Business transferred by him to his daughter, 
such involvement has been strictly on a pro bono basis since he was diagnosed with a form of 
cancer in 2008. As to the basis on which the Business generates its income, his position is that 
the retainer/compensation agreements entered into by the clients of the Business provide only 




Petrone, the issue of fairness and reasonableness is remitted to the Superior Court of Justice. 
Followed: Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.); Housen v. 
Nikolaisen (2002), 10 C.C.L.T. (3d) 157, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 577 
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Heydary Hamilton Professional Corp. V. Baweja (2011 ONSC 2568) 
2011 CarswellOnt 2877, 2011 ONSC 2568, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 349 
Quick Facts "On October 19, 2007 Thakar retained the Lawyers to prosecute a franchise dispute against 
Druxy's." MOTION to set aside an Order for Assessement. 




27% contingency fee: "Thakar signed a written retainer agreement... "an initial flat fee 
retainer in the amount of $50,000"... [plus a] "partial contingency fee" by which Thakar 
would pay the Lawyers "with reference to the actual amounts actually recovered inclusive of 
interest, but exclusive of the initial $50,000.00 or any amount awarded...in respect of costs 
and disbursements (the "Recovery Amount"), twenty-seven per cent (27%) of any Recovery 
Amount." "The Agreement confirmed that if costs of the Action were awarded to the Clients 
and paid to the Lawyers they "would be deducted from any fee payable to" the Lawyers. The 
Agreement had the following termination provision:” 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
"… The issue is what the Clients should be required to pay for that work." "The Lawyers are 
of the view that in accordance with the Agreement they are entitled to the [$50k] simply for 
the privilege of retaining the Lawyers and thereafter they are entitled to 27% of recovery or in 
the event of termination, [$50k] plus the greater of 27% of recovery or of time based fees... 
their position is that they are entitled to the $50,000 in addition to their time based fees for 
which they have rendered an account for [$64k]"  "The issue is this: In the event of recovery, 
are the Lawyers entitled to the $50,000 retainer plus their contingency based fees of 27% of 
recovery or is the $50,000 retainer part of and deducted from their contingency based fees? In 
the event of termination before recovery (as is the case here), are the quantum meruit fees to 
which the Lawyers are entitled $50,000 plus their time based (or contingency based) fees or 
must the $50,000 be deducted from their time based (or contingency based) fees? In this 
Assessment the issue in dispute is whether the [$50k] retainer is to be treated as part of or in 
addition to the time based fees and disbursements of [$64k]" 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed.  
"In my view, the determination of whether the Lawyers are entitled to $50,000 plus time 
based fees or whether the Lawyers must account for the $50,000 retainer as part of time based 
fees is a matter relating solely to the quantum of the account." "Given my determination that 
the Order for Assessment stands, section 6(4) [of the Solictors Act] prevents the Lawyers from 




Simpson V. Bridgewater Bank (2012 ONSC 2191) 
2012 CarswellOnt 5054, 2012 ONSC 2191, 18 C.L.R. (4th) 257, 215 A.C.W.S. (3d) 326 
Quick Facts This case details the interaction between a CFA agreement and indemnity costs: "The 
existence of a [CFA] does not affect the amount or any right or remedy for the recovery of 
costs payable by a third party to a client. However, the client who has entered into the [CFA] 
is not entitled to recover more than the amount payable by the client to the client's own 
solicitor under the agreement. See sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the Solicitors Act, as noted in 
Orkin, The Law of Costs..."" "The [CFA] between Mr. Simpson and his solicitors is that he 
will not be required to pay unless he is successful.... if Mr. Simpson is successful, the 
solicitors "... will recover based on standard billing rates plus premium for risk" in accordance 




Indcondo Building Corp. V. Sloan (2012 ONCA 83) 
 – see second ONCA decision below 
2012 CarswellOnt 1742, 2012 ONCA 83, 18 C.P.C. (7th) 223, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811, 347 D.L.R. (4th) 119 
 
  
Date Heard: February 2, 2012 
Judgment: February 7, 2012 
Parties Indcondo Building Corporation (plaintiff), Appellant  
Valerie Frances Sloan, David Robin Sloan and Cave Hill Properties Ltd. (defendants), 
Respondents 
Counsel Philip P. Healey, for Appellant 
P. James Zibarras, Trung Nguyen, for Respondents 
Judge/s Robert P. Armstrong J.A. 
Quick Facts Law firm for appellant was retained on contingency basis. It was accepted that appellant 
corporation and its principal were impecunious, and had been so found in previous motion for 
security for costs. Appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs below and costs of 
appeal. Respondents brought motion seeking order requiring law firm for appellant to pay into 
court $300,000 as security for costs of action, which was dismissed as abuse of process, and 
also to pay into court $75,000 as security for costs of appeal. (see more detailed Facts in 2nd 
chart below) 






Details of CFA not provided, see ‘Quick Facts’ 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
The respondents argue that lawyers who act on a contingency basis and who have accepted 
the risk of bearing the plaintiff's costs of litigation should be treated no differently than the 
plaintiff would be treated when it comes to the costs obligations to a successful defendant. 
(para 5) 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed without costs. 
“…as a matter of principle, the lawyer who acts on a contingency fee basis is already carrying 
the significant risk of not being paid and, as in this case, being stuck with the costs of paying 
the disbursements. To add the additional burden of posting security for costs would no doubt 
have a chilling effect on those lawyers who might otherwise make their services available on a 
contingency basis — thus creating another problem for access to justice.” (para 7) 
Followed: Intellibox Concepts Inc. v. Intermec Technologies Canada Ltd. (2005), 2005 
CarswellOnt 1603, [2005] O.T.C. 310, 14 C.P.C. (6th) 339 (Ont. S.C.J.) 
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Indcondo Building Corp. V. Sloan (2012 Onca 502) – Appeal And Motion For Review 
Of (2012 ONCA 83) 
 – see above 
2012 CarswellOnt 9030, 2012 ONCA 502, 217 A.C.W.S. (3d) 540, 22 C.P.C. (7th) 22, 293 O.A.C. 392, 352 D.L.R. 
(4th) 235, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 324 
Date Heard: March 14, 2012 
Judgment: July 18, 2012 
Parties Indcondo Building Corporation (plaintiff), Appellant  
Valerie Frances Sloan, David Robin Sloan and Cave Hill Properties Ltd. (defendants), 
Respondents – brought this motion 
Counsel P. James Zibarras, Trung Nguyen, for Appellant 
Philip P. Healey, Miranda Spence, for Respondents 
Judge/s S.T. Goudge, Robert J. Sharpe, R.G. Juriansz JJ.A. 
Quick Facts Impecunious plaintiff was judgment creditor of defendant David Sloan (DS). DS allegedly 
fraudulently conveyed or preferred certain property to others to defeat plaintiff's claim. 
Plaintiff brought action to set aside allegedly fraudulent or preferential conveyances 
("2002 action"). DS subsequently became bankrupt, 2002 action was stayed by operation 
of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and plaintiff proved claim in bankruptcy. DS was 
subsequently discharged, and obtained Act order dismissing 2002 action. Plaintiff then 
retained counsel on contingency basis to pursue derivative trustee action against bankrupt 
and related defendants said to be recipients of fraudulent or preferential conveyances 
pursuant to s. 38 of Act ("2008 action"). DS brought motion to dismiss 2008 action as 
abuse of process as, inter alia, res judicata of 2002 action. Motion was granted, 2008 
action was dismissed and plaintiff appealed. Defendant brought motion for order 
compelling counsel for plaintiff to post security for costs of appeal and of proceedings 
below personally (see above chart). Motion was dismissed and now the defendant has 
brought a motion for review. (Thus, there are two matters dealt with in this decision: 1) 
motion for review brought by defendant; and 2) appeal.) 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s 38, a 178(2) 




NA – see  Indcondo Building Corp. v. Sloan (2012 ONCA 83) above 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
NA – see  Indcondo Building Corp. v. Sloan (2012 ONCA 83) above 
(Appeal itself not directly relevant to CFA.) 
Outcome Held: Appeal allowed and motion to review dismissed. “The appellant is entitled to its 
costs for the motion and in this court, including the review of the order of Armstrong J.A. 
and the appeal itself.” (para 34)  
Goudge J.A. agreed with reasons of Armstrong J.A. to dismiss motion (see chart above), a 
successful motion would have required that the appeal be deemed “frivolous” per Rule 
61.06… which clearly was not the case (per Goudge J.A.) given that it was allowed. 
Additional Reasons 
in Incondo Building 
Corp v Sloan (2012 
ONCA 619) 
Additional reasons relating to costs of judgement reported in this decision were delivered by 
S.T. Goudge J.A., Robert J. Sharpe J.A., R.G. Juriansz J.A. (same judges as on this 
appeal/motion) on September 21, 2012.  
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Rbc Life Insurance Co. V. Janson (2013 ONSC 3154) 
2013 CarswellOnt 8593, 2013 ONSC 3154, 116 O.R. (3d) 264, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 851 
Quick Facts Only mention of CFA: "It should have come as no surprise that RBC Life balked at paying an 
account provided by a firm it did not retain and calculated on the basis of a contingency 
arrangement not previously disclosed to or accepted by RBC Life. No description was 
provided of the services rendered except the statement in the accompanying correspondence 
that the firm had acted for Mr. Janson "through three appeal levels (Claims, Appeals, Tribunal) 
and continue to do so." As noted, despite the wording of the policy, RBC Life offered to 
contribute $6,500 towards costs in May, 2011 notwithstanding the fact that the law firm did not 




Stojanovic V. Bulut (2014 ONSC 672) 




Date Heard: November 29, 2013 
Judgment: January 29, 2014 
Parties Miodrag Stojanovic, Plaintiff (Responding party) 
Nikola Bulut (aka Nicolas Bulut), Steven Bulut, Marko N. Bulut, 1091369 Ontario Inc. and 
1112618 Ontario Inc., Defendants (Moving parties) 
Counsel J. Kleiman, for Plaintiff / Responding Party 
P. Jervis, for Defendant / Moving Party 
Judge/s Master C. Albert 
Quick Facts Defendants asked court to order plaintiff to post security for costs of $217,918.35 and to 
submit to further examination for discovery. Plaintiff was resident of Belgrade in State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro. In action plaintiff sought to recover $1,368,923 that he claimed he 
paid in kind by providing equivalent value in pulp products to Serbian government corporation 
to satisfy guarantee. He claimed to have guaranteed funds given by corporation to defendant 
NB. He hoped to recover money by forcing sale of land registered to defendant numbered 
company in Ontario. Principal of numbered company was defendant SB, son of NB. Plaintiff 
alleged that NB fraudulently transferred assets to his son to prevent plaintiff from realizing on 
his Serbian judgment, and brought motion for security of costs. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




MS entered into a CFA with Mr. Genereaux, which provided for: 
 30% contingency fee 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
The Buluts allege that the CFA between the plaintiff, MS and Mr. Genereaux makes Mr. 
Genereaux a litigation creditor and creates an obligation on the part of Mr. Stojanovic to obtain 
the funds to post security for costs from Mr. Genereaux to fund Mr. Stojanovic's litigation. 
“The issue is whether a lawyer who accepts a deferred fee arrangement should be required to 
post security for costs.” (para 41) 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. 
On CFA issue: “In my view a lawyer who accepts such a fee arrangement is not a commercial 
creditor. Rather, such a lawyer is providing access to justice to litigants who may not otherwise 
have sufficient liquidity to participate in time consuming and costly litigation. It would not be 
good policy for the court to provide a disincentive to lawyers willing to take cases on 
a contingency basis and risk an unsuccessful result.” (para 41) 
“Having found that Mr. Stojanovic has no assets in Ontario and is neither impecunious nor in 
an involuntary position of financial hardship, and further finding that his claim does not have a 
strong chance of success, THIS COURT ORDERS THAT Mr. Stojanovic pay into court 
security for costs…” (para 57) 
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Hames V. Greenberg (2014 ONSC 245) 
2014 CarswellOnt 664, 2014 ONSC 245, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 649, 23 B.L.R. (5th) 117 
 
  
Date Heard: December 13, 2013 
Judgment: January 20, 2014 
Parties Richard Hames, R. Hames Family Trust and BHCC Services Inc., Applicants 
Stanley Greenberg, S. Greenberg Family Trust, Zvia Wered, Josip Zaborski, J. Zaborski 
Family Trust, Sabatino Cipro, S. Cipro Family Trust, 1327519 Ontario Inc., Residential 
Energy Savings Products Inc. and Consumer's Choice Home Improvements Corp., 
Respondents 
Counsel L. Munro, for Applicants 
M. Klaiman, for individual Respondents 
J. Levitt, for corporate Respondents 
Judge/s D.M. Brown J. 
Quick Facts Shareholders Hames (H), Greenberg (G), Zaborski (Z), and Cipro (C) and their respective 
trusts held shares in corporation that owned two subsidiaries. H was allegedly excluded from 
all corporate matters including payouts when he announced his intention to retire. H and his 
trust commenced action against other shareholders, their trusts, corporation, and subsidiaries 
for relief from oppression. H and his trust brought motion for order requiring corporation to 
pay interim costs 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




Greenberg filed an affidavit deposing that Hames once told him that he had "a special 
arrangement with Lerners wherein they had agreed to accept payment at the end of the case, 
rather than requiring payment on an ongoing basis for fees incurred". (para 57) 
Greenberg thought Hames meant a contingency fee arrangement. Hames denied making any 
such statements and deposed: "My retainer agreement with Lerners LLP is not now and never 
has been on a contingency fee basis. I am required to pay all legal fees and expenses, as they 
are incurred." (para 57) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
NA – the only mention of contingency fees in the lengthy decision is in paragraph 57 – which 
I have recreated above. There were no contingency fee issues per se and the above was 
developed any further later in the judgement. 
Outcome Held: Motion granted in part. Interim costs awarded to Hames. 
Followed: Alles v. Maurice (1992 – Ont Gen Div) 
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Siskinds Llp V. Canadian Imperial Bank Of Commerce  
– not a traditional CFA under Solicitors Act – likely not relevant for your purposes but included just in case 




Date Heard: January 22, 2014 
Judgment: May 28, 2014 
Parties Siskinds LLP, Plaintiff 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Defendant 
Counsel E. Cherniak, Q.C., J. Squire, for Plaintiff 
P. LeVay, J. Safayeni, for Defendant 
Judge/s D.M. Brown J. 
Quick Facts Parties entered into agreement pursuant to which plaintiff would collect debts owing to 
defendant and would receive percentage of amounts collected (agreement). Part of the work 
the plaintiff completed for the defendant was work on “opposition files”, essentially files on 
which an opposition to a BIA discharge had been filed and which might require court 
attendances. CIBC paid Siskinds a contingency fee on "opposition files".  
Section 15(d) of agreement included clause stating that that if agreement was terminated, 
plaintiff could invoice defendant for services performed up to date of termination (disputed 
clause). Plaintiff's interpretation of disputed clause was that it entitled plaintiff to be 
compensated in respect of payments made by debtors after termination date. Defendant's 
interpretation of disputed clause was that plaintiff was only entitled to fees on payments 
received up until termination date. Defendant terminated agreement. Plaintiff commenced 
action claiming compensation based on its interpretation of disputed clause. Plaintiff brought 
motion for partial summary judgment, and defendant brought cross-motion for summary 







CIBC paid Siskinds a contingency fee on "opposition files", ranging from 30% all inclusive to 
35% plus costs plus taxes, depending upon the file. 
CIBC also paid Siskinds a 10% contingency fee on all payments received, prior to the 
termination date of June 30, 2011, on the Siskinds Files.  
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
NA – see ‘Outcome’ 
Outcome Held: Motion dismissed; cross-motion granted. 
“I see little if any resemblance between the work performed by Siskinds under the 2008 
Business Agreement and that performed by lawyers under traditional [CFAs] because 
Siskinds performed largely clerical, administrative debt monitoring and collection work using 
non-legal staff under its agreement with the CIBC.” (para 58) 
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Hervé Pomerleau Ontario Inc. V. Ottawa (City) (2014 ONSC 1496) 




Date Judgment: March 7, 2014 
Parties  Defendant counsel not named in decision. 
Counsel David Elliott, Christopher McLeod, for Plaintiff 
Ronald Caza, Alyssa Tomkins, for Defendant 
Judge/s Albert Roy J. 
Quick Facts Defendant successfully defended plaintiff's action. Defendant submitted that costs should be 
awarded on substantial indemnity basis because of repeated allegations of bad faith on part of 
plaintiff toward defendant. Parties made submissions regarding costs  
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 131. 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 20(2). 




Fee agreement provided for: 
 blended rate of $171/hour 
 if costs awarded by the Court were in excess of the blended rate, excess would be 
shared by counsel and Defendant 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
An ancillary issue to the main costs disagreement: Is the fee agreement a CFA? Counsel 
for the Defendant asserts that it is. 
Outcome Held: Fixed costs awarded  (see paras 14-15 for details) 
“Plaintiff's language may well have been exaggerated and colorful but I made no findings that 
the Plaintiff conducted the litigation in a reprehensible or outrageous manner.” (para 3)  
On fee agreement: “I disagree with counsel that this is a contingency agreement. Nor would I 
categorize it as Plaintiff counsel has a risk premium which have been referred to in the 
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Walker v. Ritchie [citation removed] and usually 
involves counsel representing an impecunious Plaintiff.” 
Followed: Dunstan v. Flying J Travel Plaza (2007 – Ont SCJ); Mantella v. Mantella (2006 – 
Ont SCJ); Wasserman, Arsenault Ltd. v. Sone (2000 – Ont SCJ) 
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Evans Sweeny Bordin Llp V. Zawadzki (2015 ONSC 869)  
– see  ONCA decision below 




Date Heard: February 5, 2015 
Judgment: February 6, 2015 
Parties Evans Sweeny Bordin LLP, solicitors 
 Joseph Zawadzki, Frenchmen's Creek Estates Inc. and 550075 Ontario Inc., clients 
Counsel Mr. Michael Bordin, for Solicitors 
Mr. William L. Roland, for Clients 
Judge/s J.A. Ramsay J. 
Quick Facts Three invoices for legal services were referred to an assessment officer by order of a judge. 
The assessment officer made a report on December 10, 2013. The assessment officer allowed 
$268,354.13 of $812,543.91 in fees. He added pre-judgment interest of $29,333.87. He 
deducted $4,691.86 for fees already paid and $47,870.62 for costs of the assessment. His final 
certificate, then, required the clients to pay $245,125.52. The clients submit that the fees 
should be further reduced. The solicitors accept the $268,354 for fees, but submit that the 
assessment officer should not have disallowed the $500,000 bonus that was provided for in a 








Of the approximately $800,000 in fees submitted for assessment, $500,000 were payable 




A. Did the assessment officer have the jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the CFA? 
B. If yes, was the assessment officer’s conclusion unreasonable? 
Outcome Held: Report of assessment officer varied (see para 35 for details) 
A. “…assessment officer can decide the validity of a [CFA] only if the question is referred to 
him, and that an assessment officer has no jurisdiction to decide whether such a contract is fair 
and reasonable. In the case at bar, nothing to do with the [CFA] was referred to the assessment 
officer. He acted without jurisdiction.” (para 12)  “Under the order of Tucker J., the entire 
amount is now payable.” (para 16) 
B.  Yes. “The assessment officer's conclusion was unreasonable. I would have set it aside on 
that ground if I had thought that he had jurisdiction.” (para 34)   
Followed:  Girao v. Bogoroch & Associates (2012 ONSC 2495);  Williams (Litigation 
Guardian of) v. Bowler (2006) (Ont SCJ) 
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Evans Sweeny Bordin Llp V. Zawadzki (2015 ONCA 756)  
– SEE ONSC DECISION ABOVE 
2015 CarswellOnt 16984, 2015 ONCA 756, 127 O.R. (3d) 510, 259 A.C.W.S. (3d) 380, 342 O.A.C. 160, 393 
D.L.R. (4th) 399, 80 C.P.C. (7th) 1 
 
  
Date Heard: October 20, 2015 
Judgment: November 9, 2015 
Parties Joseph Zawadzki, Frenchmen’s Creek Estates Inc. and 550075, Appellant 
Evans Sweeny Bordin LLP, Respondent 
Counsel William L. Roland, for Appellant 
Michael Bordin, for Respondent 
Judge/s E.E. Gillese, P. Lauwers, David Brown JJ.A. 
Quick Facts Pursuant to CFA, land owners and developers (“owner” – now appellant) agreed to pay 
solicitors a bonus of $500,000 in the event their appeal from final order of foreclosure was 
granted. The appeal was granted and solicitors (now respondent) rendered account for just 
over $700,000, including the bonus. Owner obtained order to assess account, assessment 
officer reduced amount, and held that CFA was not fair or reasonable. Both parties moved to 
oppose confirmation of assessment officer's report. Motions judge held that assessment officer 
lacked jurisdiction to consider fairness and reasonableness of fee agreement and concluded 
that agreement was fair and reasonable. Owner appealed. 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 3. 




On October 17, 2007, the parties entered into a CFA governing the appellants’ retainer of the 
respondents, to represent them in an appeal of their initial failed application for relief from 
foreclosure.  Under the CFA, the appellants agreed to pay the respondents "the full sum of all 
legal fees and all disbursements incurred by the Law Firm." And that,   "In the event that the 
appeal is granted, the Law Firm shall be paid $500,000...The above amounts shall be due and 
payable to the Law Firm within 60 days of the granting... of the appeal." 
The appeal was granted by order of the ONCA dated February 6, 2008. The respondents 




A. Was the CFA fair and reasonable? 
B. And, did the assessment officer have the jurisdiction to make determinations of the fairness 
and reasonableness of the CFA? 
Outcome Held: Appeal dismissed. Appellants ordered to pay the respondents $11,000 in costs 
(including disbursements and HST) 
The motions judge correctly found that the assessment officer lacked jurisdiction to consider 
the fairness and reasonableness of the contingency fee agreement. The record before the 
motions judge enabled him to assess fairly the agreement, and there is no basis for appellate 
intervention in his conclusion that the agreement was fair and reasonable. 
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G M Textiles Inc V. Sidhu (2016 ONSC 2055) 




Date Heard: September 30, 2013; January 2, 2014; January 3, 2014; January 28, 2014; June 30, 
2014; July 2, 2014; July 3, 2014; July 4, 2014; April 13, 2015; April 14, 2015; April 16, 2015; 
April 30, 2015; January 26, 2016; March 1, 2016; March 9, 2016 
Judgment: March 23, 2016 
Parties G M Textiles Inc., Gurdev Singh Grewal, and Mohinder Singh Matharoo, Applicants 
Fateh Singh Sidhu, et al, Respondents 
Counsel M. Solmon, F. Damji, for Applicants 
M. Simaan, for Respondents 
Judge/s Robert B. Reid J. 
Quick Facts Applicants invested and loaned money to several Popeye’s franchise businesses.  The 
corporate respondents were the operating companies and companies which had leasehold 
interests in the businesses. Mr. Fateh Singh Sidhu was the principal of the companies and was 
in charge of running the businesses.  On June 14, 2012, all the legal proceedings were settled 
and Minutes of Settlement were executed. A final judgment was granted on July 20, 2012 for 
approximately $1.7 million for the applicants against the respondents. Prior to the execution 
of the Minutes of Settlement, a number of court orders were made, some of which continued 
in force. Applicants brought two motions to the court seeking findings of contempt against the 








Counsel for the applicants worked under a CFA, which provided for “a significant increase in 
the billed hourly rate in the event of success” (para 68). The CFA was not court approved. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
CFA was only at issue in the final determination of costs awarded against the respondents. 
Outcome Held: Motions granted. 
Reid J: “I found that Fateh Singh Sidhu was in contempt as a result of numerous failures to 
comply with multiple terms of six orders of this court” (para 2). 
And, since the “…contingency fee agreement has not been approved in advance by the court. I 
do not consider it appropriate to impose that obligation on the respondents [in the 
determination of costs].” (para 68) Respondents ordered to pay applicants $369,644.26 
(inclusive of HST and disbursements). 
Followed:  Sussex Group Ltd. v. Fangeat (2003 – Ont SCJ) 
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III.  Employment Issues 
 
Loreto V. Little (2010 ONSC 755) 
2010 CarswellOnt 916, 2010 ONSC 755, [2010] O.J. No. 679, 185 A.C.W.S. (3d) 230 
Date Heard: January/February, 2010 
Judgement: February, 2010 
Parties Plaintiff: Loreto 
Defendants: Little; Morello; Segreto; Vettese; Borello; Miranda; Sawczak; Morello, Vettese, 
Segreto LLP 
Counsel For Plaintiff: Jonathan Speigel for Plaintiff 
For Defendants: Enzo Di Iorio, Melissa Mackovski 
Judge/s Then: Edward Belobaba J. 
Quick Facts Termination of an employee at a firm, and what amount of compensation the terminated 
employee was entitled to, given that most of the firm's employees were billed through CFAs. 





30% CFA: "The legal fee was 30% of the total amount recovered less disbursements which 
had to be paid in any event by the client. If the retainer was terminated by either LLM or the 
client … the client agreed to pay for the time that had been spent on the file to date at the 
prevailing hourly rates..." 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
 NA – CFA was not considered 




Tossonian V. Cynphany Diamonds Inc. (2015 ONSC 766) 
 – additional reasons relating to costs of judgement in (2014 ONSC 7484) 




Date Judgment: February 3, 2015 
Parties Razmig Tossonian, Plaintiff 
Cynphany Diamonds Inc., o/a Symphony Diamonds, Defendant 
Counsel Andrew Wray, Christian Vernon, Niiti Simmonds, for Plaintiff 
William Chalmers, for Defendant 
Judge/s Graeme Mew J. 
Quick Facts Plaintiff commenced application for wrongful dismissal. At trial it was concluded that 
plaintiff did not have fixed term contract of employment, but that he was dismissed and was 
entitled to two months' notice of termination. Plaintiff was awarded damages of $13,520 plus 
pre-judgment interest, which were within monetary jurisdiction of Small Claim Court. Parties 







CFA had not been produced 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Issue regarding CFA was that it had not been produced and defendants argue that this is 
“essential evidence” lacking regarding the costs equation. 
Outcome Held: Plaintiff awarded partial indemnity costs of the trial (fixed at $88,450.98 – inclusive of 
disbursements and HST + $3,500 for costs of the motion) 
 
“Counsel have not directed my attention to any case in which the disclosure of 
a contingency fee agreement has been held to be a pre-requisite of a plaintiff's entitlement to 
recover partial indemnity costs of a proceeding. In the circumstances, the fact that the plaintiff 
had a contingency fee agreement with his lawyers is not a sufficient reason for not awarding 
him costs in this case.” (para 17) 
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IV.  Estates/Trusts 
 
Krentz Estate V. Krentz (2011 ONSC 1653) 
2011 CarswellOnt 1651, 2011 ONSC 1653, [2011] O.J. No. 1124, 199 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1025, 66 E.T.R. (3d) 132 
Judge/s Then: Turnbull J. 
Quick Facts "Roman Krentz (Roman) must have been a wise man. He recognized that appointing one or 
more of his four children to administer his estate would widen the existing estrangement 
among his children... When the Trustees moved to pass the accounts of the estate, a series of 
simmering issues bubbled to the surface." 
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
N/A - See "Contingency Fee Agreement" section 
Contingency Fee 
Agreement 
The Judge in this case was merely analogizing contingency fee retainers to a trustee of an 
estate, to decide what would be required of an estate trustee: "In recent years, the legislature 
has had to deal with an analogous situation with respect to contingency fees in various forms of 
civil actions, including class actions and personal injury claims. Strict requirements to validate 
such agreements have been included in relatively recent amendments to the regulations enacted 
under the Solicitors' Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S. 15. ... Unfortunately, similar provisions have not 
been included in the Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.T. 23 to deal with situations where the 
solicitor will have a "contingent" interest in the estate. Compensation for a lawyer who is 
counsel and a Trustee is notionally similar to the lawyer acting on a contingency fee retainer in 
that ..." 
 
Mcpeake V. Cadesky And Associates (2013 ONSC 6237) 
2013 CarswellOnt 14926, 2013 ONSC 6327, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 360 
Quick Facts Action related to allegations of professional negligence against lawyer and firm of chartered 
accountants related to formation and constitution of family trust for plaintiff. In 2006, parties 
reached agreement that plaintiff would issue notice of action and then adjourn action sine die. 
Plaintiff's lawyer obtained different order for extension to February 2007 to serve and file 
statement of claim. Plaintiff's lawyer still understood that action was suspended. In 2007, 
action was administratively dismissed for delay but plaintiff's lawyer did not become aware 
that action had been dismissed until 2011. Plaintiff brought motion to reinstate action. 
(Motion was granted.) 
Summary Two mentions of CFA: "The withdrawal of funding meant that McPeake would have damages 
regardless of the outcome, as indicated above (in the form of either increased taxes or 
contingency fee)… It appears as if neither the Tax Court proceeding nor the rectification 
application had been started by the time Dawe's client decided to stop funding Rachert in June 
2007. On July 12, 2007, Rachert wrote again to the Defendants stating that McPeake had 
retained him on a contingency fee basis and that his fees would form part of the damages 




Vitale V. Martin (2014 ONSC 2396) 




Date Heard: February 18-21, 24-28; April 2, 4, 2014 
Judgment: April 16, 2014 
Parties Myrna Winnifred Vitale, Applicant 
Joanne Martin, Estate Trustee of the Estate of Salvatore Vitale and in her Personal capacity, 
Filippo Vitale and Giuseppina Vitale, Respondents 
Counsel A. Saji, for Applicant / Respondent 
Joanne Martin, Estate Trustee of the Estate of Salvatore Vitale, Respondent, for herself 
Filippo Vitale, Giuseppia Vitale, Respondents, for themselves 
J. Webster, for A. Saji 
Judge/s Peter B. Hambly J. 
Quick Facts Wife was married to deceased. There were two major assets in deceased's estate, which were 
his home and RSP's as well as life insurance. Subject to general term permitting sale of assets 
to pay debts, deceased left house to wife and her children. Wife brought application for 
dependant's relief under Succession Law Reform Act. Estate brought application for 
directions, including order for sale of house to pay debts and income tax on RSP. Following 
mediation, parties allegedly entered into settlement, with wife agreeing to pay estate $95,000 
in return for title to house, which would be transferred to wife subject to current mortgage. 








Details of CFA not given beyond: “Mr. Saji has acted for Myrna without charging her 
anything with the expectation of taking his fees out of whatever she may receive in these 
proceedings” (para 33) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Main issue in case was whether or not parties entered into a settlement agreement. And, 
flowing from that, what legal fees are available to Mr. Saji. 
Outcome Held: Legal fees issues deferred to assessment officer, but with the following statement: 
“I would not think that Mr. Saji would be entitled to any fees from Myrna for his work at this 
trial since he accepted a retainer to take a case to trial that I have found had already been 
settled. I leave that to whatever Mr. Saji can work out with his client and to the assessment 
officer.” (para 35) “This case is an illustration of the perils of contingency fees because the 
lawyer has a financial interest in the outcome of the case.” (para 34)  
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Spiteri Estate V. Canada (Attorney General) 
2014 CarswellOnt 14831, 2014 ONSC 6167, 246 A.C.W.S. (3d) 769 
 
  
Date Heard: October 6, 2014 
Judgment: October 23, 2014 
Parties Christopher Spiteri, as Estate Trustee of the Estate of Tessa Spiteri et. al., Plaintiffs 
The Attorney General of Canada et. al., Defendants 
Counsel C. Katie Black, for Plaintiffs 
Miriam Vale Peters, for Defendant, Hay 
Agnieszka Zagorska, for Defendant, Attorney General of Canada 
Judge/s Master MacLeod 
Quick Facts Deceased purported to change beneficiary of employer pension from ex-husband to mother, 
for benefit of her children. Unbeknownst to deceased, employer rejected her change of 
beneficiary form. After deceased's death, death benefit was paid to ex-husband, who refused 
to pay it to deceased's estate or children. Estate trustee brought action against employer and 
ex-husband. Estate’s counsel was retained on a CFA (Caza Saikaley LLP). Action was settled 
on terms discontinuing action against ex-husband without costs and that employer would pay 




Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c. C.43, s 131. 






 20% of recovery in the event of a successful outcome 
 disbursements and applicable HST to be paid on an ongoing basis 
 in the event the retainer terminated by the client prior to resolution of the claim, then 
hourly rates apply, which are “contingency rates”, higher than the firm’s normal 
hourly rates to account for risk of contingency fee work 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
What is the relevance of the actual fee charged to the client pursuant to the CFA to the 
appropriate amount to be paid by the defendant Attorney General to the plaintiff estate as 
costs award? 
Outcome Held: Estate’s motion granted. Ex-husband’s motion dismissed. 
It would not be appropriate to use 60% of the "contingency rate” because it incorporates a risk 
premium that is not relevant here, and is only provided for in the CFA for when the client 
terminate their counsel’s services. “I fix the amount to be paid by the Attorney General as 
partial indemnity costs at $49,162.11 inclusive of HST and disbursements. There will be no 
costs of the motion.” (para 70) 
Followed:  Boucher v. Public Accountants Council (Ontario) (2004) (Ont CA);  McLean v. 
Knox (2012) (Ont SCJ);  Moore v. Getahun (2014) (Ont SCJ);  Walker v. Ritchie (2006 SCC 
45) 
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V.  Other /Unclear 
 
Sun V Pomes (2012 Onsc 3031) – Motion To Extend Time For Appeal  
– see (2013 ONSC 508) below 
2012 CarswellOnt 6342, 2012 ONSC 3031 
Date Heard: May 22, 2012 
Judgment: May 23, 2012 
Parties Jia Ke Sun (plaintiff), Moving Party 
Dr. Regis Pomes and Hospital for Sick Children, Altaf M. Khan, Respondent on Motion 
Counsel Jia Ke Sun, for himself  
No one for Altaf M. Khan  
Judge/s Aston J. 
Quick Facts Order was made in the Superior Court of Justice proceeding in which Dr. Sun is the plaintiff 
and Dr. Pomes and the Hospital for Sick Children are named as defendants, but the order in 
question relates to a dispute between Dr. Sun and his former solicitor Altaf Khan. When Dr. 
Sun brought a motion to add a defendant in the Superior Court of Justice proceeding, solicitor 
Khan brought a motion the same day to be removed as Dr. Sun's solicitor of record. 
Dr. Sun disputed provision requiring law firm acting for defendant to reissue cheque drawn in 
favour of plaintiff and ordering that new cheque be drawn in favour of lawyer. Order required 
Sun to pay additional $390 to lawyer to receive delivery of file. Order required court file to be 
charged for solicitor's lien for one-third amount against any settlement of judgment. Plaintiff 
brought motion to extend time for appealing and for leave to appeal. Plaintiff claimed plaintiff 
never received motion material from lawyer until day in court and copy of notice of motion 
and supporting material were handed to plaintiff after decision was made. Plaintiff was not 
asked for submissions on any of issues now challenged. 
(unclear what the nature of the underlying claim is.)  
Statute & Rules 
Considered 
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 19(1)(a)  
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 28.1(8), 28.1(12) 




NA – see  Sun v Pomes (2013 ONSC 508) chart below 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
NA – see  Sun v Pomes (2013 ONSC 508) chart below 
Aston J. lacked jurisdiction to set-aside but stated… “ I have reviewed the motion record of 
Mr. Khan. It is quite obvious on its face that there is nothing contained in that record to 
establish a contingency fee agreement that would be enforceable under the Solicitors Act. In 
particular, the prescribed regulations for form, content and enforceability found in Ontario 
Regulation 195/04 "contingency fee agreements", authorized and promulgated pursuant to s. 
28.1(12) of the Solicitors Act, have not been met. Furthermore, the specific section of 
the Solicitors Act that Mr. Khan was trying to identify for Justice Allen, s. 28.1(8), only 
authorizes judicial approval of contingency fee agreements "arising as a result of an award of 
costs" (as is the case here) on a joint application to a judge by the solicitor and the client. A 
solicitor cannot unilaterally apply for approval. In short, s. 28.1(8) — incorrectly cited as s. 
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Sun V Pomes (2013 ONSC 508)  
– see other ONSC decision above 
2013 CarswellOnt 999, 2013 ONSC 508, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 266 
 
  
28(8)(b) in the handwritten endorsement — was a red herring.” (para 12) 
Outcome Held: Order granted 
“(i) extending the time for perfection of Dr. Sun's appeal by 60 days from today's date, if 
necessary; and 
(ii) granting leave to appeal paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the order of Allen J. dated November 21, 
2011, if necessary.” (para 14) 
Date Heard: January 21, 2013 
Judgment: January 21, 2013 
Parties Jia Ke Sun (plaintiff), Appellant 
Dr. Regis Pomes and Hospital for Sick Children, Altaf M. Khan, Defendants 
Counsel Jia Ke Sun, for himself  
Mr. Khan, also for himself  
Judge/s Herman J., Lederer J., Ray J. 
Quick Facts Order was made requiring Bennett Jones, the lawyers acting for the defendants in the main 
action, to pay the $28,815 costs award to Mr. Khan instead of to Dr. Sun. The order also 
required Dr. Sun to pay $390 to Mr. Khan to receive the solicitor's file and created a lien in 
Mr. Khan's favour for one-third of any future settlement or judgment. Individual plaintiff (Mr. 
Sun) appealed.  
See more detail in ‘Quick Facts’ in Sun v Pomes (2012 ONSC 3031) above. 
 
(unclear what the nature of the underlying claim is.)  
Statute & Rules 
Considered 




See ‘Quick Facts’ 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. Individual defendant (Mr. Khan), admittedly, failed to serve motion in accordance with 
Solicitors Act.  
B. Individual defendant also failed to make joint application for approval of CFA. 
C. And, Dr. Sun did not have an opportunity to address the issues at the hearing of the motion. 
Outcome Held: Appeal allowed with costs awarded to Dr. Sun in the amount of $250 
Any payments made to individual defendant to be paid to plaintiff. 
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Cookish V. Paul Lee Associates Professional Corp. (2013 ONCA 278)  
– see additional reasons in (2013 ONCA 425) below 
2013 CarswellOnt 5070, 2013 ONCA 278, [2013] O.J. No. 1947, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1181, 305 O.A.C. 359, 39 
C.P.C. (7th) 227 
Date Heard: January 14, 2013 
Judgment: April 30, 2013 
Parties Paul Lee Associates Professional Corporation (respondent), Appellant 
Kathleen Cookish (applicant), Respondent 
Counsel Tanya A. Pagliaroli, for Appellant 
David S. Wilson, for Respondent 
Judge/s Doherty, Laskin, Blair JJ.A. 
Quick Facts Respondent client was represented by appellant law firm for long-term disability claim. Client 
signed what lawyer called standard contingency fee agreement, after first meeting with firm. 
Firm negotiated settlement of claim for client.  11 months after settlement, client informed 
law firm that she would seek accounting of bill. Client did not indicate issue with nature of 
retainer as contingency fee, but only challenged amount. On this understanding, firm 
consented to order requiring hearing with assessment officer (upon order by Corrick J. of the 
Superior Court). At assessment, new counsel for client raised issue of validity of retainer, to 
which firm responded that matter should be referred to Superior Court. Over objections of 
client, assessment officer adjourned hearing. Firm moved to have consent order set aside, but 
was unsuccessful. Firm appealed from consent order and failure to set order aside. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 90, 90(3) 
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, 3, 3(a), 4, 4(1), 6, 6(4), 6(5), 11, 18, 23, 24, 26-28, 28.1, 
30 





Appellant firm negotiated settlement for respondent for a total settlement of $285,000 + 
$44,000 in costs and disbursements. Respondent received a net recovery of $237, 120, after 
deduction of the retainer amount. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Was the parties’ agreement a CFA? Can an assessment officer make that 
determination? At the heart of the dispute was a difference of opinion over the validity of the 
retainer agreement as a valid CFA. Appellant argued that assessment officer did not have 
jurisdiction to deal with the matter given this added layer of difficulty, needed to go to a judge 
instead (per s. 28.1 of the Solicitors Act). 
Outcome Held: Appeal allowed. Orders of motion judge and Corrick J. set-aside. Matter remitted to a 
judge of the Superior Court to hear the application for assessment. Costs awarded to appellant.  
Legislation placed matter of review in power of judge, not assessment officer, who has more 
limited powers. Although not a strict requirement, it was preferable that a judge determine the 
initial issues over what kind of agreement the retainer was, and refer matters of quantum to 
assessment officer afterwards if necessary. Issues of fairness and reasonableness 
of agreement were within knowledge of judge, more so than that of assessment officer. 




Cookish V. Paul Lee Associates Professional Corp. (2013 ONCA 425) 
 – additional reasons to (2013 ONCA 278) – see above 
2013 CarswellOnt 8517, 2013 ONCA 425, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 352 
 
  
Date Heard: January 14, 2013 
Judgment: June 21, 2013 
Parties Kathleen Cookish (applicant), Respondent 
Paul Lee Associates Professional Corporation (respondent), Appellant 
Counsel Tanya A. Pagliaroli, for Appellant 
David S. Wilson, for Respondent 
Judge/s H. Doherty J.A., John Laskin J.A., R.A. Blair J.A. 
Quick Facts Client retained law firm pursuant to CFA. Law firm negotiated settlement of claim for client, 
who subsequently sought accounting of bill. Law firm consented to order requiring 
assessment hearing. Client's new counsel raised issue of validity of retainer. Assessment 
officer adjourned hearing. Law firm's motion to have consent order set aside was 
unsuccessful. Appeal by law firm was allowed 










Outcome “After considering the submissions, we fix costs of the appeal, including costs of the previous 
motion to quash, in favour of the appellant in the amount of $10,000 inclusive of 
disbursements and all applicable taxes… We confirm as well that, since the consent order of 
Corrick J. was set aside, including the costs order made by her against the appellant, any 
monies paid on account of that costs award must be returned.” (paras 3-4) 
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Miller, Canfield, Paddock And Stone Llp V. Bdo Dunwoody Llp (2015 ONSC 4806)  
– see ONCA decision below 
2015 CarswellOnt 16539, 2015 ONSC 4806, 260 A.C.W.S. (3d) 168 
Date Heard: July 27, 2015 
Judgment: August 7, 2015 
Parties Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone LLP, Plaintiff 
BDO Dunwoody LLP, Defendant 
Counsel Myron W. Shulgan, Q.C., for Plaintiff 
James Thomson, for Defendant 
Judge/s Pamela L. Hebner J. 
Quick Facts Two members of defendant accounting and tax firm were charged with criminal offences. 
Charges were dismissed at preliminary hearing. Defendant funded cost of defence, exceeding 
$3 million. Defendant retained plaintiff law firm to bring action against Crown and others, 
seeking damages for wrongful prosecution. Parties entered into CFA. Defendant's action, 
alleging various causes of action was dismissed on summary judgment, except for claim for 
misfeasance in public office. Plaintiff did not have counsel capable of prosecuting appeal and 
recommended outside counsel. Parties disagreed over whether outside counsel's fees were 
disbursement payable by defendant or were plaintiff's responsibility to cover. Appeal was 
substantially successful, and defendants' claims were resurrected. Plaintiff submitted account 
to defendant in amount of $427,891.57. When account was not paid, plaintiff commenced 
action. Defendant brought motion for summary judgment dismissing action. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 




Retainer agreement (CFA) struck between BDO and MCPS in April 2007 provided for: 
 25% contingency fee of gross recovery of any damages, costs or re-judgement interest 
recovered 
 interim billing of  client for disbursements in excess of $5,000, “from time to time” 
CFA included provision stating that client could have fee set-out in agreement  reviewed by 
judge, and for the client’s right to terminate services, but that client would be liable to pay for 
services up until that point on based-on time spent on the case. 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. Can the legal fees for the appeal be charged to BDO as "disbursements" within the 
meaning of the CFA? 
B. Was the CFA breached by MCPS? (I.e. The CFA requires MCPS to "act on our behalf in 
any and all proceedings against the informants, the DOJ, the CRA and their servants, agents 
and employees ...". MCPS suggests that "proceedings" does not include appeals. 
C. Did the breach of the agreement amount to repudiation and, if so, what options were 
available to BDO? 
D. Is BDO obligated to pay anything to MCPS on account of fees and disbursements? 
Outcome Held: Motion granted. Action dismissed. 
A. “In my view, MCPS cannot refer any of the work it agreed to do under the 
retainer agreement with BDO to another firm, then pay that firm as a disbursement. To 
include fees for any step as a disbursement would be inconsistent with the [CFA] reached 




B. The appeal is a breach of the retainer agreement. “Proceedings” does include appeals. 
C. “the breach of contract on the part of MCPS was a substantial breach such as would justify 
future non-performance of BDO's obligations. The breach constituted a repudiation of 
the [CFA] on the part of MCPS.” (para 27) 
D. No. “BDO is not obligated to pay anything to MCPS on account of fees and disbursements 
as MCPS, as the repudiating party cannot enforce any of the terms of the agreement against 
BDO.” (para 36) 
Followed:  Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp.[1999] 3 SCR 423;  
968703 Ontario Ltd. v. Vernon (2002) (Ont CA) 
 224 
Miller, Canfield, Paddock And Stone, Llp V. Bdo Dunwoody Llp (2016 ONCA 281)  
– see ONSC decision above 
2016 CarswellOnt 5970, 2016 ONCA 281 
 
Date Heard: April 15, 2016 
Judgment: April 21, 2016 
Parties Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, LLP (plaintiff), Appellant 
BDO Dunwoody LLP (defendant), Respondent 
Counsel Myron W. Shulgan, for Appellant 
James P. Thomson, for Respondent 
Judge/s John Laskin J.A., C.W. Hourigan J.A., David Brown J.A. 
Quick Facts Appellant law firm acted for respondent company (BDO) under a CFA. CFA allowed for firm 
to demand fees for services provided, if retainer was terminated. BDO terminated retainer, 
and firm delivered its account to company.  BDO took the position that the Law Firm's refusal 
to accept responsibility for appeal counsel's fees amounted to a repudiation of the CFA 
(retainer).  On June 19, 2012, BDO wrote the Law Firm to advise that BDO accepted the 
repudiation and directed the Law Firm not to take any further steps on behalf of BDO. BDO 
brought motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Law Firm's action to collect its fees. 
Motion was granted. Law firm appealed 






Under the CFA (dated April 30, 2007): 
 Law Firm agreed to act on behalf of BDO "in any and all proceedings" BDO intended 
to commence against certain defendants 
 contained a provision entitled "Termination of Legal Services," which provided that 
the client, BDO, had the "right, with or without cause, to cancel" the Law Firm's 
services 
 In that event, BDO agreed it would be "responsible to protect and pay the value of all 
services to date," and the retainer agreement specified how the value of services 
would be calculated. 
On April 15, 2014, the Law Firm rendered an invoice to BDO in the amount of $427,891.57 
for the value of the services rendered to the date of termination of the retainer agreement. (no 
dispute about the amount) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
Whether or not the Law Firm’s refusal to accept responsibility for appeal counsel's fees 
amounted to a repudiation of the CFA. 
Outcome Held: Appeal allowed. Costs awarded to the Law Firm in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of 
disbursements and HST, and its costs of the motion below in the amount of $20,000, plus 
disbursements and HST. 
“…the motion judge did not apply the proper principle of law to her interpretation of that 
contract. A repudiatory breach of a contract does not, in itself, bring an end to a contract. 
Rather, it confers upon the innocent party, such as BDO, the right of election to treat the 
contract at an end.” (para 6) “We grant judgment in favour of the Law Firm in the amount of 
$427,891.57, together with pre-judgment interest.” (para 8) 
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Guest V. Fletcher (2016 ONSC 2623) 
2016 CarswellOnt 6035, 2016 ONSC 2623 
 
Date Heard: March 11, 2016 
Judgment: April 20, 2016 
Parties Christopher Stephen Guest, Appellant 
Beverley Evelyn Fletcher and Michael Patrick Fletcher, Defendants 
Counsel Appellant, for himself 
Eric Lavictoire, for Defendants 
Judge/s R. Smith J. 
Quick Facts The appellant, Christopher Guest is a lawyer who seeks leave to appeal the decision of 
Laliberté J. dismissing his claim for costs against his former clients. The motion judge 
exercised his discretion and refused to award Mr. Guest any costs because he found that he 
purchased his clients' interest in their action, which breached section 28 of the Solicitors' Act, 
s. 4. He found that the agreement whereby Mr. Guest acquired his clients' right to claim for 
damages against the vendors, in return for abandoning his claim against them for fees of 
approximately $15,000, was void ab initio. Mr Guest made motion for leave to appeal. 
Statute/Rules 
Considered 
Solicitors' Act, 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, S. 4, s 28 
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R 62.04(4) -- sets out the grounds on which 
leave to appeal may be granted 
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, ss 1, 2(10), 3.1, 4(4) 




Mr. Guest submits that his unsigned retainer agreement with the Fletchers qualifies as a CFA 
and allowed him to recover 100% of the amount they recovered in their cause of action 
against the Vendors as legal fees,  in return for foregoing his claim against them for fees of 
$15,000. 
Mr. Guest submitted that he sent letters to the Fletchers but acknowledged that his clients 
never signed an agreement with him containing any such terms. (para 27) 
Issue/s with 
Agreement 
A. Can a lawyer acquire a right of subrogation in his or her clients' action (and receive 100% 
of the damages recovered therefrom as legal fees)? 
B. Is this agreement between Guest and his clients an illegal CFA? 
C. Is this agreement prohibited by s. 28 of the Solicitors' Act? 
Outcome Held: Motion for leave to appeal dismissed. 
A.  Mr. Guest is not an insurer as defined under the Insurance Act and he has not made any 
payment to his clients to indemnify them for a loss they suffered. As a result, Guest could not 
acquire any right of subrogation to bring an action in the name of his clients where he is not 
an insurer' but rather their lawyer, and where he never indemnified the Fletchers for any 
damages suffered. 
B. Agreement and minutes of settlement between Guest and his clients is not a CFA. It does 
not comply with requirement under the CFA Regulation, as it was unsigned, it did not clearly 
state it was a CFA, and the client no longer retained rights to make “critical decisions 
regarding the conduct of the matter”—i.e. the right not to proceed with the claim or to 
discontinue it (in contravention of ss. 1, 2(10), 3.1, 4(4)). 
C. Yes. “Whether the agreement was illegal or void ab initio was not essential to exercise of 
his discretion. I find that there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's 
decision to dismiss Mr. Guest's claim for costs as being very unfair and in breach of s. 28…” 
(para 32) 




Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement31 32 33 
[Firm Name34, Address35, Telephone Number36, Email] 
 
[Date]37 
[Client Name] 38 
[Client Address]39 
[Client Telephone Number]40 
 
Re: Accident of [date of accident]  
Part 1: Our Services 
Legal services covered by this contract 
 
[Firm Name and/or Lawyer Name] is being retained by the client to provide the following services 
and to represent the client in respect to injuries, losses and damages resulting from a [type of accident] 
which occurred on or about [date].41 
 
                                                     
31  Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, “1(1)(a) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition 
to being in writing, a contingency fee agreement, (a) shall be entitled "Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement"… 
32 Solicitors Act, s.28.1(1) “A solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement with a client in accordance 
with this section.” 
33 Solicitors Act, s.28.1(4) “A contingency fee agreement shall be in writing.” 
34 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1 “2. A solicitor who is a party to a contingency fee 
agreement shall ensure that the agreement includes the following: 1. The name, address and telephone number 
of the solicitor and of the client.” 
35 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1 
36 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1 
37 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04 “1(1)(b) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition to being 
in writing, a contingency fee agreement,… (b) shall be dated; and… 
38 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1 
39 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1 
40 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1 
41 s.2.2 A statement of the basic type and nature of the matter in respect of which the solicitor is providing 
services to the client.” 
 227 
Your role as client 
You understand the importance of giving us all the facts and of being totally honest with us. We can 
only do our best job if we have your trust and are fully informed. 
In particular, we ask you to give us all information you have, or have access to, which could help us in 
working on your lawsuit. We need copies of all letters and documents relating to the accident; medical 
reports; physiotherapy records; income tax records; paycheque stubs; and medical, drug, and parking 
receipts. If necessary, we will ask you to give us written authorization to obtain this information from 
other parties. 
You retain the right to make all critical decisions regarding the conduct of your claim.42 
Sole Representation 
We will be representing solely you in this matter. Our representation of you does not include the 
representation of related persons or entities, such as family members; friends; the individuals or entities 
that are shareholders, directors or officers of a corporation, its parent, subsidiaries or affiliates; partners 
of a partnership or joint venture; or members of a trade association or other organization. In acting for 
you, we are not acting for or taking on any responsibilities, obligations or duties to any such related 
persons or entities and no lawyer-client or other fiduciary relationship exists between us and any such 
related persons or entities. 
 
[Multiple Clients – Optional in the alternative if not sole representation] 
 
Representing Multiple Clients with Apparent Same Interest (Joint Representation) 
 
As you know the following [party/parties] are involved with you in this matter and you and they have 




We have discussed with you the principles we must follow of undivided loyalty. No information 
received from one of you as a part of the joint representation can be treated as confidential as between 
all of you. If we should receive information from one of you which we are instructed to keep 
confidential as between all of you, we will have to stop acting for all of you. 
We have discussed these matters with you and have concluded that, at least at present, each of your 
individual interests in this matter are the same. The areas in which these individual interests may 




                                                     
42 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.10 “A statement that informs the client that the client retains 
the right to make all critical decisions regarding the conduct of the matter.” 
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If we agree to act for one of you in a matter separate from this one, and we receive confidential 
information from that separate matter that is relevant to this matter, and the client in that separate matter 
wishes to keep it confidential, then 
 
[Lawyer when drafting agreement must choose (i) or (ii) following] 
 
(i) the information must not be disclosed to the other in this matter. This means we must withdraw 




(ii) the information must be disclosed to each of you in this matter and we may continue to act jointly 
for both of you. 
 
Other conflicts may arise that cannot as yet be foreseen. A conflict of interest occurs when what is best 
for one of our clients somehow is not best for or hurts another of the firm’s clients. At the present time 
we can represent all of you. However, if it later becomes apparent that there is a conflict, we confirm 
each of your instructions to attempt to resolve this conflict. If a successful resolution cannot be 
accomplished in a timely way or at all, or if our attempts to resolve the issue cause us ethical concerns, 
we will have to withdraw from representing all of you. 
 
[if applicable] We confirm your agreement that if a contentious issue between you and 
 
_______________ arises, we may continue to advise _______________________________ 
about the contentious matter and that I we will refer you to another lawyer or paralegal. 
Our billings will name and be sent to all of you and each client is responsible for payment of the entire 
amount. You will need to decide between you how our accounts will be divided. 
 
Part 2: Our Fees, Expenses, and Billing Arrangements 
Our fee is a percentage and contingent on a favourable settlement or trial outcome 
We have explained to you that you have the option of retaining a lawyer other than by a contingency 
fee agreement.43 
There are two main ways a lawyer can bill you:44 
                                                     
43 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(i) “A statement that indicates, i. that the client and the 
solicitor have discussed options for retaining the solicitor other than by way of a contingency fee agreement, 
including retaining the solicitor by way of an hourly-rate retainer” 
44 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(i) 
ithout court approval, and thus le. the client must prove that the ch were quite tever way the lawye nts, and the 
court228228228228228228228228 
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Option 1 — by charging an hourly fee for work done; 
Option 2 — by charging a percentage of the amount of money awarded in a settlement or 
court judgment; or, alternatively, by accepting court ordered costs as the fee.45 
We have explained that hourly rates may vary among lawyers and that you can speak to other lawyers 
to compare rates.46 
You have asked us to charge you fees based on a percentage of the amount of money awarded to you in 
a settlement or court judgment, or by accepting court ordered costs as the fee, whichever is greater 
(option 2). We agree.47 
You acknowledge and understand that all the usual protections and controls on retainers between a 
lawyer and client, as defined by the Law Society of Upper Canada and the common law, apply to this 
contingency fee agreement.48 
The disadvantage of choosing a percentage arrangement (option 2) is that you may end up paying us 
more in legal fees than if we were to charge you an hourly fee for work done (option 1). This could 
happen if we are fortunate in favourably settling your lawsuit quickly. 
There are also advantages to choosing a percentage fee. First, if we cannot settle your case or if you lose at trial, 
then you would only have to pay our disbursements. You would not have to pay us any fees. Second, if we go 
to trial and win, the percentage fee may be less than an hourly fee if we have spent a significant amount of time 
on the trial. 
The contingency fee is to be paid to us contingent on a settlement or trial verdict.49 
Percentage based on work done 
Our percentage fee will be less if your claim is settled than if it goes to trial. If it is settled, the fee will 
depend on the stage at which the lawsuit is settled. Our percentage fee will be: 
 
1. [___, for example, 20]% of the damages awarded if we settle your claim before the 
examination for discovery (Steps in a Lawsuit explains this step) 
2.  [___, for example, 25]% of the damages awarded if we settle your claim during or after the 
examination for discovery and at least 90 days before trial  
3. [___, for example, 30]% of the damages awarded if we settle your claim less than 90 days 
before trial or during trial, but before the court judgment  
                                                     
45 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.5. “A statement that sets out the method by which the fee is 
to be determined…” 
46 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(ii) “that the client has been advised that hourly rates may 
vary among solicitors and that the client can speak with other solicitors to compare rates,” 
47 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(iii). “that the client has chosen to retain the solicitor by 
way of a contingency fee agreement, and” 
48 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(iv) “that the client understands that all usual protections 
and controls on retainers between a solicitor and client, as defined by the Law Society of Upper Canada and the 
common law, apply to the contingency fee agreement.” 
49 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.4 “A statement that explains the contingency upon which the fee is to 
be paid to the solicitor.” 
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4. [___, for example, 33-1/3]% of the damages awarded if your claim does not settle and is 
decided by a trial. 
 
For the purposes of calculating our percentage fee, any amount awarded in respect of costs and 
disbursements is excluded.50 
 
You understand that we will not recover more in fees than you recover in damages or receive through a 
settlement.51 
Costs 
If we successfully settle your claim or win at trial, we will seek a sum of money called costs from the 
Defendant(s). If our fee is calculated as a percentage of the settlement or court judgment, you will 
receive the full amount of these costs since these costs are not included in the calculation.52 
You understand that unless ordered otherwise by a judge53, you are entitled to receive any costs 
contribution or awarded to you, on a partial or substantial indemnity scale.54 55 
If, on the other hand, you are liable to pay costs, you are responsible for paying any costs contribution 
or award, on a partial or substantial indemnity scale.56 
                                                     
50 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.5 “… and, if the method of determination is as a percentage 
of the amount recovered, a statement that explains that for the purpose of calculating the fee the amount of 
recovery excludes any amount awarded or agreed to that is separately specified as being in respect of costs and 
disbursements.” 
51 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.3.1 “If the client is a plaintiff, a statement that the solicitor 
shall not recover more in fees than the client recovers as damages or receives by way of settlement.” 
52 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.5 “… and, if the method of determination is as a percentage 
of the amount recovered, a statement that explains that for the purpose of calculating the fee the amount of 
recovery excludes any amount awarded or agreed to that is separately specified as being in respect of costs and 
disbursements.” 
53 Solicitors Act, s.28.1(9) A contingency fee agreement that is subject to approval under subsection (6) or (8) is 
not enforceable unless it is so approved. 
54 Solicitors Act, s.28.1(8) A contingency fee agreement shall not include in the fee payable to the solicitor, in 
addition to the fee payable under the agreement, any amount arising as a result of an award of costs or costs 
obtained as part of a settlement, unless, 
(a) the solicitor and client jointly apply to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice for approval to include the 
costs or a proportion of the costs in the contingency fee agreement because of exceptional circumstances; and 
(b) the judge is satisfied that exceptional circumstances apply and approves the inclusion of the costs or a 
proportion of them. 
55 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.3.3(i) “A statement that explains costs and the awarding of 
costs and that indicates, i. that, unless otherwise ordered by a judge, a client is entitled to receive any costs 
contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if the client is the party 
entitled to costs, and…” 
56 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.3.3(ii) “that a client is responsible for paying any costs 
contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if the client is the party liable 
to pay costs.” 
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Disbursements57 
In addition to our percentage fee or court-ordered costs as our fee, you agree to pay all disbursements, 
even if we cannot settle your claim or lose at trial. 
Minor disbursements 
We will charge you for the minor ongoing disbursements that we have to pay. Some of these disbursements 
are: long distance telephone calls; photocopying costs; costs to deliver documents to court or the other lawyers; 
faxes; court filing fees (which the court charges to keep an official record of court documents); and, necessary 
land or company registry searches (for example, to find out the proper name of the defendant). 
If we successfully settle your claim or win at trial, the settlement or court judgment most likely will require 
the Defendant(s) to reimburse you for some of these disbursements. 
Major disbursements 
We may have to hire other people such as court reporters, expert witnesses, accountants, and property 
appraisers to help us with your lawsuit. If we need to hire these people, we will first discuss the matter 
with you. We usually ask you to pay these major disbursements in advance, or we will have the bill sent 
directly to you to pay. Again, please pay these bills within 30 days. After 30 days we will begin 
charging interest at [XX]% per annum. 
Also, as with the minor disbursements, if we successfully settle your claim or win at trial, the settlement 
or court judgment most likely will require the Defendant(s) to pay you costs to reimburse you for some 
of these disbursements. 
 
First Charge 
We have first charge on any funds received in regards to disbursements or taxes as a result of a 
judgment or settlement of the claim, subject to section 47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998. 
HST 
In addition to our legal fees and disbursements, you agree to pay any Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) that 
we must charge you. 
Example of Contingency Fee Calculation58 
To illustrate how our percentage will be determined, we offer the following sample calculation. A claim 
settles before examinations for discovery for the following amounts paid as a lump sum: 
 
                                                     
57 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.3.2 “A statement in respect of disbursements and taxes, 
including the GST payable on the solicitor's fees, that indicates, i. whether the client is responsible for the 
payment of disbursements or taxes and, if the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements, a general 
description of disbursements likely to be incurred, other than relatively minor disbursements, and ii. that if the 
client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and the solicitor pays the disbursements or taxes 
during the course of the matter, the solicitor is entitled to be reimbursed for those payments, subject to section 
47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998 (legal aid charge against recovery), as a first charge on any funds 
received as a result of a judgment or settlement of the matter.” 






HST (on costs and disbursements) $ 2,600.00 
Total (lump sum payment from defendant) $122,600.00 
 
Since the claim settled before examinations for discovery, our fee would be 20% of the damages 
including interest awarded to the client. The client receives the total amount of the costs. The invoice 
delivered to the client would look like this: 
 
Fee of 20% x $100,000.00 damages $ 20,000.00 
Disbursements (reimbursed by defendants) $ 10,000.00 
Other Disbursements (not paid by defendants) $ 300.00 
HST (on fee and disbursements totaling $30,300) $ 3,939.00 
Sub-total $34,239.00  
 
The client would then receive ($122,600.00 - $34,239.00 =) $88,361.00 
You have the right to ask the Superior Court of Justice to review and approve our bill if payment of fees 
and disbursements is by way of this contingency agreement. Should you wish to do so, you may apply 
to the Superior Court of Justice for an assessment of the bill within six months of its delivery.59 
Billing Arrangements 
You agree and direct that all funds claimed by us for legal fees, costs, taxes and disbursements shall be 
paid to us in trust from any judgment or settlement money. We will then deduct our fee, any HST, and 
any unpaid disbursements, and give you the balance.60 
Structured Settlements 
Instead of a lump sum payment, some claims are paid out by way of a structured settlement. A 
structured settlement will pay you tax-free payments at set time intervals for a period of time. If your 
claim is paid out by way of a structured settlement, our contingency fee is calculated and paid in lump 
                                                     
59 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.8 “A statement that informs the client of their right to ask 
the Superior Court of Justice to review and approve of the solicitor's bill and that includes the applicable 
timelines for asking for the review.” 
60 s.3.4 “If the client is a plaintiff, a statement that indicates that the client agrees and directs that all funds 
claimed by the solicitor for legal fees, cost, taxes and disbursements shall be paid to the solicitor in trust from 
any judgment or settlement money.” 
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sum based on the total damages award at the time of settlement.61 
Part 3: Dealing with Each Other 
Ending the relationship 
By you 
You are free to end our services before your case is completed by writing us a letter or note. If you do, 
you agree to pay our disbursements and an hourly fee based on the actual time spent up to the date of 
ending those services.62 
Our hourly fee depends on which lawyer or assistant helps with the work. I will be the main lawyer 
responsible for your case, but some work may need to be done by a more senior lawyer, and other work 
can be done equally well by a more junior lawyer. There are also many services, such as gathering 
information and preparing routine documents, that our paralegal assistant is well qualified to perform. 
A paralegal works under the supervision of a lawyer, but may not give legal advice. Our paralegal can 
serve you at a lower cost than one of our lawyers can. 
If you end our relationship, our hourly fee will be based on these rates: 
My rate $[amount] per hour 
[senior lawyer’s] rate $[amount] per hour 
[junior lawyer’s] rate $[amount] per hour 
[paralegal’s] rate $[amount] per hour 
If a lawsuit has already commenced, you will take the appropriate steps under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure to file and serve a Notice of Change of Lawyers or a Notice of Intention to Act in Person. If 
you do not do so within 30 days, we will bring a motion to remove ourselves as lawyers of record and 
charge you a flat rate of $1,000.00. 
 
By us 
Subject to our obligations to you to maintain proper standards of professional conduct, we reserve the right 
to terminate our services to you for good reasons which include, but are not limited to: 
1. if you fail to cooperate with us in any reasonable request;  
2. if our continuing to act would be unethical or impractical; or  
3. did not pay our bills on time without making other arrangements for payment.  
Again, you agree to pay our disbursements and an hourly fee for our legal services up until the time we 
stopped acting for you. 
                                                     
61 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.7 “A statement that outlines how the contingency fee is calculated, if 
recovery is by way of a structured settlement.” 
62 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.9 “A statement that outlines when and how the client or the 
solicitor may terminate the contingency fee agreement, the consequences of the termination for each of them 
and the manner in which the solicitor's fee is to be determined in the event that the agreement is terminated.” 
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[If the client is a minor or person under disability include the following section: 
Minors or Persons under Disability 
If you are a party under disability as defined under the Rules of Civil Procedure, you, as represented by 
a litigation guardian, must have the contingency fee agreement reviewed by a judge before the 
agreement is finalized or as part of the motion or application for an approval of a settlement or a 
consent judgment under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The amount of the legal fees, costs, taxes and disbursements are subject to the approval of a judge when 
the judge reviews a settlement agreement or consent judgment under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Any money payable to a person under disability under an order or settlement shall be paid 
into court unless a judge orders otherwise under Rule 7.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.] 
Confidentiality 
As your lawyers, we have to share relevant information about your case with the Defendant(s) and the 
court. But unless we need to share this information as part of our work, all information you give us will 
be kept confidential between us. Your information will be collected, used and disclosed for the sole 
purpose of providing our services to you in accordance with our Privacy Policy. 
You confirm communication via the following is confidential and consent to me/our firm contacting 
you at: 
[client address]  
[client home number]  
[client cell number]  
[client email] 
No guarantee of success 
We will work with you towards your desired outcome. However, all legal actions are subject to many 
possible variables such as the demeanour and recollection of witnesses, the availability of substantiating 
documents and other evidence, and the evidence marshalled by the other side - all of which affect the 
decision of a judge or jury. Accordingly, we cannot guarantee that your desired result will in fact be 
achieved. For us to work towards your desired outcome, it will be necessary for you to abide by the 
terms described in this agreement. Remember that all lawsuits involve risks and uncertainties in the 
law, the facts, and the evidence. 
Part 4: Signing this Contract 
This contract contains the whole agreement between us about our relationship with each other and our 
legal fees and disbursements. It will not be changed unless we both agree and sign any changes. It will 
legally bind anyone such as heirs or legal representatives who replace either you or us, but it does not 
legally bind other lawyers who might act for you if you decide to end our relationship. 
If you want us to proceed on the basis described above, please sign both copies of this agreement in 
the space provided and return one copy to us in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. If there is 
anything you do not agree with, or if there is anything you would like to discuss before signing, please 


















                                                     
63 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04 “1(1)(c) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition 
to being in writing, a contingency fee agreement,… (c) shall be signed by the client and the solicitor with each 
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to being in writing, a contingency fee agreement,… (c) shall be signed by the client and the solicitor with each 
of their signatures being verified by a witness. 
65 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04 “1(1)(c) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition 
to being in writing, a contingency fee agreement,… (c) shall be signed by the client and the solicitor with each 
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